

***UNITED STATES – CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY
OFFSET ACT OF 2000:***

Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU

**Submission of the
United States of America**

April 23, 2003

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the *Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes* (“DSU”), Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico and Thailand (hereinafter referred to as the “complaining parties”)¹ have requested arbitration to determine the “reasonable period of time” for the United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”), adopted January 27, 2003, in *United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000*. After stating its intention to implement the DSB recommendations and rulings in a manner consistent with its WTO obligations, the United States was prepared to engage in discussions pursuant to Article 21.3(b) in an effort to reach agreement on the reasonable period of time for U.S. implementation. No such agreement was achieved.

2. Implementation will require legislative, as opposed to administrative, action. As discussed in more detail below, the United States intends to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB as promptly as it can, but anticipates that implementation will require no less than 15 months.

3. This reasonable period of time is based on the particular circumstances of this dispute, as will be discussed below. As a reference point, however, the United States notes that in previous arbitrations under Article 21.3(c) involving legislation alone, the reasonable period of time awarded has ranged from 10 to 15 months.²

¹ The United States’ participation in these proceedings is without prejudice to the U.S. position on what rights each complaining party has in its dispute, given the fact that only Canada requested adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body reports.

² *Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages* (“*Japan – Alcoholic Beverages*”), WT/DS8/15, WT/DS10/15, WT/DS11/13, Award of the Arbitrator circulated 14 February 1997 (15 months); *European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Banana Regime* (“*EC – Banana Regime*”), WT/DS27/15, Award of the Arbitrator circulated 7 January 1998 (15 1/4 months); *EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products*

(continued...)

II. FIFTEEN MONTHS IS A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS DISPUTE

A. The WTO Legal Framework

4. Under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, the arbitrator's role is limited to determining the reasonable period of time a Member has to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. In making this determination, the arbitrator should examine the particular circumstances of the dispute which may lengthen or shorten the amount of time reasonably needed by a Member to implement.

5. The most direct guidance for the arbitrator is found in Article 21.3(c) itself, which provides as a guideline that the reasonable period of time "should not exceed 15 months from the date of the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report." However, "that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular circumstances."

6. The particular circumstances relevant to the arbitrator's determination of the reasonable period of time are: the legal form of implementation (legislative or regulatory), the technical complexity of the necessary (legislative or regulatory) measures the Member must draft, adopt

² (...continued)

(*Hormones*) ("EC - *Hormones*"), WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13, Award of the Arbitrator circulated 29 May 1998 (15 months); *Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages* ("Korea - *Alcoholic Beverages*"), WT/DS75/16, WT/DS84/14, Award of the Arbitrator circulated 4 June 1999 (11 ½ months); *Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages*, WT/DS87/15, WT/DS110/14, Award of the Arbitrator circulated 23 May 2000 (over 14 months); *United States - Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act*, WT/DS160/12, Award of the Arbitrator circulated 15 January 2001 (12 months); *Canada - Term of Patent Protection*, WT/DS170/10, Award of the Arbitrator circulated 28 February 2001 (10 months); *United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916*, WT/DS136/11, WT/DS162/14, Award of the Arbitrator circulated 28 February 2001 (10 months); *Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products*, WT/DS207/13, Award of the Arbitrator circulated 17 March 2003 (14 months).

and implement, and the period of time in which the implementing Member can achieve the proposed legal form of implementation in accordance with its system of government.³

7. In this dispute, both the legal form of implementation and the technical complexity of the necessary measures require a “reasonable period of time” of no less than 15 months. With respect to the legal form of implementation, legislation will be necessary because, as the complaining parties argued before the Panel, the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (“Offset Act”) is mandatory legislation. Accordingly, U.S. authorities lack the ability to implement the DSB’s recommendations and rulings through administrative means.

8. Moreover, the legislation required will be technically complex. This is not a situation where simple repeal of the measure is the only option or the only reasonable option. The Appellate Body expressly disavowed the notion that *any* expenditure of collected antidumping or countervailing duties would constitute a WTO violation.⁴ Indeed, the Appellate Body offered one example of what, in its view, would be a WTO-consistent expenditure; *i.e.*, a legal aid program designed to support domestic small businesses in antidumping or countervailing duty investigations.⁵

9. Accordingly, a reasonable legislative option would be to revise the Offset Act so that expenditures are made in a manner that does not run afoul of U.S. WTO obligations. Based on consultations with Congress to date, it appears that legislators are giving serious consideration to this option. However, there would appear to be numerous WTO-consistent ways in which

³ *Japan- Alcoholic Beverages*, para. 12.

⁴ *United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000*, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body adopted 27 January 2003, para. 245 (“*Offset Act (AB)*”).

⁵ *Id.*, para. 258.

collected duties might be spent, and choosing between them will require consideration of the complex question as to the dividing line between permissible and impermissible expenditures for purposes of the WTO agreements.

10. As the Appellate Body report makes clear, there is no simple litmus test for answering this question.⁶ Instead, in assessing any legislative option, legislators will have to consider (as did the Appellate Body) numerous factors in order to reach an ultimate determination as to whether or not expenditures under a particular option could be deemed to be “inextricably linked to, and strongly correlated with, a determination of dumping . . . or a determination of subsidy” and, thus, be “specific” to dumping or subsidization.⁷ Similarly, the design and structure of a particular legislative option will have to be assessed in order to reach a judgment as to whether or not the legislation could be deemed to be “against” dumping or subsidization. The Appellate Body report indicates that this assessment, too, requires a consideration of numerous factors.⁸

11. The lack of an easily applied litmus test means that there will be ample room for reasonable and principled disagreements among legislators as to the types of legislative alternatives that could be considered WTO-consistent. Resolving these disagreements and selecting among various WTO-consistent alternatives will take more time than would be the case if there were only a few legislative alternatives available.

⁶ See, e.g., *Offset Act (AB)*, paras. 237-262; see also *United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000*, WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234/R, Report of the Panel, as modified by the Appellate Body, adopted 27 January 2003, para. 8.3, noting that the Offset Act is “applied in a complex legal environment.”

⁷ *Id.*, para. 242.

⁸ *Id.*, para. 255.

12. Furthermore, as the arbitrator in *Korea – Alcoholic Beverages* determined, “although the reasonable period of time should be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, this does not require a Member, in my view, to utilize an *extraordinary* legislative procedure, rather than the *normal* legislative procedure, in every case.”⁹ In that case, the arbitrator found that it was reasonable for Korea to follow its normal legislative procedure – the next regular session of the national Assembly – for the consideration and adoption of implementing legislation, even if that legislation could have been submitted during an extraordinary session.

13. Applying these standards, the arbitrator should conclude that fifteen months is a reasonable period of time, as detailed further below.

B. Fifteen Months Would Be Required for Legislation

1. Fifteen Months Is Reasonable in Light of the U.S. Legal System and Prior Experience

14. The DSB adopted the recommendations and rulings of the Panel and the Appellate Body in this dispute at its meeting of January 27, 2003. At that very same meeting, the United States stated its intentions to implement the recommendations and rulings in a manner consistent with its WTO obligations.¹⁰ Shortly thereafter, on February 3, 2003, the Executive branch of the U.S. government proposed to the U.S. Congress that the Offset Act be repealed, and since that time has been consulting with Congress and domestic stakeholders. Through those consultations, it

⁹ *Korea – Alcoholic Beverages*, para 42.

¹⁰ The United States confirmed these intentions at a DSB meeting held on February 19, 2003.

has become clear that Congress intends to examine all options¹¹ for implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and not simply repeal. All of these options require legislation.

15. These options raise difficult and complex questions. For example, as a result of the Appellate Body report, we know one way in which collected antidumping and countervailing duties may *not* be spent without running afoul of WTO obligations; however, the answer to the question of how such duties *may* be spent is less certain and is open to reasonable debate. Among the multiple options which Congress wishes to consider, some will perhaps be closer than others to the imprecise dividing line between permissible and impermissible measures. In this type of complex legal environment, the task of selecting one among many legislative options can be expected to take longer than would be the case where the options are fewer and the legal standard is more precise. While the process of considering and weighing various options has been on-going ever since January 27, it is apparent that the enactment of legislation to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings will require at least 15 months.

16. A period of 15 months for legislation is consistent with previous arbitration awards under Article 21.3(c) that have involved legislation. The first arbitration on the reasonable period of time required for a legislative measure implementing the DSB's recommendations and rulings was *Japan - Alcoholic Beverages*, in which Japan requested as much as 5 years to amend certain provisions of its liquor tax laws, and 23 months to amend others.¹² The arbitrator concluded that

¹¹ Congressional officials have indicated that they intend to examine these options in detail through committee deliberations, as they have not previously had the opportunity to examine the issues in this case.

¹² Para. 8.

the 15-month guideline was justified and that the EC and the United States had not demonstrated particular circumstances to justify a shorter time frame.¹³

17. Similarly, in the award issued in *EC – Banana Regime*,¹⁴ the arbitrator gave the EC 15 months and one week to implement the DSB’s rulings and recommendations. The EC requested a reasonable period of time of 15 months and one week because, according to the EC, amending the EC import regime for bananas was going to be a “difficult and complex task for a number of reasons,”¹⁵ one reason being the controversy among domestic political constituencies over implementation. The United States and the other complaining parties proposed 9 months as the reasonable period of time, arguing that the EC’s legislative process did not require 15 months and that domestic political considerations did not form part of the examination of the shortest period of time within which implementation could be accomplished.¹⁶ The arbitrator concluded that the arguments of the complaining parties – that there were particular circumstances that justified ignoring the 15-month guideline – were not persuasive given the complexity of the implementation process as outlined by the EC.¹⁷ Accordingly, the arbitrator awarded the EC 15 months and one week – focusing on the reasonable date by which the EC implementation process could be concluded, rather than on an arbitrary period of time.¹⁸

¹³ *Id.*, para. 27. In that case, the EC argued for a reasonable period of time of 15 months (para. 25).

¹⁴ Para. 18.

¹⁵ *Id.*, para. 5.

¹⁶ *Id.*, paras. 14 and 15.

¹⁷ *Id.*, para. 19.

¹⁸ *Id.*, paras. 19-20.

18. In *EC - Hormones*, the EC requested a total of 39 to 40 months, including 15 months for legislative action, to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.¹⁹ The United States and Canada proposed, based on their understanding of the EC's legislative procedures, that only 10 months were needed to implement complying legislation.²⁰ The arbitrator was not convinced by U.S. and Canadian arguments that the proposed legal form of implementation (and indeed the particular legislative option) could be accomplished in a shorter time frame than the EC's proposal of 15 months.²¹ Likewise, in this case, it is not for the complaining parties to determine what type of legislative option the United States should choose, and that a "less" complex option could be accomplished in less than the 15-month guideline.

19. In the section that follows, the United States describes its legislative process, and presents empirical information showing it is reasonable to provide for a reasonable period of time of 15 months.

2. The U.S. Legislative Process

20. Under the United States system of constitutional government, any changes to a federal statute must be enacted by the U.S. Congress, which sets its own procedures and timetable. The Executive branch of the U.S. Government has no control over these procedures and timetable. Securing the enactment of legislation in the U.S. Congress is a complex and lengthy process. Moreover, only a small fraction of the thousands of bills introduced in each Congress ever become law. This indicates that the process of obtaining the votes necessary to enact legislation

¹⁹ Paras. 5 and 12. The EC first requested 40 months, then changed that to 39 months to complete a risk assessment study. Likewise the EC had first proposed 2 years to implement its legislative measure. *Id.* para. 13.

²⁰ *Id.*, paras. 15, 18, 19.

²¹ *Id.*, para. 48; *see also* paras. 44-47.

is difficult and time-consuming. Viewed in this light, the U.S. position that this process will take 15 months is reasonable. To provide less time would be unreasonable and would not facilitate a positive resolution of this dispute.

**a. Procedures for the Introduction and Consideration of
Legislation in the U.S. Congress**

21. The power to legislate is vested in the United States Congress, which has two chambers, the House of Representatives and the Senate. Both chambers must approve all legislation in identical form, before it is sent to the President of the United States for signature or other action.²² Only after presidential approval does proposed legislation become law.²³ Proposed legislation that will become public law usually takes the form of a “bill”. From the time that a bill is introduced in Congress to the time that it is approved by both chambers, it will have passed through at least ten steps.²⁴ Most bills that are introduced do not survive this process to become law, and those that do are likely to have been significantly amended along the way. What follows is an abbreviated discussion of the steps involved in enacting legislation in the U.S. Congress.

22. The first step in the legislative process is for a bill to be introduced in the House of Representatives (“the House”) or the Senate by a member of Congress. When the Executive branch seeks to initiate legislation, it may transmit proposed draft legislation to the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the President of the Senate. The draft legislation will then

²² See generally, *The Constitution of the United States*, Article I, Section 1 and Section 7 (Exhibit 2); *How Our Laws are Made*, Charles W. Johnson, 2000 at 42 (Exhibit 3).

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ The flowchart at Exhibit 4 presents a general overview of the process.

typically be introduced in either its original or revised version by the chairman of the committee or ranking member of the committee with subject matter jurisdiction over the bill. Alternatively, the Executive branch may request that an individual member or members introduce proposed legislation.

23. After introduction, as a general rule, bills are referred to a standing committee or committees having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the bills.²⁵ These committees may also refer the proposed legislation to various subcommittees.²⁶ In the House, a bill may be referred to a number of committees,²⁷ while in the Senate a bill is more commonly referred to the committee with primary subject matter jurisdiction and then may be sequentially referred to other committees.²⁸

24. Committee action is the key to the life of a proposed bill, since most bills “die” in committee, as a result of inaction. For those bills that survive, this is where the most intense consideration of their merits is given. Most bills are referred by the committee with jurisdiction to a subcommittee for consideration. Normally, the subcommittee schedules public hearings to hear from proponents and opponents of a bill, including government agencies, experts, interested organizations and individuals.²⁹ Testimony is generally based on a written statement that will later be included in a committee report. There is no specified time frame for committee

²⁵ There are 19 committees in the House and 17 in the Senate (*see* Exhibit 5). These committees process and manage the thousands of bills that are introduced in each Congress every two years. Committees are chaired by a member of the majority political party in the relevant chamber. There is also a “ranking minority member,” a member of the other political party, who leads the minority party members on a committee.

²⁶ There are approximately 200 subcommittees.

²⁷ This description, in the interest of economy, assumes that, like most bills, draft legislation would originate in the House and then move to the Senate to receive separate consideration.

²⁸ Johnson, at 5 (Exhibit 3).

²⁹ *Id.*, at 12.

consideration, although the Speaker of the House will generally place time limits on a second committee's consideration of a bill at his or her discretion.³⁰

25. The next step in the process is the "mark-up". When the hearings are completed, the subcommittee usually meets to "mark-up" the bill – make changes and amendments prior to deciding whether to recommend (or "report") the bill to the full committee. The subcommittee may also suggest that a bill be postponed indefinitely (or "tabled").³¹ The House has a complicated "germaneness" rule which, in principle, requires that an amendment relate to the subject matter under consideration, have a fundamental purpose germane to that of the bill, and be within the jurisdiction of the committee considering the bill.³² Nevertheless, once these basic factors are met, bills or amendments to bills can move together even if they have little else in common. In essence, a bill can become a magnet for amendments in committee, slowing down a bill's progress.

26. After receiving the subcommittee's report (recommendation), the full committee may conduct further study and hearings. There will again be a markup process. The full committee then votes whether to report the bill, either as originally introduced without amendment, or as revised, to the full House.³³ Once again, the bill may be tabled, or no action may be taken on it. If the full committee votes to report a bill to the House, a committee report is written by the committee's staff. The report supports the committee's recommendation and is generally a

³⁰ *Id.*, at 10.

³¹ *Id.* at 13.

³² *Congressional Deskbook 2000*, Michael L. Koempel and Judy Schneider, The Capitol.Net Inc. at 263 (Exhibit 6).

³³ *Id.*, at 14. A "clean bill" receives a bill number.

section-by-section analysis that describes the scope and purpose of the bill, its impact on existing laws and programs, the position of the executive branch, and amendments made by the committee.³⁴ Committee reports also include dissenting views and can be supplemented by any committee member. An approved bill is “reported back” to the house.

27. The timing of consideration of legislation on the House floor is determined as a general rule by the Speaker of the House and the majority leader (*i.e.*, the leader of the political party with the majority of seats in the House), who may place the bill on the Calendar for House debate. The House Rules Committee generally recommends the amount of time that will be allocated for debate and whether amendments may be offered. The Rules Committee recommends a rule which takes the form of a House resolution which is debated and voted on before the House considers the bill on its merits.³⁵ During the debate process, there is opportunity for members of Congress to offer further amendments.³⁶ After voting on amendments, the House immediately votes on the bill itself with any adopted amendments.³⁷ The bill can also be returned to the committee that reported it. If passed, the bill must be referred to the Senate, which may or may not have concurrent pending legislation.

28. The Senate, following its own legislative process and consideration, may approve the bill as received, reject it, ignore it or change it. While the Senate has similar procedures for consideration of legislation by relevant committees, there are significant differences in the way the Senate considers proposed legislation. The Senate functions in a less rule-driven manner

³⁴ *Id.*

³⁵ Johnson, Exhibit 3 at 19.

³⁶ *Id.*, at 25.

³⁷ *Id.*

than the House, and scheduling and floor consideration is generally decided by consensus.³⁸

Unlike the House, where debate time is strictly controlled, in the Senate debate is rarely restricted. The Senate does not have a Rules Committee to govern floor consideration. Rather, there are complex rules mandating unanimous consent for Senate floor consideration.³⁹ In addition, because of the privileges accorded to Senators, an individual Senator may “filibuster” (hold the floor and speak for a very long period of time),⁴⁰ or place a “hold” on legislation which can prevent it from being considered.⁴¹ Filibusters can only be ended by a “cloture” procedure, a rule that requires the vote of sixty senators, which is very difficult to achieve. The other major difference between the House and the Senate is that an amendment in the Senate generally does not have to be “germane,” i.e., relevant to the bill to which it is attached.⁴²

29. Most bills are unlikely to be passed by the Senate exactly as referred by the House. The Senate may amend a bill or pass its own similar legislation. Therefore, a conference committee is organized to reconcile differences between the House and Senate versions. Conference committee members are appointed by each Chamber and given specific instructions, which may be revised every 21 days.⁴³ If the conference committee cannot reach agreement, the bill dies. If the conference committee reaches agreement on a single bill, a conference report is prepared

³⁸ *Congressional Deskbook 2000* at 267 (Exhibit 6).

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ *Id.*, at 274 - 279. See also *Congress and its Members*, Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, CQ Press (1997) at 251-255 (Exhibit 7).

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² *Id.*; see also *Congressional Deskbook* at 280. Amendments that are not germane are often called “riders.”

⁴³ Johnson, Exhibit 3, at 36. House conferees are usually supporters of the House legislation, and members of the committee with jurisdiction over the bill. Senate conferees may be from either party and are chosen by unanimous consent.

describing the committee members' rationale for changes.⁴⁴ The conference report must be approved by both chambers, in identical form, or the revised legislation dies. After the bill proposed by the conference committee is approved by both chambers, it can be sent to the President for approval.⁴⁵

b. The Timetable for Consideration of Legislation in the U.S. Congress

30. The other central factor that determines when a bill becomes law is the Congressional schedule. The Constitution mandates only that Congress meet "at least once in every year"⁴⁶ and that it convene on January 3rd, unless another date is chosen.⁴⁷ A Congress lasts two years, and meets in two sessions of one year each, beginning in January. The adjournment date varies, largely depending on whether it is an election year. In an election year, Congress may adjourn in October (though it may then also reconvene for a "lame duck" session after the November election), but in a non-election year it is typical for Congress to adjourn in November or December.⁴⁸ Moreover, Congress is not usually continuously "at work" during a session. Because of intricate schedules and calendars, as well as recesses, Congress is often only present and in session 3 days a week, 3 weeks per month and is in recess for the month of August.⁴⁹ Accordingly, the earliest date a bill can be introduced is January and if it is not acted upon before adjournment, it will die at the end of the Congress.

⁴⁴ See generally Johnson at 35-38-40 and *The Legislative Process*, C-Span.org (Exhibit 8).

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ *U.S. Constitution*, Article I, Section 4 (Exhibit 2).

⁴⁷ *Id.*, 20th Amendment.

⁴⁸ See Exhibit 1. The current year – 2003 – is not an election year.

⁴⁹ See *Congressional Deskbook*, at 242-243 (Exhibit 6).

31. The length of time required for a bill to move through this complex process is a result not only of the numerous stages in the process and the lack of well-defined timetables for these stages, but also of the large volume of legislation that is proposed by members. Moreover, at almost every step of the process, especially in the Senate, members have the ability to control the progress - or seek additional time for consideration - of even non-complex legislation.

32. Most bills that do become law are not acted on until the last weeks or months of the legislative session. Also important, however, is whether a bill is introduced in the first or second session of a Congress. If a bill is introduced in the first session of a Congress but is not passed by the end of that session, the legislation is carried over to the second session; *i.e.*, the process does not have to start from the beginning. On the other hand, legislation not passed by the end of the second session of a Congress dies.

34. We currently are in the first session of the 108th Congress. Thus, for purposes of enacting legislation to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute, the 108th Congress has the ability to "save" the work that it does during 2003 and complete it in 2004. It is not forced at the end of this first session to vote on insufficiently considered legislation.

35. Taking into account the complexity of the legislative task in question, the fact that Congressional committees will be considering the issue for the first time, the need to consider implementing legislation in a deliberate – rather than a rushed – manner, and the other matters that will be under consideration during the remainder of the first session of the 108th Congress, it is the judgment of the United States that legislation implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB will not be completed in the first session of the current Congress, but instead

will need to be carried over into the second session. While the United States recognizes that it would be unreasonable to request that the reasonable period of time extend to the end of that second session, it is not unreasonable to allow a brief amount of time at the beginning of the second session to complete the legislative task. In particular, much as the end of a Congressional session spurs legislative activity, the opportunity to pass legislation may be greater prior to a Congressional recess. Congress will break for its Spring District Work Period in late April, 2004, and this would be an appropriate point at which to conclude the reasonable period of time.

III. CONCLUSION

36. In summary, in order to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, legislation will be necessary. The United States' reasonable and realistic estimate is that it will take no less than 15 months to enact such legislation.

37. Therefore, the United States requests that the arbitrator determine that 15 months is a reasonable period of time in which to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings under Article 21.3 of the DSU.

Exhibit List

- U.S. Exhibit 1: Adjournment Dates for the Last Five Congresses
- U.S. Exhibit 2: *The Constitution of the United States*, Article I, Section 1 and Section 7
- U.S. Exhibit 3: *How Laws are Made*, Charles W. Johnson
- U.S. Exhibit 4: Legislative Process Flowchart
- U.S. Exhibit 5: List of House and Senate Committees
- U.S. Exhibit 6: *Congressional Deskbook 2000*, Michael L. Koempel and Judy Schneider, The Capitol.Net Inc.
- U.S. Exhibit 7: *Congress and its Members*, Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, CQ Press (1997)
- U.S. Exhibit 8: *The Legislative Process*, C-Span.org.