U.S. Statement at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Under Item 5

Geneva, June 22, 2018

5. STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING ARTICLE 17.5 OF THE UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

- The United States requested this agenda item to draw Members’ attention to the repeated issuance of Appellate Body reports beyond the 90-day deadline mandated in the DSU.

- For too long, the Appellate Body has ignored the clear text of the DSU. We want Members to read that rule together and to decide: do the words in the WTO Agreement matter? Or is the Appellate Body free to disregard and effectively re-write those words whenever it thinks that is necessary or appropriate?

- Similarly, for too long, WTO Members have failed to fulfill their responsibility, acting through the DSB, to apply and administer the relevant rules. Although some Members have spoken out, by failing to acknowledge and address this problem collectively, we have worsened the problem, as the facts will show.

- Through this statement, the United States intends to re-start a discussion among Members on whether we understand and respect the rules we have written. To facilitate that discussion, in this statement we will highlight five aspects of this issue for Members.

- First, we will highlight the text of Article 17.5 and the mandatory requirement to complete appeals in no more than 90 days, with no exceptions.

- Second, we explain that the Appellate Body’s pre-2011 practice respected this rule and, when there were deviations, it was only with the agreement of the parties.

- Third, we will draw Members’ attention to the inexplicable change in the Appellate Body’s practice in 2011.

- Fourth, we will discuss the result of this change; namely, appeals are taking longer and longer.

- Finally, we will conclude by explaining the serious consequences for the WTO dispute settlement system of the Appellate Body’s repeated, flagrant breach of Article 17.5.
First: The DSU is designed to promote prompt settlement of disputes and mandates that appeals be completed in no more than 90 days, with no exceptions

- The prompt settlement of disputes is a cornerstone of WTO dispute settlement. In Article 3 of the DSU, Members agreed that “[t]he prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between rights and obligations.”

- The principle of prompt settlement is enshrined in numerous provisions of the DSU, including Article 17.5 in particular.

- Article 17.5, which concerns appellate proceedings, provides that: “As a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the date a party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its report.” It’s worth pausing here. Appeals are not supposed to take 90 days. They are supposed to be completed in 60 days “as a general rule”.

- But WTO Members recognized that would not always be possible, and so they provided for the possibility to extend the appeals period. The third sentence of Article 17.5 provides: “When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60 days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report.”

- And then the final sentence of Article 17.5 provides: “In no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days.” This statement is categorical – it uses the terms “in no case” and “shall” – and therefore sets the outside limit of an extension of the appeals period at 90 days.
Article 17.5 therefore does not accord discretion to the Appellate Body to issue reports beyond the 90-day deadline. In the early days, the Appellate Body itself recognized this. For example, when the Appellate Body first issued its working procedures, it explained to the DSB that the timeframes for WTO Members’ submissions had to be short as a “consequence of Article 17(5) of the DSU, which states that … in no case shall [the proceedings] go beyond 90 days”.¹

The Appellate Body’s working procedures, at Rule 23bis, paragraph 3, also refer to “the requirement to circulate the appellate report within the time-period set out in Article 17.5”. Thus, if any Member considers today that Article 17.5 does not mean exactly what it says, we would simply point out that, some 20 years ago, the Appellate Body understood Article 17.5 to mean exactly what it says.

Second: The Appellate Body’s past practice respected the 90-day deadline in Article 17.5

An examination of the Appellate Body’s pre-2011 practice demonstrates that it made every effort to comply with the requirements of the DSU. From the first appeal in 1996, in US – Gasoline, up to the appeal in US – Tyres (China) in 2011 – a span of 15 years, covering 101 appeals – the Appellate Body either met the 90-day requirement or, in a limited number of appeals, consulted and obtained the agreement of the parties to exceed the 90-day deadline.

In fact, for 87 of those appeals, the Appellate Body issued its report within the 90 day deadline, including in complex appeals, such as EC – Bananas, US – Steel Safeguards, EC – Tariff Preferences, US – Offset Act, Japan – DRAMs, and others.

In the other 14 of those appeals, the Appellate Body was concerned it would not be able to meet the 90-day requirement, and it therefore consulted with the parties and obtained their consent to go beyond that period. This was done in a transparent manner, and was reflected in the Appellate Body’s report or a communication from the Appellate Body to the DSB.

¹ See, e.g., Communication from the Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB WP/W/1 (Feb. 7, 1996), pp. 2-3 (“You will notice that the time limits set out in the Working Procedures for Appellate Review are short. This is the inevitable consequence of Article 17(5) of the DSU, which states that as a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days, and in no case shall go beyond 90 days, from the date a party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its report. It is our view that the timeframes we have established for the filing of submissions and an oral hearing with the parties are reasonable within the constraints imposed by the DSU and afford due process to all parties concerned while at the same time providing the Appellate Body with the time it requires for careful study, deliberation, decision-making, report-writing by the division and subsequent translation of the Appellate Report.”) (emphasis added).
For example, in European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, the Appellate Body Report reflects the following agreement of the parties to the dispute (the European Communities, Australia, Brazil, and Thailand):

After consultation with the Appellate Body Secretariat, the European Communities and Australia, Brazil, and Thailand agreed, in letters filed on 19 January 2005, that it would not be possible for the Appellate Body to circulate its Report in this appeal within the 90-day time limit referred to in Article 17.5 of the DSU. The European Communities and Australia, Brazil, and Thailand accordingly confirmed that they would deem the Appellate Body Report in this proceeding, issued no later than 28 April 2005, to be an Appellate Body Report circulated pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU.

The practice of Members’ submitting so-called “deeming letters”, which was an explicit recognition that issuing a report outside of the 90-day period was not consistent with Article 17.5 of the DSU, was followed in at least ten appeals.

During this time, Members also cooperated in other ways to facilitate the ability of the Appellate Body to meet the 90-day deadline. At the request of the parties to the dispute, the DSB several times agreed to take DSB decisions to extend the time period for adoption or appeal of panel reports so that the appeal could be considered at a time when the Appellate Body would be better placed to issue its report within 90 days.

---

2 EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (AB), para. 7.


4 See, e.g., EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/24, WT/DS266/24, WT/DS283/5 (procedural agreements between the EC, Australia, Brazil, and Thailand to extend the 60-day time-period in Article 16.4 of the DSU); US – Zeroing (EC), WT/DS294/11; Brazil – Retreated Tires, WT/DS332/8 (joint
• For example, in the context of the EC – Fasteners dispute, the European Union and China sought a DSB decision extending the 60-day time period for negative consensus adoption of the panel report in Article 16.4 of the DSU. At a meeting held on January 25, 2011, the DSB agreed to the jointly-proposed decision.

Third: In 2011, the Appellate Body began ignoring the 90-day requirement, and some WTO Members expressed significant concerns

• The Appellate Body’s commitment to respecting the 90-day rule was commendable, and surely entailed significant efforts on the part of those AB Members and the Secretariat staff then assisting them. However, later that year (2011), starting with the appeal in US – Tyres (China), the Appellate Body, without explanation, departed from the long-established practice of consulting and obtaining the parties’ consent where it considered it could not meet the 90-day requirement.

• At the time of the adoption of the report in that dispute, the United States informed the DSB of the approach taken by the Appellate Body in that appeal and expressed its concern:

Pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU, the Appellate Body had notified the DSB through a letter circulated on 27 July that it would not be able to complete its Report within 60 days. While the notice had informed the DSB of the expected circulation date, it had not noted that this date was beyond the 90-day deadline. Moreover, contrary to past practice, the notification had made no mention of whether the parties had been consulted on this issue or whether each party had agreed. Neither did the Appellate Body Report mention these issues. And in fact, both parties had not agreed that the Report could be provided beyond the 90-day deadline specified in Article 17.5 of the DSU.

request by the European Communities and Brazil for a Decision by the DSB); EC – Bananas III, WT/DS27/87 (procedural agreement between Ecuador and the European Communities regarding the Time-Period under Article 16.4 of the DSU); Thailand Cigarettes, WT/DS371/7 (Joint Request by Thailand and the Philippines for a Decision by the DSB); and EC Fasteners, WT/DS397/6.

5 Joint Request by the European Union and China for a Decision by the DSB (WT/DS397/6).

6 Minutes of the DSB Meeting on January 25, 2011 (WT/DSB/M/291), p. 15.

7 Minutes of the DSB Meeting on October 5, 2011 (WT/DSB/B/304), para. 4.
• That was the first time the Appellate Body had operated in such a manner. In sharing its concerns, the United States expressed its view that the issuance of a report by the Appellate Body beyond the 90-day deadline in the DSU, without meaningful consultations with the parties, and even more importantly without the affirmative agreement of the parties, should not be repeated in the future. At that same DSB meeting where the report was considered for adoption, several other Members similarly expressed concerns with the Appellate Body’s approach, including Japan, Australia, Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.

• Unfortunately, those statements did not change the Appellate Body’s new approach. Other reports were issued beyond the 90-day deadline, without consultation with the parties, as we will review shortly. And the Appellate Body did so despite the fact that at least 10 WTO Members continued to express concerns in the DSB in relation to at least 10 reports issued beyond the time limit in Article 17.5.

• Despite the Appellate Body’s change in practice, at least for a period of time, Members continued to cooperate to address the legal uncertainty raised by the Appellate Body’s breach of Article 17.5.

---

8 Minutes of the DSB Meeting on October 5, 2011 (WT/DSB/B/304), para. 6.

9 See, e.g., Minutes of the DSB Meeting on October 5, 2011 (WT/DSB/304), paras. 4-7, 11-20.

10 See, e.g., Minutes of the DSB Meeting on February 22, 2012 (WT/DSB/M/313) (adoption of report in China – Raw Materials; statements by the United States, Canada, Japan, Costa Rica, Norway, Australia, and Guatemala); Minutes of the DSB Meeting on March 23, 2012 (WT/DSB/M/313) (adoption of report in US – Large Civil Aircraft; statements by the United States and Japan); Minutes of the DSB Meeting on June 13, 2012 (WT/DSB/M/317) (adoption of report in US – Tuna II; statements by the United States, Japan and Mexico); Minutes of the DSB Meeting on July 10, 2012 (WT/DSB/M/319) (in relation to the appeal in US – COOL; statements by the United States, Canada, and Mexico); Minutes of the DSB Meeting on July 23, 2012 (WT/DSB/M/320) (adoption of report in US – COOL; statements by the United States, Costa Rica, Japan, Australia, Guatemala, and Turkey); Minutes of the DSB Meeting on June 18, 2014 (WT/DSB/M/346) (adoption of report in EC – Seals; statements by the United States, Guatemala, Norway, and Japan); Minutes of the DSB Meeting on December 19, 2014 (WT/DSB/M/354) (adoption of report in US – Carbon Steel (India); statement by the United States); Minutes of the DSB Meeting on January 16, 2015 (WT/DSB/M/355) (adoption of report in US – CVD (China); statements by the United States, Australia, and Canada); Minutes of the DSB Meeting on January 26, 2015 (WT/DSB/M/356) (adoption of reports in Argentina – Import Measures; statements by the United States, Japan, Chinese Taipei, Australia, Canada, and Norway); Minutes of the DSB Meeting on May 29, 2015 (WT/DSB/M/362) (adoption of reports in US – COOL 21.5, statements by Canada and the United States); and Minutes of the DSB Meeting on June 19, 2015 (WT/DSB/M/364) (adoption of the report in India – Agricultural Products; statements by the United States, Norway, and Japan).
• For example, in the context of the China – Raw Materials dispute, despite the failure of the Appellate Body to seek the consent of the parties, the United States and China submitted a joint communication indicating they agreed to extend the 90-day deadline for completion of the appeal, and would deem the report to be an Appellate Body report circulated pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU. The text of the joint US-China deeming letter read as follows:

Prior to the initiation of the appeal in the above referenced dispute, the Appellate Body Secretariat requested to meet with the United States and China to discuss scheduling issues relating to a possible appeal. The Secretariat informed the parties that the Appellate Body considered that it would not be possible to circulate the Appellate Body Report in an appeal within the 90-day time limit referred to in Article 17.5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"). In light of the complex appeal under consideration by the Appellate Body and the numerous issues likely to arise in an appeal in this dispute, the United States and China agreed to extend the 90-day deadline for completion of the Appellate Body Report.

On 28 October 2011, the Appellate Body informed the DSB of its reasons for the delay in providing its report and stated that the report "will be circulated to Members no later than Tuesday, 31 January 2012". Consistent with past practice, the United States and China hereby confirm that they will each deem an Appellate Body Report in this proceeding, issued no later than 31 January 2012, to be an Appellate Body Report circulated pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU.\(^ \text{11} \)

• Unfortunately, Members’ cooperation did not continue as some Members became unwilling to take action to address this problem. For instance, in the original appeal in the US – COOL disputes, Canada, Mexico, and the United States jointly requested the DSB to adopt a decision to deem an appellate report in each dispute “circulated by the Appellate Body no later than 29 June 2012, to be an Appellate Body report circulated pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU.”\(^ \text{12} \)

---

11 Joint Communication from the United States and China (WT/DS394/14).

12 WT/DS384/15 and WT/DS386/14.
The parties explained that consideration by the DSB of the draft decision and adoption of that decision would serve several useful purposes:

First, through circulation of the draft decision and consideration at a DSB meeting, the issue is given full transparency. Members of the DSB can give due consideration to the reasons cited by the Appellate Body in its communication for circulation outside the 90-day time limit as well as the reasons cited by the parties to the disputes for putting forward the draft decision. Through circulation of the draft decision, the parties to the disputes are informing other Members of their agreement to the circulation of the appellate reports outside the 90-day time limit. The parties consider that it would be desirable that the Appellate Body consult with the parties and have their agreement, and this draft decision informs other Members of the parties' agreement. Through the process of consideration of the draft decision, Members will therefore be fully apprised of the circumstances under which the reports may come before the DSB for adoption.

Second, the parties consider it desirable that the DSB provide greater certainty on the adoption procedure that will apply to the reports. The reports will be put before the DSB for adoption by all Members. Any Member may observe that the 90-day deadline in Article 17.5 of the DSU has not been met. The parties to the disputes consider that in these circumstances it would be appropriate also for the DSB to agree to deem the reports to be Appellate Body reports pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU. Without prejudice to any Member's systemic views on the proper adoption procedure, the draft decision, if adopted by the DSB, would increase certainty with respect to the adoption process.

Finally, the parties note that the language of the draft decision has been drawn from the letters filed by a number of Members in numerous past appeals, through which the parties to those disputes have expressed their willingness to deem the reports in those appeals to be Appellate Body reports pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU.  

---

13 WT/DS384/15 and WT/DS386/14.
• Unfortunately, some WTO Members indicated informally they would not support the proposed DSB decision. That choice was, and is, regrettable. Those WTO Members chose to ignore a clear breach of the DSU. They refused to recognize the role of WTO Members to administer the rules of the DSU. They refused to support the parties to the dispute to address a serious procedural concern. And, as we shall see, their refusal apparently encouraged the Appellate Body to exceed the 90 days more frequently and by increasing amounts.

• It is also worth noting that the parties, in the communication for that proposed decision, already identified that there were concerns related to the adoption procedure for reports circulated after the 90-day deadline in the DSU. This was six years ago – this is not a new issue.

Fourth: Since 2011, the Appellate Body has frequently and increasingly breached its 90 days obligation

• Prior to the appeal in US – Tyres (China) in 2011, excluding the EU and US large civil aircraft disputes, the average length of an appeal was approximately 90 days. As noted, in those rare instances where the Appellate Body exceeded 90 days, it did so with the agreement of the parties to the dispute.

• However, since the Appellate Body’s unexplained change of approach in 2011, the situation is very different. The average length of appeals since then, again excluding the EU and US large civil aircraft disputes, is approximately 149 days. That is, an appeal has taken, on average, 59 more days, which is an increase of 66 percent (two-thirds).

• In fact, if one considers only the appeals since 2014, the problem is even more striking. Since May 2014, not a single appeal has been completed within the 90-day deadline. The average over that 4.5 year period is 163 days.

• What is clear from the data is that the length of appeals has continued to increase from the point at which the Appellate Body stopped respecting the 90-day deadline established by Members in Article 17.5 of the DSU. That is, once the Appellate Body asserted that it had the authority to take whatever time it considers appropriate for individual appeals, it also apparently decided that the appropriate time period would, almost always, be more than 90 days.

• It is also worth noting that the Appellate Body has also stopped observing the obligation in Article 17.5 of the DSU to provide the DSB with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. Recent communications from the Appellate Body simply inform Members that the Appellate Body will not meet the 90-day deadline, without providing any estimated date for when the Appellate Body will circulate a report.
• This problem may also relate to other systemic concerns Members have expressed. For example, an appeal will take longer where the Appellate Body spends valuable time addressing issues that are not necessary to resolve a dispute.

Fifth: The Appellate Body creates reasons for breaching the rule rather than changing its behavior to ensure compliance with the rule

• The Appellate Body has for many years apparently considered that it is not possible to issue reports within the 90-day deadline. The United States has two reactions to that notion: first, we do not see objective evidence to support it; second, and more importantly, that it is not within the Appellate Body’s authority to disregard or amend the DSU.

• On the first point, the Appellate Body seems to assert that under Article 17.12, it must “address each of the issues raised” in the appeal – as if this means that the report must write an interpretation and reach the merits on each issue. But we know this is not true because the Appellate Body itself has, over and over, exercised judicial economy on issues on appeal – which means it does not address the merits of that claim. And it is appropriate to exercise judicial economy because to “address” an issue does not mean to write an interpretation; it means to think about and dispose of the issue appropriately, which could also mean not writing an interpretation.

• Appellate Body reports also provide compelling evidence that the Appellate Body is not making every effort to issue its reports within 90 days. How do we know this? Because in multiple appeals, the Appellate Body has reached issues not necessary to resolve the appeal.

---

14 See, e.g., US – Upland Cotton (AB), paras. 510-511, 747, where the Appellate Body refrained from interpreting provisions of the covered agreements where doing so was “unnecessary for the purposes of resolving [the] dispute.” See also India – Solar Cells (AB), paras. 5.156-5.163.

15 Oxford Dictionary online: “Address” (third definition): “think about and begin to deal with (an issue or problem)”.
• In this regard, we recall that the report in *Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services* was issued 167 days after the notice of appeal, but more than two-thirds of the Appellate Body’s analysis – 46 pages – was in the nature of obiter dicta. In that appeal, having resolved the first, threshold issue of “likeness”, it would have been appropriate to stop the analysis at that point. Instead, the Appellate Body went on to consider issues on appeal that the Appellate Body itself considered not necessary to resolve the dispute.\(^{16}\)

• Similarly, as we explained with regard to the appeal in *Indonesia Import Licensing* last year, once the Division in that appeal found that Article XI:1 continued to apply to agricultural products and upheld the Panel’s findings that each of the challenged measures was inconsistent with that provision, the Division could and should have refrained from substantively addressing the remainder of Indonesia’s claims, none of which had any potential to alter the DSB recommendations and rulings.\(^{17}\) Unfortunately, it did not so refrain, and the report was issued 265 days after the date of appeal.

• Similarly, at the last DSB meeting, the United States explained that the appeal in *EU – Countervailing Measures on Certain PET from Pakistan* could and should have been resolved upon Pakistan’s statement that it sought no recommendation on the EU’s withdrawn measure. In this regard, we agreed with the EU’s appeal that Pakistan’s alleged “dispute” was a purely advisory exercise. And as we explained at the last DSB meeting, the United States further agreed with the EU that the DSU does not grant WTO adjudicators the authority to issue advisory opinions regarding the interpretation of provisions of the covered agreements in the abstract, and outside the context of resolving a dispute.\(^{18}\) And yet the report in that dispute was issued 258 days after the notice of appeal.

\(^{16}\) *Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services (AB)*, para. 6.83 (“Our reversal of these findings [on likeness] means that the Panel's findings on “treatment no less favourable” are moot because they were based on the Panel’s findings that the relevant services and service suppliers are "like". Moreover, as a consequence of our reversal of the Panel's “likeness” findings, there remains no finding of inconsistency with the GATS. This, in turn, renders moot the Panel's analysis . . . pursuant to Article XIV(c) of the GATS and . . . paragraph 2(a) of the GATS Annex on Financial Services.” (italics added)). But after clarifying that all of the Panel’s findings other than “likeness” were rendered moot, the Appellate Body in paragraph 6.84 states that “[w]ith these considerations in mind, we turn to address the issues raised in Panama’s appeals.” That is, after clarifying that Panama’s appeals concern “moot” panel findings, the Appellate Body goes on to address those moot appeals. That approach does not reflect the role of dispute settlement as set out in the DSU and, as the report was issued after 90 days, is in breach of Article 17.5 of the DSU.


These reports and others therefore do not support the notion that it is not possible for the Appellate Body to comply with the 90-day rule in DSU Article 17.5.

Second, and more importantly, it is simply not the Appellate Body’s place to disregard or amend the DSU.

In the absence of a DSU amendment, or other appropriate DSB action, Article 17.5 sets out a rule. The 90-day deadline was recently referred to as a “great rule”; whether it is, or is not, it is a “rule”. Because WTO Members have not amended Article 17.5 to provide for an exception, it is the responsibility of the Appellate Body to follow that rule.

When a rule is not followed, the Appellate Body diminishes the rights of WTO Members, contrary to DSU Article 3.2, and undermines confidence in the WTO as a whole.

Sixth: It is past time for WTO Members to meet their responsibility to administer the WTO rules-based system according to the rules

We urgently need to find solutions to this rule-breaking. Of course, WTO Members themselves may assist by focusing their appeals on issues that are material to the outcome of the dispute. And the Appellate Body can approach appeals by focusing on addressing only those issues necessary to resolve a dispute promptly.

But most importantly, a rules-based system needs the adjudicators to follow the rules of the system.

It is simply not tenable for the Appellate Body, in seeking to help ensure Members observe their obligations under the WTO agreements, to itself ignore the requirements of the DSU.

Members will recall that we have had discussions recently on the consequences of issuance of an appellate report that is not in conformity with Article 17 of the DSU. As this statement makes clear, Article 17.5 and the 90-day deadline is a fundamental rule and critical piece of Article 17. The consequence of the Appellate Body choosing to breach DSU rules and issue a report after the 90-day deadline would be that this report no longer qualifies as an Appellate Body report for purposes of the exceptional negative consensus adoption procedure of Article 17.14 of the DSU. No party should bear uncertainty as to the adoption of a report due to the adjudicator’s unwillingness to follow the rules or obtain the DSB’s agreement to deviate from those rules.
• If Members fail to take responsibility for administering and maintaining the system, and do nothing to address this growing problem, we can expect the length of appeals to continue to grow, as they have for the last seven years.

• We can expect the dispute settlement system to move further way from the principle of prompt settlement reflected in DSU Article 3.

• We can expect that the system would become even less effective for resolving disputes, diminishing WTO Members’ desire and willingness to bring their disputes to the WTO.

• The consequence will be to further erode support for the dispute settlement system and for the WTO as a whole.

• If any Member disagrees with our understanding of the plain text of Article 17.5, we look forward to hearing how you read that obligation. For any other Member, we look forward to engaging you to finally address this longstanding, and still urgent, problem.