2018 Report on the Implementation and Enforcement of Russia’s WTO Commitments

United States Trade Representative
February 2019
# Implementation and Enforcement of Russia’s WTO Commitments

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I. Introduction

Russia became a Member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on August 22, 2012, 19 years after first applying to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT 1947) in 1993.\(^1\) During the years leading up to accession, Russia adopted numerous measures (laws, regulations, resolutions, decrees, and other directives) to modernize its economy and create a stable business environment. Through the WTO accession negotiation process, WTO Members worked with Russia to ensure that Russia’s legal regime incorporated the key WTO principles of national treatment, most-favored nation (MFN) treatment, transparency, and, more generally, the rule of law. The Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization (WPR), reflecting the results of Russia’s work and the accession negotiations, discusses the process by which Russia became a WTO Member.\(^2\)

This Report on the Implementation and Enforcement of Russia’s WTO Commitments (the Russia WTO Report) for 2018 is prepared pursuant to section 201(a) of the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-208) (the Act). This provision requires the U.S. Trade Representative, not later than one year after the United States extends permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to the products of Russia, and annually thereafter, to submit a report to the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives assessing the extent to which Russia is implementing the WTO Agreement (including the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) and the progress Russia has made in joining the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). In addition, to the extent that the U.S. Trade Representative believes that Russia is not fully implementing its WTO commitments or not sufficiently progressing to join the ITA and the GPA, the Report is to describe the actions that USTR plans to take to encourage Russia to

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\(^1\) In 1994, Russia’s GATT Working Party was transformed into a working party on its accession to the WTO.

\(^2\) The “WTO Agreement” comprises the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization as well as its annexed covered agreements.
improve its implementation of its commitments or increase its progress toward acceding, as the case may be.

The 2018 Russia WTO Report is also prepared pursuant to section 201(b) of the Act that requires that the U.S. Trade Representative submit annually a report to the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives describing the enforcement actions taken by USTR to ensure Russia’s full compliance with its obligations as a Member of the WTO. The 2018 Russia WTO Report thus provides an assessment of the extent to which Russia is implementing its WTO commitments, an enumeration of the steps USTR has taken to enforce those commitments, and a description of the actions USTR plans to take in the coming year to press Russia to comply with its WTO obligations.

In the development of this Report, USTR has drawn on the expertise of numerous individuals who have studied and worked with Russia over the years. USTR solicited comments from interested parties, both throughout the year and in the preparation of this Report, and collected information from other U.S. Government agencies, particularly the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. USTR staff also called on their years of experience studying and analyzing Russia’s economic policies, including negotiating Russia’s WTO accession. In addition, on October 4, 2018, USTR hosted a hearing in Washington, DC, before the Trade Policy Staff Committee at which two parties testified.

II. Executive Summary

U.S. trade in goods with Russia has fluctuated since Russia joined the WTO in 2012. Exports from the United States to Russia rose steadily from 2012 (when Russia joined the WTO) through 2014 (when Russia invaded Crimea and the United States imposed sanctions) but then fell into 2015 and 2016. Imports from Russia fell steadily from 2012 to 2106. In 2017, both exports and

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3 In addition, the U.S. Trade Representative and the Secretary of State are required to submit annually to the same committees a report that describes the actions the agencies have taken to promote the rule of law in Russia and that discloses the status of any pending petition for espousal filed with the Secretary of State by a U.S. investor in Russia. That report will be submitted separately.

4 See Appendix 1 for list of parties who filed public comments.

5 See Appendix 2 for a list of witnesses that testified at the hearing.
imports rose slightly, a trend that continued into the first 10 months of 2018. In 2017, U.S. goods exports to Russia in 2017 were $7.0 billion, including aircraft ($2.3 billion), machinery ($1.4 billion), vehicles ($638 million), optical and medical instruments ($506 million), and electrical machinery ($440 million). In that same year, U.S. goods imports from Russia totaled $17.0 billion; top import categories included mineral fuels ($7.6 billion), iron and steel ($2.5 billion), aluminum ($1.6 billion), precious metal and stone (platinum) ($1.0 billion), and inorganic chemicals ($740 million). U.S. services exports to Russia, by contrast, have consistently exceeded imports. In 2017, the United States exported $4.9 billion in services to Russia and imported only $2.1 billion.

In 2018, Russia continued to implement its scheduled tariff reductions as prescribed by its WTO commitments. Following pressure from the United States, industry, and other WTO Members, Russia finally lifted its transit ban on poultry products. However, since then Russia has disrupted transit of U.S. poultry at border crossing points, referencing long dormant and obscure railway regulations and dubious sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) claims. Russia has exhibited some respect for the WTO’s emphasis on transparency and notified many draft measures to the relevant WTO committees. However, these few positive steps do little to counter the continued promulgation of Russia’s protectionist measures and disregard of the general principles of the WTO as well as many of the specific commitments that it made in the WPR.

Importing into Russia remains a difficult task. The United States continues to watch carefully the application of Russia’s tariff commitments, but non-tariff measures appear to pose the greatest barriers to trade. For example, Russia’s import licensing regime is burdensome and opaque, and its import licensing regime for products with cryptographic capabilities, in particular, restrains U.S. exporters’ ability to export many consumer electronic products to that market and raises questions of its WTO consistency. The United States will continue to press Russia to address these concerns, however meeting requests from the U.S. Embassy often are not granted.

U.S. exports to Russia are likewise hampered by a less than transparent customs legal regime, a situation exacerbated by Russia’s failure to meet its notification commitments in the Customs Valuation Committee and under the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. In addition, the United States will continue to monitor Russia’s implementation of the Eurasian Economic Union
(EAEU) Customs Code to ensure compliance with its WTO commitments. Although Russia appropriately notified its trade remedy laws to the WTO upon accession, the United States will continue to track Russia’s compliance with ongoing notification obligations and the Eurasian Economic Commission’s administration of its trade remedy laws.

The United States has also raised concerns about Russia’s export restrictions. Russia maintains a list of so-called “important” products that could become subject to export restrictions. The United States will continue to analyze Russia’s export regulatory regime to ensure its consistency with WTO disciplines, and will pursue enforcement actions as appropriate.

The agricultural sector continues to be one of the most challenging sectors for U.S. exporters. In addition to the import ban on nearly all agricultural goods from the United States and other WTO Members, Russia continues to erect unjustified barriers to U.S. agricultural exports. For example, the United States has raised concerns that Russia maintains sanitary and phytosanitary requirements that are not consistent with international standards or based on scientific justification, and requires attestations in veterinary certificates that are not based on international standards. The United States has also challenged Russia’s listing requirement for export establishments, veterinary restrictions on low-risk products, and transit bans. The United States has also raised concerns about Russia’s technical regulations, in particular those applicable to alcoholic products, and the adoption of certain good regulatory practices. Russia’s failure to follow WTO norms on these issues is very troubling.

The United States has raised concerns about many of Russia’s industrial policies. Specifically, the United States has voiced concerns about certain discriminatory measures adopted by Russia, including the application of its recycling fee, the administration of its copyright levy system, and the collection of value-added tax on the distribution of movies. Russia provides subsidies to many of its producers, and the United States has continued to press for information on those programs, and to highlight any inconsistencies with the relevant WTO disciplines. The United States has also sought information from Russia about its pricing policies on natural gas and railway tariffs to ensure that Russia is not using such policies to protect its market.

The United States, in conjunction with other WTO Members, has repeatedly questioned the expansion and WTO consistency of Russia’s array of import substitution policies. Even as
initially applied only to government procurement, such policies do not bode well for Russia’s
dedication to the market-opening principles of the Government Procurement Agreement.
However, Russia has expanded the reach of its localization/domestic content policies well
beyond government procurement to apply to its state-owned enterprises, and often by implication
to the private sector. For example, in July 2018 Russia terminated two egregious local content
programs -- automotive investment incentive programs under which automotive manufacturers
could import parts duty free provided they met domestic content requirements and production
targets -- but within a week announced state support programs conditioned on local content and
production quotas. The United States continues to press Russia on these practices in the WTO to
ensure that Russia meets its WTO obligations.

Russia’s localization policies have not been limited to goods and are beginning to impact exports
of U.S. services to Russia. The United States has raised questions about Russia’s data
localization law and limits on foreign ownership in the audio-visual and media service sectors.
The United States will continue to remind Russia of its national treatment obligations across the
range of service sectors.

Russia’s protection and enforcement of intellectual property has long been a concern for the
United States. Russia strengthened its intellectual property rights (IPR) regime as part of its
WTO accession, but reliable and effective implementation of those rules has stalled. The United
States has concerns about Russia’s implementation of its commitments on data exclusivity and
patent protection, in addition to concerns with Russia’s collective management regime. Recent
legislative proposals suggest that Russia may be introducing measures to allow compulsory
licenses on broad terms. Although Russia has improved somewhat its enforcement against
online piracy, it does not appear to have extended those enforcement efforts against the operators
of the infringing websites. The United States will continue to press Russia to improve its
protection and enforcement of IPR.

Finally, although WTO accession has, in general, made the rules-making process in Russia more
transparent, the United States continues to press Russia to notify the WTO about draft measures
in a timely manner to give trading partners an opportunity to express their concerns before
potentially WTO-inconsistent measures are passed into law.
Russia’s accelerating withdrawal from the market-opening rules of the WTO raises barriers to U.S. exports of goods and services. Since early 2014, the U.S. Government has curtailed its bilateral engagement with Russia in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, limiting USTR’s ability to raise directly with Russia our concerns about the adverse impact of its trade policies. Nevertheless, the United States will continue to examine and evaluate Russia’s trade and investment actions, and to hold Russia accountable for those actions in the WTO and other international forums. If the United States finds that Russia is not acting consistent with its WTO commitments, it will investigate and use all appropriate means to resolve the matter and keep Russia’s markets open to U.S. exports.

In 2012, the United States and others welcomed Russia into the WTO’s rules-based system with the hope of expanding the benefits of open and freely competitive markets. The reality has been disappointing. Russia has not embraced the responsibility of each WTO Member to implement its commitments and to permit reciprocal and mutually advantageous trade. Despite Russia’s continued reliance on inward-looking, protectionist economic policies, the United States will continue to press Russia to comply with its WTO commitments and pursue market-based principles. But, at the end of the day, Russia must decide its future and take responsibility for its actions and the impact of those actions on its citizens.

III. Russia and the Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Union

On January 1, 2010, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus began implementing a customs union (the Customs Union or CU) by adopting a common external tariff (CET), following a variety of preferential trading arrangements among the three countries over a number of years. On July 1, 2010, a common CU Customs Code entered into force, and on July 1, 2011, the CU member states abolished all customs posts on their internal borders, allowing for the free flow of most goods among the CU member states. Also on July 1, 2010, the three CU member states established the CU Commission as the permanent regulatory body of the CU.

In early 2012, the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) replaced the CU Commission as the supranational administrative and policy body charged with implementing external trade policy and regulation for the CU member states. The next significant event in the move toward greater economic integration was the entry into force on January 1, 2015, of the Eurasian Economic
Union Treaty (the Treaty) creating the EAEU, the successor to the CU. The following day, January 2, 2015, Armenia joined the EAEU, and on August 12, 2015, Kyrgyzstan became the fifth country to join the EAEU. Moldova became an EAEU observer in 2017.

The EAEU is larger than the CU in terms of geographic and substantive scope. The Treaty expanded the competence of the EEC into a number of new policy areas, including financial services, government procurement, intellectual property rights, industrial subsidies, and agricultural support measures. Beyond these areas, the Treaty commits the member states to harmonize national policies over time in the areas of financial regulation, monetary policy, macroeconomic policy, competition, transportation and rail policy, labor migration policy, and policies regulating their markets for oil, gas, and electricity.

Russia and the EAEU have established a legal framework that would allow an EAEU member state to comply fully with its WTO commitments. Moreover, the “Treaty on the Functioning of the Customs Union in the Framework of the Multilateral Trading System of 19 May 2011” (“Treaty on the Multilateral System”) requires that EAEU measures comply with the WTO Agreement as well as all commitments set forth in the Protocol of Accession and working party report of each EAEU member state; that the rights and obligations of an EAEU member state under the WTO Agreement override prior and future EAEU agreements and decisions of EAEU bodies; and that any treaty signed by the EAEU be consistent with the WTO commitments of each EAEU member state. When Russia joined the EAEU, it nominally transferred authority over many aspects of its foreign trade regime to the EAEU, including import tariff rates, trade in transit rules, non-tariff import measures (e.g., tariff-rate quotas, import licensing, and trade remedy procedures), customs policies (e.g., customs valuation, customs fees, and country of origin determinations), border enforcement of intellectual property rights, establishment and administration of special economic and industrial zones, and the development of technical regulations and SPS measures. As a result, many of Russia’s WTO commitments are implemented through EAEU measures. In such cases, Russia’s WPR specifically provides that Russia’s WTO commitments apply whether the Russian government or the competent bodies of the EAEU are responsible for implementation of the relevant commitment.

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6 For ease of reading, references to the EAEU in this Report generally include the CU.
IV. Russia in the World Trade Organization

On August 22, 2012, following 19 years of negotiations with the United States and other WTO Members, Russia became a Member of the WTO. At that time, however, the United States and Russia each invoked non-application of the WTO Agreement with respect to the other. On December 21, 2012, following the termination of the application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Russia and the extension of PNTR to the products of Russia, the United States and Russia both filed letters with the WTO withdrawing their notices of non-application and consenting to have the WTO Agreement apply between them.

V. Import Regulation

A. Tariffs and Border Fees

As a result of bilateral goods market access negotiations with the United States and 54 other WTO Members, Russia agreed to bind all 11,170 tariff lines in its tariff schedule. According to the WTO, after all of its tariff bindings are implemented (by 2020), Russia’s simple average final bound rate for all goods will be approximately 7.6 percent; 7.1 percent for industrial goods and 11.0 percent for agricultural goods.7

In industrial sectors, Russia agreed to bind its tariffs on wide body aircraft at 7.5 percent; Russia’s previously applied tariffs on these products were as high as 20 percent. Russia also committed to an average final bound tariff for plastics of 6.2 percent; Russia previously applied an average tariff of 10 percent. Russia agreed to an average final bound tariff rate of 6 percent on steel products; previously, Russia applied an average tariff rate of 8.9 percent. In the chemical sector, Russia’s final bound tariff rates will average 5.3 percent. Previously, Russian tariffs on chemicals averaged 6.7 percent and ranged as high as 20 percent. In the technology goods sector, Russia has completed the process of joining the ITA, and has eliminated its tariffs on computers, semiconductors, and other information technology products consistent with its ITA obligations.

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7 By contrast, the comparable figures for the United States are 3.4 percent for all goods; 3.2 percent for industrial goods; and 4.8 percent for agricultural goods. In other words, Russia’s commitments with respect to tariffs are significantly weaker than those made by the United States.
In 2016, Russia implemented its final bound tariff of 12.5 percent for wine; previously, Russia applied a tariff of 20 percent. For pears and other fresh fruit, Russia implemented its final bound tariff of 5 percent in 2015, in contrast to its previous applied tariff rate of 10 percent. As a result of U.S. efforts, Russia agreed to expand access to its market for U.S. meat products, liberalizing the tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for both pork and beef, including additional access for High Quality Beef with a 15 percent tariff outside of the TRQ for beef. Finally, Russia has committed to a maximum final bound tariff of 5 percent for live animals, with tariff lines for some live animals bound at zero percent. Russia previously applied up to a 40 percent tariff on live animals.

In 2018, Russia implemented another round of annual tariff reductions as required by its WTO commitments. Russia brought 77 tariff lines to their final bound rates in 2018, including certain chemical lines (from a bound rate at accession of 20 percent down to 6.5 percent), seats for use in aircraft (from a bound rate at accession of 20 percent down to 5 percent), beer (from a bound rate at accession of 0.6 Euros per liter to 0.18 Euro per liter) and prepared, preserved meat (from 20 percent, but not less than 0.5 € per kg, to 17 percent, but not less than 0.43 € per kg). Overall, Russia has implemented final bound rates for over 99 percent of its tariff lines. Russia cannot legally apply EAEU CET tariffs above these tariff bindings.  

Russia’s tariff reductions initially contributed to improved market access for U.S. goods exports, with U.S. goods exports to Russia increasing nearly 20 percent in the first year following Russia’s accession. Notwithstanding the greater market access created by Russia’s WTO access, U.S. exports to Russia started to decline in 2014, due to a variety of political and economic factors. That trend has recently reversed, however, with U.S. goods exports to Russia growing since 2016.

Russia’s implementation of certain tariff commitments has raised concerns. One source of concern has been Russia’s implementation of decisions of the EEC (the EAEU body responsible for administering the EAEU CET). In particular, pursuant to those decisions, Russia appears to have changed the type of duty on certain lines by augmenting the applied ad valorem rates with

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8 As a customs union, the EAEU applies a common external tariff. Russia’s WTO tariff schedule commitments, for the most part, bind the entire EAEU CET, with some temporary (lower) exceptions for Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan due to existing WTO tariff commitments.

9 Export data are based on data from the Global Trade Atlas. Russia has not provided import data for 2015.
an additional minimum specific duty (thereby creating a “combined tariff”). Under WTO rules, the resulting combined tariff must not exceed Russia’s bound tariff commitments. However, Russia has not informed WTO Members whether, for those goods subject to a combined tariff, the *ad valorem* equivalent of the specific duty is within the WTO *ad valorem* bound duty rate.

Of greatest concern, however, was Russia’s decision in July 2018 to adopt tariffs ranging from 25 percent to 40 percent on various industrial products imported from the United States, in retaliation against the President’s decision to adjust U.S. imports of steel and aluminum articles under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. The United States has urged Russia to work with the United States to address the common problem of excess capacity in the global steel and aluminum sectors, rather than engage in unjustified retaliation designed to punish American workers and companies. The United States will take all necessary actions to protect U.S. interests in the face of such retaliation. In this regard, on August 27, 2018, the United States launched dispute settlement proceedings against Russia at the WTO. Following unsuccessful consultations in November, the United States requested the establishment of a panel; a panel was established on December 18, 2018.

**B. Customs Fees**

Upon becoming a WTO Member, Russia agreed to comply with Article VIII of the GATT 1994, which requires that fees and charges imposed on or in connection with importation (other than tariffs) be limited to the approximate cost of the service provided. Russia amended its system of customs clearance fees to reduce those fees and establish fixed minimum and maximum fees for customs clearance of goods using electronic format or other simplified procedures for filing customs declarations. Russia’s implementation of these commitments is currently reflected in Article 47 of the EAEU Customs Code, which limits the amount of customs fees to the approximate cost of the service rendered. U.S. officials are not currently aware of any areas of concern with respect to Russia’s implementation of these commitments since becoming a WTO Member.

**C. Customs Valuation**

The WTO *Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994* (“Customs Valuation Agreement” or CVA) is designed to ensure that determinations of the customs value for the
application of duty rates to imported goods are conducted in a neutral and uniform manner, precluding the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs values. Adherence to the CVA is an important issue for U.S. exporters, particularly to ensure that market access opportunities provided through tariff reductions are not negated by unwarranted and unreasonable increases in the customs value of goods to which tariffs are applied. Russia agreed to implement its obligations under the CVA, including the interpretative notes, upon accession to the WTO, without any transition period. In addition, Russia took a specific commitment in the WPR, inter alia, not to use reference prices or fixed valuation schedules as a means for determining customs value and to provide for the right to appeal decisions that were based on a minimum value, fixed valuation schedule, or reference price.

Russia and its EAEU partners have integrated the CVA’s basic provisions into the EAEU legal framework. Specifically, the hierarchy of the six methods of customs valuation in the CVA, as well as most, but not all, of the provisions of the interpretative notes, are reflected in Russia’s domestic law and implemented by reference in the EAEU Customs Code. However, U.S. stakeholders report that Russia continues to lack clear regulations governing import valuation, creating uncertainty and increasing the paperwork load. In addition, U.S. stakeholders have, on occasion, raised concerns that Russia’s Federal Customs Service (FCS) is continuing to use reference prices that seem inconsistent with the invoice valuation. In response to these concerns, the United States has raised questions in the WTO Committee on Customs Valuation, and continues to urge Russia to provide copies of legislation related to customs valuation, and seeking clarification as to where in Russia’s, or the EAEU’s, legislation certain commitments of the CVA can be found. The United States will continue to meet with and solicit information from U.S. stakeholders concerning Russia’s valuation practices and work with the FCS to ensure full implementation of Russia’s commitments on customs valuation.

D. Trade Facilitation

The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) entered into force February 22, 2017. The TFA builds on earlier related provisions in the GATT and further expedites the movement, release, and

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10 WPR, ¶514.
11 WPR, ¶527.
clearance of goods, including goods in transit. It is the first WTO agreement in which these WTO Members can determine their own implementation schedules and in which progress in implementation is linked explicitly to capacity. Developed countries have committed to implement the Agreement immediately upon its entry into force.

Russia ratified the TFA on April 22, 2016, and as a developed country was obligated to implement all provisions on entry into force as of February 22, 2017. Russia has not, however, provided the required notifications, including four transparency notifications and yearly capacity building notifications.

E. Trading Rights

The right to import and export (e.g., to declare goods at the border for import and meet relevant requirements, such as payment of any customs duties, SPS measures, technical standards, and intellectual property rights protection) without having to invest in the importing country or employ a customs broker to facilitate market access is critically important, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises that may not be able to afford to establish an office in each market or that, for commercial reasons, need to be the importer of record for the goods. In 1991, Russia eliminated its state monopoly on foreign trade. However, prior to its WTO accession, Russia had not only limited the right to import and export goods to Russian enterprises, but it also required an “activity license” to engage in the business of importing or exporting (in addition to requiring import licenses on select products). As part of its WTO accession commitments, Russia eliminated the requirement for an activity license to import and export goods. Following Russia’s accession, the only requirement to engage in the business of importing and exporting is registration with the appropriate authorities in Russia, and Russia has committed to employing an expeditious and transparent registration policy.

Russia still requires an activity license as a precondition for obtaining an import license for some products (e.g., alcohol, encryption products, and pharmaceuticals). However, pursuant to Russia’s WTO commitments, the importer of record (declarant) is permitted to pay the relevant customs duties, fees and charges in connection with the importation of the goods, and meet other

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12 WPR, ¶216.
13 WPR, ¶227.
import requirements, without presenting this license. The person withdrawing the goods from
the customs checkpoint for distribution in Russia is now responsible for presenting the requisite
import or activity license.

U.S. officials are not currently aware of any areas of concern with respect to Russia’s
implementation of these commitments since becoming a WTO Member.

F. Quantitative Restrictions

Article I of the GATT 1994 requires that WTO Members accord MFN treatment to imports from
all other WTO Members. In addition, Article XI of the GATT 1994 generally prohibits the
imposition of restrictions or prohibitions (other than tariffs, taxes, or other charges) on imports,
except if justified under an applicable WTO provision. Notwithstanding these obligations, on
August 6, 2014, Russia issued an order banning certain agricultural imports from the United
States, the EU, Canada, Australia, and Norway for one year. The list of banned food included
certain beef, pork, poultry, fish and seafood products; fruits and nuts; vegetables; some sausages;
and most prepared foods. Russia has since amended the list of products covered by the ban and
expanded the list of countries for which products were banned, adding Ukraine, Albania,
Montenegro, Iceland, and Liechtenstein.14 In July 2018, Russia extended the ban for another
year, until December 31, 2019; no changes were made to the list of covered products. Russia
claims the current ban is justified on the basis of national security concerns. The United States
intends to press Russia on the stated justification for these troubling quantitative restrictions.

G. Import Licensing

The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures (Import Licensing Agreement) establishes rules
for all WTO Members that use import licensing procedures requiring the submission of an
application or other documentation (other than that required for customs purposes) to the
relevant administrative body as a prior condition for importation into the customs territory of the
importing Member. The Import Licensing Agreement serves to ensure that the procedures used
by Members in operating their import licensing systems do not, in themselves, form barriers to

14 The ban initially did not apply to agricultural products from Ukraine, but those goods became
subject to the ban as of January 1, 2016, the date on which Ukraine implemented the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU.
trade. An important objective of the Import Licensing Agreement is to increase transparency and predictability with respect to import licensing procedures and to establish disciplines to protect against unreasonable requirements or delays associated with such procedures.

To implement the rules of the Import Licensing Agreement, Russia amended aspects of its import licensing regime to liberalize and simplify the process of importing certain products subject to import control.\textsuperscript{15} For example, Russia agreed to eliminate the non-automatic import license requirement for sugar. In addition, when Russia became a WTO Member, it eliminated its non-automatic import licensing requirements for spirits and alcohol products and replaced them with an automatic licensing requirement.\textsuperscript{16} Industry stakeholders inform us that Russia has, in fact, continued to simplify its licensing regimes in many, but not all, areas.

Russia also agreed to liberalize its import licensing regime for products with cryptographic capabilities (encryption products). Prior to 2010, Russian law provided that any encryption product required an import license, and that the receipt of an import license was predicated on receiving an import permit from the Federal Security Service (FSB). In practice, however, many products with low-level encryption entered Russia without a license. In the WPR, Russia agreed to establish three categories (or “Buckets”) of encryption products with corresponding levels of control: (1) encryption products that can be imported with no customs formalities related to encryption; (2) encryption products that require only a one-time notification; and (3) encryption products that require an “import permission” and an import license. In addition, Russia agreed that, although an activity license to distribute encryption products would be required to obtain an import license for encryption products, encryption products covered by the first two categories would be exempt from the requirement to obtain an activity license to distribute encryption products. Russia also committed to integrate certain procedural safeguards into its licensing regime for encryption products, such as confirming that source code would not be required to obtain an import license and that once an import permission was obtained for an encryption good, the same good or a good used for the same purpose with identical encryption could be imported under an automatic license.\textsuperscript{17} Finally, Russia agreed to review its import licensing

\textsuperscript{15} See WPR, ¶¶456-457.
\textsuperscript{16} WPR, ¶460.
\textsuperscript{17} See WPR, ¶¶471-486.
regime in consultation with interested WTO Members and confirmed that it would add to Bucket 1 \textit{(i.e.,} allow into Russia without a license or notification) those products de-controlled in the future under Category 5, Part 2 “Information Security” of the Wassenaar Arrangement.\textsuperscript{18}

On December 31, 2009, Russia implemented an import licensing regime for encryption products, reducing the procedural hurdles for importing encryption products into Russia.\textsuperscript{19} However, after further review and following discussions with U.S. stakeholders, the United States has identified certain aspects of the regime that raise concerns with regard to Russia’s implementation of its commitments in this area. For example, the list of products subject to notification does not appear to reflect the definition of products that Russia agreed in the WPR would be subject to notification. In addition, U.S. electronics exporters report that Russia is not implementing properly the “mass market” category for products subject to notification. Furthermore, according to industry, Russia does not allow any encryption products to enter Russia “with no customs formalities related to encryption” \textit{(i.e.,} no recognition of Bucket 1). Moreover, Russia has not decontrolled (included in Bucket 1) any products that have been released from control under the Wassenaar Arrangement. U.S. electronics exporters also continue to raise concerns about the seemingly inconsistent application of the import licensing regime, absence of a written explanation when licenses are denied, issuance of licenses only for individual shipments rather than for all shipments of the “product family,” requirement that information be submitted on a product-specific basis, rather than on a family-specific basis, and delays in issuing a license. The United States plans to examine further this problematic licensing regime, and will continue to press the Russian government to address U.S. concerns regarding Russia’s implementation of its commitments on import licensing of encryption products.

**H. Trade Remedies**

Binding tariffs and applying them equally to all trading partners are key WTO requirements that contribute to the efficient flow of trade in goods. The WTO Agreement, however, permits Members to refrain from applying these requirements in certain limited circumstances. Trade remedy measures comprise three such circumstances: (1) actions taken to remedy the effect of

\textsuperscript{18} WPR \textsuperscript{¶}478 and 483.

\textsuperscript{19} Russia’s import licensing regime for encryption products was adopted \textit{in toto} by the EAEU.
imports of goods that are sold below normal value and are causing or threatening to cause material injury ("anti-dumping duties"); (2) actions taken to offset countervailable subsidies on imports that are causing or threatening to cause material injury ("countervailing duties"); and (3) measures that address an increase in imports that is causing or threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry ("safeguard measures"). Russia committed that, as of the date it became a Member of the WTO, any trade remedy measure in place or any trade remedy measure investigation launched before the date of accession would be consistent with the relevant WTO agreements on trade remedies, namely the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the Agreement on Safeguards.20

As a member of the EAEU, Russia has transferred responsibility for administering its trade remedy laws to the EEC. Importantly, however, Russia made a commitment that any trade remedy investigation or measure would be consistent with its WTO commitments regardless of whether the investigation had been commenced by, or the measure had been put in place by, Russia’s investigating authority or the EAEU investigating authority.21 To implement these commitments, prior to becoming a WTO Member, Russia revised its trade remedy law (covering anti-dumping and countervailing duties and safeguard measures). The new law reflected the procedural requirements of the WTO agreements, including the authorities’ need to disclose findings and reasoned conclusions on pertinent issues of fact and law; the requirement that an authority determine the accuracy of the information submitted by domestic and foreign parties; and the right of interested parties to submit comments during the investigation. In addition, the EAEU member states adopted several agreements to implement the WTO requirements on the use of trade remedy laws.

When Russia joined the WTO, it notified its trade remedy laws and procedures (and those of the CU) as required under the transparency provisions of the WTO Agreement and the WPR. It also provided notifications concerning the safeguard investigations that were in process when it joined the WTO and those initiated after it joined the WTO.

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20 WPR, ¶620.
21 WPR, ¶620.
In 2014, the EU commenced the only (to date) WTO challenge to Russia’s trade remedy measures, concerning Russia’s anti-dumping duties on light commercial vehicles from Germany and Italy. In 2017, the panel issued its report finding that Russia had acted inconsistently with its obligations under the Antidumping (AD) Agreement. On appeal in 2018, the Appellate Body also found that Russia had acted inconsistently with its obligations under the Antidumping Agreement. In April 2018, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified by the Appellate Body report. The United States participated actively before the panel and Appellate Body as a third party in this dispute, presenting arguments on the appropriate legal interpretation of provisions in the AD Agreement that apply to an authority’s injury determination. In particular, the United States offered arguments on the appropriate definition of the domestic industry, the requisite level of scrutiny on the price effects of dumped imports, the authority’s examination of the impact and effect of dumped imports, and other procedural obligations in the AD Agreement. In June 2018, Russia reported that with the expiration of the anti-dumping measure, it had fully implemented the DSB’s recommendations and rulings in this dispute.

Also in 2018, the EEC commenced an antidumping investigation against fiber optic cable from the United States and a safeguard investigation on certain types of rolled metal products. The United States will consult with the affected industries and continue to assess Russia’s compliance with its notification obligations and the EEC’s administration of its trade remedy laws.

VI. Export Regulation

When it acceded to the WTO, Russia agreed to reduce or eliminate export duties on a large number of products, including ferrous scrap and copper cathode, and bound the tariff levels of the remaining products on which it applied export tariffs. Russia also committed to adhere to Article XI of the GATT 1994, which generally prohibits WTO Members from maintaining export restrictions (other than duties, taxes, or other charges) except those that can be justified under applicable WTO provisions. Consistent with that commitment and the relevant EAEU agreements, Russia eliminated an export ban on grain imposed in 2010. Russia also confirmed

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22 WPR, ¶646.
that any export restraints imposed to ensure essential materials to domestic producers would not operate to increase the exports or the protection of that processing industry.23

Russia has amended its national regulations to replace the export licensing regime for precious stones, diamonds, and metals with an automatic licensing regime in order to reduce the number of goods subject to export licensing and to remove export bans and other quantitative restrictions on the export of certain types of goods. In addition, Russia has eliminated restrictions on the export of raw materials for pharmaceuticals and reduced the number of pharmaceuticals subject to export licensing.24 Also, consistent with the commitments on ferrous scrap and copper cathode contained in the WPR, Russia has reduced its export duties on those products as provided in its tariff schedule.25 Russia continues to maintain an export duty on wheat, but temporarily reduced the duty rate to zero (until July 1, 2019) to encourage exports.

During Russia’s WTO accession negotiations, the United States raised concerns about the conformity of Russia’s and the EAEU’s export licensing provisions with WTO disciplines, and Russia recognized that work needed to be done in this area.26 For example, Russia maintains, and regularly updates, a list of products “of utmost importance for the domestic market” the export of which could be subjected to export restrictions or prohibitions. In 2017, Russia expanded the list of products, including ferrous steel and non-ferrous scrap, which could be subject to export restrictions. Although not all listed products are subject to export controls, Russia has, for example, banned the export of raw hides intermittently since 2014 in order to protect its leather processing industry. In 2018, Russia restricted the export of ferrous scrap by permitting the export of ferrous scrap from only nine Far Eastern ports, some of which are not open year-round. In addition, Russia will introduce an export quota on the export of birch logs during the first half of 2019 and a ban on the export of conifers and pine for industrial processing is being considered. The United States has worked with other WTO Members to question Russia’s use of export controls, in particular their consistency with Russia’s WTO commitments.

23 WPR, ¶668.
24 WPR, ¶¶648-655.
25 WPR, Schedule CLXV, Part V.
26 See WPR, ¶¶665 and 666.
The United States will continue to scrutinize the evolution and implementation of the Russian and EAEU export regulatory regime to ensure its consistency with WTO disciplines.

VII. Agriculture

Upon its accession to the WTO, Russia assumed the obligations of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), as well as the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, which contains commitments in three main policy areas for agricultural products: market access, domestic support, and export subsidies. Russia also made a number of additional agriculture-related concessions on its level of financial support for agricultural production, as specified in the WPR.

A. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

The SPS Agreement establishes rules and procedures regarding the formulation, adoption, and application of SPS measures, i.e., measures taken to protect against risks associated with plant- or animal- borne pests and diseases, additives, contaminants, toxins, and disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages, or feedstuffs. The SPS Agreement requires that SPS measures address legitimate human, animal and plant health concerns; do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between WTO Members’ agricultural and food products; and are not disguised restrictions on international trade. The SPS Agreement requires that SPS measures be based on scientific principles and evidence. It also requires that SPS measures be based on relevant international standards or appropriate assessments of risk. At the same time, the SPS Agreement preserves each Member’s right to choose the level of protection it considers appropriate with regard to sanitary and phytosanitary risks.

In the WPR, Russia assumed each of these obligations together with the other obligations of the SPS Agreement as part of its accession. In the WPR, Russia specifically committed to ensure that all of its SPS measures, whether adopted by it or the competent bodies of the CU (now EAEU), would be based on international standards, guidelines, and recommendations unless a more stringent measure is justified by a risk assessment. Russia further explicitly committed that measures which were not based on international standards, guidelines, or recommendations would not be applied in Russia without providing Members a scientifically based justification of
the measures, in accordance with the SPS Agreement.\textsuperscript{27} Russia also confirmed that all SPS measures, whether adopted by Russia or by the competent bodies of the CU (now EAEU), would comply with the non-discrimination provisions of the SPS Agreement.\textsuperscript{28} SPS measures would not, Russia agreed, be used in such a way as to constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.

Russia, in addition, undertook the following specific obligations in the WPR: to negotiate and sign veterinary certificates that comply with World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) requirements for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy attestations; to base its requirements for goods subject to veterinary control on international standards; to ensure that its measures do not discriminate between imports from WTO Members or between Russia’s products and imports; to accept international standards regarding certain antibiotic residues or justify more stringent requirements with a risk assessment that conforms to international standards; and to ensure that any actions that are taken by Russian or EAEU authorities in response to non-compliance by importers with Russian or EAEU requirements are proportional to the non-compliance.\textsuperscript{29}

At the time of its accession, Russia confirmed the criteria for “de-listing” or “temporarily suspending” an establishment (an action which has the effect of prohibiting imports from that establishment), and committed to notify the exporting Member and give the exporting Member time to propose corrective measures. With regard to emergency measures, Russia confirmed that its decisions and procedures for de-listing or temporarily suspending an approved establishment would be in accordance with the SPS Agreement. Russia further confirmed that, by the time of accession, specific inspection guidelines would be developed that reflected the principles of equivalence and that were based on international standards, guidelines, and recommendations. Russia also agreed to remove certain veterinary control measures, such as the requirement that establishments (e.g., processing plants or storage facilities) be approved in order to export selected products to Russia, and confirmed that veterinary control measures applied to animal products would be modified only in accordance with the SPS Agreement.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{27} WPR, ¶1009.
\textsuperscript{28} WPR, ¶1033.
\textsuperscript{29} WPR, ¶¶ 895, 901, 926, 1009, 1033, and 1062.
\textsuperscript{30} WPR, ¶¶ 923, 926, 927, 932, and 908.
To ensure compliance with WTO rules on transparency, Russia confirmed that all Russian normative legal acts relating to SPS measures would be published in Russia’s two official journals and that EEC Decisions and other EAEU legal acts relating to SPS measures would be published on the EEC website. Russia further committed that drafts of SPS technical regulations and other mandatory requirements would be made publicly available for comment and that interested persons would have at least 60 days to provide comments on the drafts. Finally, Russia has established an SPS inquiry point and established a website with full detailed conditions for the importation of specific products.\(^{31}\)

Because the authority over many SPS matters was transferred to the EAEU, most of the measures necessary to implement Russia’s WTO SPS commitments must be adopted at the EAEU level. However, Russia’s national SPS measures continue to apply to the extent that they do not conflict with EAEU measures.

In order to assure WTO Members that Russia would implement its commitments regarding harmonization with the international standards, recommendations, and guidelines, Russia and the EAEU amended existing legislation and adopted new measures. The EAEU adopted decisions that committed Russia to three key principles: in the absence of EAEU or Russian requirements, the relevant international standards would apply; if there are stricter EAEU or Russian requirements that lack scientific justification, the international standards would apply; and lastly, that Russia or the EAEU would align its standards with the relevant international standards or provide a scientific justification following a request from an interested party, including foreign governments. In addition, Russia established a process for reviewing those SPS measures that interested parties believe are inconsistent with the international standards. Through this process, interested persons can request that specific SPS measures that are inconsistent with international standards be brought into conformity with the relevant international standard.

By 2011, the EAEU had established common veterinary requirements and 40 common forms of veterinary certificates for imports into the EAEU territory from any third country. During Russia’s accession negotiations, the United States and other Members expressed concern that many of the common veterinary requirements appeared to be more stringent than the relevant

\(^{31}\) WPR, ¶¶1051 and 1055.
international standards and did not allow the conditions in an exporting country to be taken into account. To allow exporting countries the opportunity to address these concerns with regard to some of the requirements in the pre-existing common veterinary certificates, the EEC extended the validity of bilateral veterinary certificates and provided Russian officials with the authority to negotiate certificates with exporting countries with terms that differ from EAEU common requirements. In addition, the EEC confirmed the EAEU member states’ right to amend the EAEU certificates and the requirement to reflect international standards established by the OIE and Codex Alimentarius (Codex), allowing the United States to negotiate certificates with the EAEU member states that may differ from the EAEU common form, and which better reflect the conditions of trade between the United States and Russia.\(^{32}\)

The United States and other WTO Members have also expressed concern about the veterinary requirements adopted by the EAEU, which included a requirement that all veterinary controlled products come from an establishment approved by all the EAEU member states. In order to address concerns regarding the extension of this requirement to many products, the EEC removed the establishment requirement for certain products including dairy and pet food.

To implement Russia’s commitments with regard to inspections, the EEC established the basis for joint inspections, systems audits, and acceptance of exporting country’s guarantees. In addition, the EEC adopted inspection guidelines for meat processing and storage establishments, fish and fish products, and dairy and dairy products in accordance with the relevant international standards and confirmed that it would not suspend imports from establishments based on the results of on-site inspections before it had given the exporting country the opportunity to propose corrective measures. To implement Articles 4 and 5 of the SPS Agreement concerning equivalence and risk assessment, the EEC established the basis for determining equivalence and conducting risk assessments in accordance with international standards.\(^{33}\)

Although Russia has put in place the legal framework to allow it to comply with its WTO commitments, its implementation of these commitments remains problematic. For example, Russia does not appear to have implemented fully its commitments to base measures on

\(^{32}\) WPR, ¶¶893 and 890.

\(^{33}\) See, WPR, ¶¶1022-1031.
international standards, or, where it applies a more stringent standard, to provide a science-based, objective risk assessment. Moreover, in those cases where Russia has provided the United States with a risk assessment purporting to justify its SPS measures, it is the judgment of U.S. government experts that those assessments do not appear to have been conducted taking into account risk assessment techniques of relevant international organizations. For example, Russia has adopted a zero tolerance for both ractopamine and trenbolone acetate, standards more stringent than Codex’s maximum residue levels (MRLs) for pork and beef, but does not appear to have provided risk assessments that conform to Codex guidelines. In addition, Russia has a near zero tolerance for tetracycline residues, a standard more stringent than Codex’s MRL, but again appears to have failed to provide WTO Members with a risk assessment that conforms to international guidelines. Russia also maintains non-science based microbial standards, such as a zero tolerance for salmonella, and requires that imports be tested in Russia (rather than in the United States prior to export). Russia’s testing standards, however, are not clearly defined. The United States raised these concerns directly with Russia prior to 2014 without a constructive response from Russia. Despite requests to Russia from the United States for adequate risk assessments based on Codex guidelines, none have been forthcoming.

The United States is also concerned about various Russian measures that disrupt or prohibit imports of certain U.S. agricultural products, including poultry products. For example, in December 2014, following a disease outbreak that was limited to poultry flocks in certain U.S. states, Russia imposed a ban on poultry products from all parts of the United States notwithstanding the existence of OIE guidelines that contemplate regionalized application of trade restrictions related to the disease in question. In May 2015, Russia extended the import ban to hatching eggs and live poultry; and in June 2015, Russia extended the import ban to cover transit of poultry and poultry products from the United States through Russian territory. Although Russia lifted this ban in February 2018 following concerted U.S. efforts, a new ban on U.S. poultry shipments transiting Russia for Kazakhstan was imposed in November 2018. Russia introduced this latest ban following purported evidence of banned substances in recent U.S. poultry shipments. The United States has supported other WTO Members’ requests to Russia in various WTO committees for further information on, and a justification for, such transit bans. Although Russia removed its transit ban in August 2018, it continued to disrupt
transit of U.S. poultry at border crossing points, referencing long dormant and obscure railway regulations and dubious SPS claims.

Also in May 2015, Russia issued a decision to prohibit the importation of all U.S. peanuts due to the detection of low levels of cadmium (too low to present a human health risk) in some shipments from the United States. In February 2016, the Russian Federal Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance Service (VPSS) announced a “temporary” suspension of imports of U.S. soybeans and corn (popcorn), without providing a strong scientific justification for the suspension. VPSS maintains an approach of extremely limited engagement with U.S. Government officials, but efforts continue to open the Russian market.

Another practice that has raised WTO concerns is Russia’s reluctance to accept an exporting country’s guarantees concerning the process for approving establishments as eligible to export to Russia. Notwithstanding Russia’s commitments regarding inspections and establishment approvals described above, securing acceptance by Russia of U.S. guarantees concerning U.S. procedures for approving establishments has become very difficult. Since July 2014, Russia has refused, without any apparent reason, to approve an establishment until after an on-site inspection or a systems audit has been conducted by the EAEU member states’ veterinary services.

The United States is also concerned with Russia’s apparent failure to implement its obligation to remove certain veterinary control measures for lower risk products. In 2011, the EAEU adopted a decision removing such veterinary control measures. However, days before Russia became a WTO Member, Russia’s veterinary service imposed a temporary measure to maintain the establishment listing requirement for lower risk products imported into Russia until after a successful audit has been completed. Despite strong objections by the United States and other WTO Members in the WTO and bilaterally prior to 2014, Russia has refused to withdraw this listing requirement.

In order to meet its WTO commitments, Russia agreed to negotiate veterinary certificates with the United States (or any other WTO Member) that differ from EAEU certificates after receiving substantiated requests from the United States (or other WTO Member). However, Russia insisted on including attestations in the new proposed certificates that do not appear to be based
on the relevant international standards and have offered no risk assessment in support of the alternative attestations, notwithstanding Russia’s commitments to conform its attestations to such standards unless a more stringent measure is justified through risk assessment. Engagement on new certificates has been difficult, with inconsistent participation by the EAEU member states’ experts and a lack of coordination among the EAEU member states. Moreover, there was limited incentive for the U.S. Government to engage because, but for Russia’s import ban, U.S. exporters could have exported under existing bilateral certificates. USTR and the U.S. Department of Agriculture will continue, where possible and permitted, to request technical level meetings with Russian counterparts in an effort to negotiate new certificates.

As a WTO Member, Russia must notify any new or modified SPS measures that affect international trade. In turn, as a member of the EAEU, Russia is also responsible for notifying changes to SPS measures adopted by the EEC. In 2018, Russia notified a number of SPS measures imposed by it and/or the EEC. However, Russia has still not notified SPS measures (both Russian measures and EEC measures) concerning sampling of food products, rules for registering genetically engineered organisms, and amendments to its veterinary certificates and surveillance rules. The United States will continue to intervene in the WTO SPS Committee to highlight Russia’s failures to meet this critical transparency obligation. As explained above, the United States’ bilateral work with Russia since 2014 on these issues has been limited due to Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine. Moreover, because Russia’s ban on imports of many agricultural products from the United States has dramatically reduced U.S. exports, engagement in the WTO has been limited. Nevertheless, the United States government will continue to meet and consult with industry stakeholders to discuss their concerns and strategies to remove these trade barriers.

**B. Domestic Supports and Export Subsidies**

When Russia joined the WTO, it was still restructuring its agriculture sector to recover from decades of central planning and an imbalance in prices and revenue. To support development and employment in the rural territories, and to encourage agricultural production, Russia had in place numerous subsidy programs. Nevertheless, Russia committed to a reduction of its domestic agriculture support payments to $4.4 billion by 2018, down from $9 billion aggregate measure of support binding in 2013. Moreover, Russia accepted an obligation to ensure that the
sum of all product-specific support does not exceed 30 percent of the non-product specific support. Finally, Russia agreed to eliminate all of its export subsidies. Russia has notified the WTO that it has met both these obligations.

In the WTO Committee on Agriculture, the United States closely reviews Russia’s notifications on its domestic agricultural programs to ensure their transparency and WTO consistency. In 2018, the United States raised concerns about Russia’s subsidization of railway freight to compensate for part of the cost transporting grains and various food and agricultural products to ports of potential export to anywhere in the world. The United States will continue to track Russia’s support for the agriculture sector to ensure transparency and consistency with WTO obligations.

VIII. Internal Policies Affecting Trade

A. Non-Discrimination

In the WPR, Russia agreed to assume the obligations of the GATT 1994, the WTO agreement that establishes the core disciplines that constrain and guide WTO Members’ policies relating to trade in goods. Two core disciplines of the GATT 1994 are the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) treatment – referred to in certain U.S. legislation as “normal trade relations” – and national treatment. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains parallel MFN and national treatment obligations with respect to services.

The MFN rule for goods (Article I of the GATT 1994) prohibits a Member from discriminating against imported goods of one trading partner in favor of the imported goods of another trading partner. Accordingly, if a WTO Member grants one WTO Member’s goods a benefit or advantage, it must immediately and unconditionally grant the same benefit or advantage to like goods imported from all WTO Members. This rule applies to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed in connection with importation and exportation, as well as to internal taxes and charges, and other internal measures. Article II of the GATS provides for a comparable MFN obligation for services.

The national treatment rule with respect to goods (Article III of the GATT 1994) complements the MFN rule. It prohibits discrimination against imported goods vis-à-vis the importing
Member’s own goods. Generally, a WTO Member may not subject imported goods from another WTO Member to internal taxes or charges in excess of those applied to like domestic goods. Similarly, with regard to measures affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use of goods, a WTO Member may not treat imported goods less favorably than like domestic goods. The national treatment rule applies in a similar manner to services under Article XVII of the GATS. This provision requires a WTO Member, in sectors in which it has taken commitments in its schedule, to accord no less favorable treatment to services and service suppliers of other WTO Members than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.

The WPR elaborates on Russia’s commitment to apply both Articles I and III of the GATT 1994, as well as Articles II and XVII of the GATS. Throughout the 19 years of accession negotiations, Russia reviewed its laws and regulations and made an effort to revise those that conflicted with its WTO MFN and national treatment obligations, e.g., measures governing prices charged for railway transport, application of internal taxes, subsidies for new automobiles, and the right to import and export. In addition, Russia, in conjunction with its EAEU partners, reviewed the EAEU agreements, regulations, and decisions to ensure their conformity with the MFN and national treatment provisions of the WTO Agreement.

However, since Russia’s WTO accession, national treatment concerns have been raised in connection with the imposition of a number of Russian measures and policies. Although Russia amended its “recycling” fee on motor vehicles in response to concerns about its discriminatory application (by removing the exemption for motor vehicles manufactured in the EAEU), Russia has now adopted a Waste Management Law that imposes a “disposal fee” on waste products (e.g., plastic containers and paper packaging) as well as on agricultural and forestry machinery (known as a “utilization fee”) to be paid by importers and domestic producers to cover the recycling, salvage, reclamation, and disposal of those products. In 2018, Russia expanded the list of vehicles subject to the recycling fee to include certain construction and agricultural equipment.

U.S. stakeholders contend that although the utilization fee appears non-discriminatory because it must be paid by both importers and domestic producers, in fact, Russia has introduced subsidies that effectively reimburse domestic producers for having to pay the utilization fee. In 2018,
Russia updated those subsidy programs, extending the subsidies and amending the qualifications in ways that continue to exclude imports or products made in Russia by foreign-owned companies. The United States will consult with U.S. stakeholders affected by this fee to evaluate its impact on U.S. exports. Moreover, USTR will scrutinize the implementation of the law and the introduction of any new fees and subsidies and take appropriate action in the WTO necessary to press Russia to comply with its WTO commitments and not discriminate against U.S. exports.

Similarly, Russia’s copyright levy system continues to raise national treatment concerns. Russia collects a levy on both domestically produced and imported products that can be used to reproduce copyrighted material for personal use (e.g., video recorders, voice-recorders, photocopy machines). However, the list of domestically produced products on which the levies are paid appears to differ from the list of imported products on which the levies are paid. In addition, the reporting and payment systems appear to differ. The FCS provides information on imports to the Ministry of Culture, which in turn provides the information to the collecting society to verify the payment of the levies, whereas domestic manufacturers pay based on sales and self-notify. U.S. officials have reviewed Russia’s copyright levy regime and discussed with industry representatives. USTR’s WTO delegate has met with Russia’s WTO delegate to seek an explanation about this seemingly discriminatory practice, and will continue to press Russia to eliminate any discriminatory practices.

The United States also has concerns regarding national treatment with regard to taxation of distribution services on motion pictures. Russia applies an 18 percent VAT on payments for the “right to use” (i.e., payments for distribution services) cinema products. However, the recipient of the payment can apply for a VAT rebate if the cinema product is “Russian.” A “Russian” cinema product is defined as a movie in which the producer is Russian; a majority of authors are Russian residents; at least 30 percent of the cast and crew are Russian residents; the movie is in the Russian language; at least 50 percent of the movie is financed by Russian residents; or the movie is produced under special international agreements. In other words, the VAT collected on payments for the “right to use” a “Russian” movie (as defined in the Russian Tax Code) can be reimbursed whereas the VAT collected on payments for the “right to use” a U.S. or other non-Russian movie cannot be reimbursed. This discriminatory tax regime raises concerns about Russia’s implementation of its national treatment commitments. USTR has reviewed
information provided by U.S. stakeholders and studied the relevant Russian laws and regulations. With this information in hand, USTR’s WTO delegate initiated a discussion with Russia’s WTO delegate and will continue to press Russia for a satisfactory resolution of the seemingly discriminatory tax regime.

**B. Industrial Policy, Including Subsidies**

Upon its accession to the WTO, Russia assumed obligations under the *WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures* (SCM Agreement), which addresses the use of subsidies and countervailing duty measures by WTO Members. In the WPR, Russia committed that it would eliminate, by the time of its accession, all subsidy programs prohibited under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, i.e., subsidies contingent on export performance (export subsidies) and subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods (import substitution subsidies).[^34] In addition, Russia took a specific commitment to extend subsidies for the purchase or lease of aircraft to include the purchase or lease of foreign-made aircraft that had previously been available only for the purchase or lease of Russian-made aircraft.[^35]

With regard to its transparency commitments, both during its accession negotiations and as a Member, Russia has provided subsidy notifications to the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Committee). The United States has pressed Russia to provide complete information about its subsidy programs, particularly those that appear to be prohibited export subsidies. The United States continues to assess Russia’s compliance with its commitments under the SCM Agreement to ensure full transparency.

During Russia’s WTO accession negotiations, Members raised concerns about specific subsidy programs related to automobiles, civil aircraft, and agricultural equipment. Since then, Russia has eliminated some support programs for its automotive and civil aircraft industries. USTR has gathered information from U.S. stakeholders and other sources concerning a program benefitting agricultural equipment, under which Russia disburses financial support to producers of agriculture equipment that may be contingent on a certain level of local production. Stakeholders have also noted a proposal to require automotive manufacturers to use Russian-

[^34]: WPR, ¶698.
[^35]: WPR, ¶1200.
made metals in their manufacturing processes in order to qualify for state subsidies. In the coming year, the United States will continue to meet with interested U.S. exporters as well as other adversely affected foreign producers to discuss the implementation and operation of these programs. In addition, USTR will review carefully Russia’s next subsidy notification. The United States will not hesitate to take appropriate action in the WTO if it determines that Russia has failed to meet its transparency obligations or is providing WTO-inconsistent subsidies to its manufacturers.

USTR has received information with respect to certain benefits provided to manufacturers in the “Titanium Valley” Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Sverdlovsk region. According to a U.S. stakeholder, the primary beneficiary of these programs is Verkhne Saldinskoye Metallurgical Production Association (VSMPO), currently the only titanium producer in Russia. VSMPO exports 70 percent of the titanium it produces. Russia has notified its SEZ programs, and the United States has sought additional information on these programs. Another possible subsidy to the Russian titanium industry (i.e., VSMPO) may have occurred in the form of the allegedly below-market price paid by Nordcom (a joint venture created by VSMPO and Gazprombank) in its purchase of VSMPO from the Russian government. USTR will seek further information about these subsidy programs and take any appropriate action in the WTO to redress any actionable subsidies.

The Russian government has in place a growing number of initiatives aimed at supporting various domestic industries, particularly as imports decline in response to Russia’s import substitution policies. Recent programs include subsidies that appear to compensate local manufacturers for paying the “utilization fee” (see above) and subsidies to reimburse costs to obtain foreign patents for Russian inventions, and proposed subsidies to support clinical trials abroad to encourage the export of medicines. The United States will continue to examine Russia’s subsidy notifications and work with U.S. stakeholders to study and assess the impact on U.S. exports of Russia’s subsidy policies and programs, with particular attention to the aviation industry as well as the agriculture and agricultural equipment industry. If the United States concludes that Russia is administering any countervailable subsidies, it will take appropriate action in the WTO.
C. State-Owned, -Controlled, and -Trading Enterprises

In addition to the disciplines in the WTO Agreement on the activities of state-owned and state-controlled enterprises (SOEs), and state-trading enterprises (STEs), Russia agreed in the WPR to additional disciplines. In particular, Russia agreed that state-owned and state-controlled enterprises, when engaged in commercial activity, would make purchases that were not intended for governmental use and sales in international trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement.36 Such enterprises would make purchases and sales of goods and services in accordance with commercial considerations, such as price, quality, marketability, and availability, and afford enterprises of other WTO Members the opportunity to compete for participation in such purchases and sales. These commitments covered all goods, as well as services for which Russia has taken commitments in its services schedule, taking into account the limitations set out in its services schedule, the rights and obligations of Russia under the GATS, and the regulatory measures of Russia otherwise covered by the WTO Agreement.

As confirmed in the WPR, Russia has many state-owned enterprises and state-controlled enterprises that operate in the commercial sphere. Prior to becoming a WTO Member, Russia took various steps to eliminate special privileges for most of those companies.

Since Russia’s WTO accession, U.S. government officials have studied Russia’s growing control over its broad state-owned sector. It is evident that, over the past several years, Russia has imposed a growing number of import substitution requirements on SOEs. For example, the Russian government has assumed the authority to establish for SOEs procurement plans and tender rules for the procurement of specific goods, works, and services and established the Government Import Substitution Commission with responsibility for approving procurement of machinery and equipment for large investment projects by SOEs, state corporations, or certain private businesses, as well as foreign procurement of certain industrial products. Moving to support specific industries, the government has banned certain companies in which the government owns more than 50 percent of the shares from purchasing imported automobiles, metal products, and heavy machinery; ordered all federal agencies and funds to transition to domestically produced software; formally recommended that regional and municipal authorities

36 WPR, ¶99.
switch to domestically produced software; banned SOEs from purchasing imported software and machinery; and restricted to domestic manufacturers the procurement of 11 types of equipment used by SOEs for projects co-funded or guaranteed by government funds unless a waiver was obtained from the Government Commission on Import Substitution. In 2016, the government of Russia established a 15 percent price preference for goods of Russian origin and to works and services performed and rendered by Russian entities; in late 2017, a proposal was put forward to increase that pricing preference to 25 percent.

In response to Russia’s continued reliance on policies directing the purchase of Russian-made goods and services, especially with regard to SOEs, USTR has met with and discussed the impact and ramifications of these policies with a broad array of U.S. stakeholders, foreign government officials, and other experts. The United States, in conjunction with other interested WTO Members, has repeatedly raised questions in the WTO Committee on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS Committee) about the consistency of these programs with Russia’s WTO commitments and sought additional information. The United States will continue to scrutinize and analyse the adoption and operation of these measures to ensure that Russia implements its WTO commitments and does not discriminate against U.S. exports.

With regards to STEs, Russia has a biennial obligation to notify its STEs to the WTO’s Working Party on State Trading Enterprises (STE Working Party). Russia missed the biennial deadline to make the required notification three times, most recently in June 2018. The United States has raised this issue in every STE Working Party meeting for the past three years; in 2018, the United States also raised Russia’s failure to meet its transparency commitments in the Committee on Agriculture. In response, Russia has informed WTO Members that the notification was being finalized in Moscow and would be presented “very soon.” Of particular concern is Russia’s failure to notify state-owned Gazprom, which owns and controls all of the gas pipelines in Russia. In 2013, Russia granted Rosneft and Novatek the right to export liquefied natural gas, but Gazprom retains a monopoly of pipeline gas exports. The United States will continue to press Russia on this issue.
D. Pricing Policies

In the WPR, Russia agreed that it would not use price controls to restrict the level of imports of goods or services, or for the purpose of protecting the production of domestic goods or impairing its services commitments. In addition, Russia listed in the WPR the limited number of products and services remaining subject to price control or government guidance pricing, and it provided detailed information on the procedures used for establishing prices.

Russia also specifically committed to unify rail transportation charges to ensure that, by July 1, 2013, products imported into, and products destined for exportation or sold for export from, Russia would face the same transportation charges. Russia further committed that regulated railway tariffs would be published before they entered into force. In December 2012, Russia’s Federal Tariff Service issued an order governing its tariff policy on rail freight and published draft measures and orders on its website. In 2017, WTO Members raised concerns in the Committee on Agriculture about Russia’s introduction of a discount on railway tariffs for exported grains from certain regions of Russia.

With regard to natural gas, Russia was allowed under its WTO commitments to continue its domestic price regulatory regime. Russia committed that producers and distributors of natural gas in Russia (including Gazprom, but also independent producers Rosneft and Novatek) would operate – within the relevant regulatory framework – consistent with normal commercial considerations to recover their costs and make a profit. However, Russia’s progress in meeting this commitment appears to be modest and uneven. In 2007, Russia started a long-term process to equalize the return on domestic gas sales as compared to the return on international gas sales. Russia has continued to delay the date by which it will achieve equal profitability of export and domestic industrial sales, including through cancellation in 2014 of a planned domestic tariff increase. Based on information obtained from U.S. stakeholders in meetings and written communications, it appears that the domestic price for industrial users may be below export prices. The United States will continue to work with U.S. stakeholders to investigate the pricing of natural gas in the Russian market.
E. Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessments

As a WTO Member, Russia has assumed the obligations of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), which establishes rules and procedures regarding the development, adoption and application of standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures (such as testing or certification) used to determine whether a particular product meets such standards or regulations. The TBT Agreement applies to all products, including industrial and agricultural products, and establishes rules that help eliminate unnecessary obstacles to trade. Furthermore, the TBT Agreement requires, among other things, that such standards-related measures be developed and applied transparently and on a non-discriminatory basis by WTO Members and be based on relevant international standards and guidelines, when appropriate. To comply fully with the WTO’s transparency requirements for technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures, Russia must notify to the WTO all technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures that are not based on relevant international standards and that may have a significant effect on trade of other WTO Members, and ensure that other Members have adequate time to submit comments and to have those comments taken into account.

Russia’s standards-related measures are implemented through EEC and EAEU measures and Russian domestic requirements. In the WPR, Russia committed to comply with all provisions of the TBT Agreement, including those relating to transparency and predictability.37 In addition, Russia has taken specific commitments with regard to technical regulations affecting the telecommunications equipment and civil aviation sectors.38

As Russia has begun to move from national regulations to regional (EAEU) regulations, it has begun to notify those regional regulations. During the past year, Russia notified several regional technical regulations to the WTO’s TBT Committee. Russia has not, however, notified its new registration requirements for alcohol products, despite repeated requests by the United States in the WTO TBT Committee that it do so. It has also failed to notify other legislative acts establishing technical standards and regulations governing the required installation in civil aircraft of navigational systems compatible with Russia’s global navigation system (GLONASS).

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37 See WPR, ¶¶712, 714, 715, 728, 738, and 739.
38 WPR, ¶¶ 738 and 744.
USTR and other U.S. government officials have met with representatives of the U.S. spirits industry to discuss Russia’s regulation of its alcoholic beverage sector. U.S. stakeholders have raised a number of concerns about consistency of Russia’s regulatory regime with the substantive and procedural requirements of the TBT Agreement. Following some investigation and analysis by USTR and other U.S. Government officials of the legal measures governing Russia’s regulation of this sector, U.S. officials raised concerns in the WTO TBT Committee about the EAEU’s draft regulation on alcoholic product safety, in particular with regard to the conformity assessment requirements, traceability requirements, certain wine and beer definitions, aging requirements for whisky, and the requirement for an expiration date on certain alcoholic beverages (a requirement not in keeping with international standards). The EEC continues to work on a draft regulation governing alcoholic beverages, but without further input from interested parties. The United States has stressed the importance of Russia implementing its obligations consistent with the TBT Agreement, including its transparency obligations. In the coming year, the United States will study Russia’s response to our concerns, watch for new measures, and seek resolution of any remaining or new issues.

In addition, USTR and other U.S. government officials have held many discussions with representatives of the U.S. toy industry concerning mandated pre-market evaluations required in draft amendments to the EAEU’s regulation “On Safety of Toys.” According to the U.S. toy industry, the draft regulation does not provide any details concerning how the pre-market evaluations would operate, the standards for approval, or how the experts making the evaluation would be selected. U.S. Government representatives met with officials of the government of Kazakhstan (the initiator of the measure) to solicit information, raise concerns and discuss the importance of international standards. In addition, U.S. Government officials expressed similar concerns to Russia’s WTO delegates regarding the importance of international standards and WTO obligations. The United States will continue to study and analyze the development of the EAEU’s toy regulation, and work with Russia and other EAEU member states to ensure that the EAEU regulation is consistent with Russia’s TBT commitments and does not block U.S. exports.

Similarly, Russia has introduced a compulsory requirement that producers of pharmaceutical products must be certified for compliance with good manufacturing practices (GMP); the regime went into effect in 2016 for new drugs and in 2017 for renewals. USTR and other U.S.
Government officials have held many conversations about this new regime with U.S. stakeholders. Although the introduction of GMP is not necessarily problematic, Russia did not notify this measure to give other WTO Members an opportunity to review. More importantly, U.S. stakeholders have explained that Russia’s GMP regime accords differential treatment to foreign versus Russian manufacturers, and that Russia has not put in place the inspection infrastructure necessary to certify expeditiously manufacturing sites for compliance with GMP provisions in such a way as to avoid market and trade disruptions and to ensure that the measures do not, in practice, disproportionately adversely impact imports. U.S. officials have met bilaterally with Russian officials on the margins of the TBT Committee to discuss these concerns, and Russia has agreed that previously issued pharmaceutical certificates will be valid until 2025. The United States will continue to press Russia to respond to the needs and concerns of U.S. stakeholders to ensure that Russia’s market remains open to U.S. exports of pharmaceutical products.

U.S. officials have also engaged with Russia concerning Russian and EEC technical regulations governing medical devices. U.S. officials have met and spoken with U.S. stakeholders about their concerns, and collaborated with WTO Members to develop strategies to counter Russia’s efforts to exclude U.S. exports for medical devices from its market. On many occasions, the United States has raised concerns in the WTO about unclear device classifications, lack of consistency with international best practices in market approvals, long processing times for market authorizations, and onerous labeling requirements. U.S. officials have also noted the inadequate comment period provided by the EEC. In response, the EEC extended the transition period through 2021 (after which the Russian registration system will be replaced by the EEC system) and the Russian Ministry of Health extended the re-registration period for current devices until 2021 in Russia. U.S. officials will continue to work with the U.S. medical devices industry to ensure that Russia complies with its WTO obligations and does not discriminate against U.S. exports.

U.S. officials continue to urge the Russian delegation to notify new measures and amendments to the WTO TBT Committee, and to provide responses to inquiries posed by U.S. stakeholders, and to emphasize the importance of stakeholder input during the drafting process.
The United States will continue to review closely Russia’s and the EEC’s technical regulations and work to ensure their consistency with the requirements of the TBT Agreement. In addition, the United States will continue to remind Russia of its transparency obligations. If the United States determines that Russia is not meeting its WTO obligations, it will take the necessary and appropriate action to ensure that Russia does not use its technical regulations to create unnecessary obstacles to U.S. exports.

F. Government Procurement

The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), a plurilateral agreement, which currently includes 47 WTO Members (including the United States), applies to government procurement of goods and services. The GPA requires GPA members to provide national treatment for covered procurement to the goods, services, and suppliers of other GPA members and to adhere to detailed procedures designed to ensure fairness, predictability, and transparency in the procurement process.

In the WPR, Russia committed to request observer status in the GPA and to begin negotiations to join the GPA within four years of its WTO accession. Russia became a GPA observer on May 29, 2013, and on June 2, 2017, circulated its initial GPA market access offer. On January 8, 2018, Russia circulated its response to the Checklist of Issues that provided detailed information about the Russian procurement system. In May 2018 the United States submitted questions and comments on Russia’s initial market access offer reflecting the U.S. view that Russia’s initial offer falls short in a number of areas including entity coverage (central, sub-central, and SOEs), goods and services coverage, and general notes. Also in May 2018, the United States submitted questions on Russia’s response to the checklist to understand better how the Russian procurement system functions and whether it would satisfy GPA obligations.

According to research undertaken by USTR and other parts of the U.S. Government, since joining the WTO, Russia has introduced a number of measures that establish preferential treatment for domestically or EAEU produced goods in public procurement such as a 15 percent

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39 WPR, ¶1143.
40 As part of its response, the United States objected to Russia’s treatment of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation.
price preference for goods of EAEU origin in purchases for government use. In some cases, Russia has banned government procurement of certain imported products if such products are available from manufacturers in the EAEU, including a wide range of machinery (particularly that used in construction and in raw materials extraction), vehicles, medical devices or pharmaceutical products, computer hardware and software, a broad array of light industrial goods, construction and building materials, and a variety of agricultural products. In addition, U.S. stakeholders have reported that Russia’s procurement rules mandate not only that Russian government entities must purchase Russian-made products, but that private contractors must use only Russian-made products. The United States is assessing whether the buy local policy applied to the purchases of private contractors can be consistent with Russia’s WTO obligations.

The United States, joined by other Members, has raised concerns in numerous WTO committee meetings about Russia’s adoption of policies that appear to discriminate against imports in public procurement. As the United States considers Russia’s possible accession to the Government Procurement Agreement, these measures and policies will be a significant focus.

IX. Services

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides a legal framework for addressing barriers affecting trade in services. The GATS contains general obligations, such as MFN and transparency, which apply to all service sectors. In addition, under the GATS, Members undertake specific commitments to provide market access and national treatment in particular sectors as set out in each Member’s schedule to the GATS. One of the objectives of the GATS is progressive liberalization, and toward that end it provides for further negotiations to open services markets of other WTO Members.

In its services schedule, Russia committed to substantial openness in a broad range of services sectors, including through the elimination of many existing limitations in service sectors of importance to the United States, such as financial services, telecommunications, distribution, energy, express delivery, professional services, and audio-visual services.41

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41 See WPR, Part II – Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services.
Russia also took “horizontal” (cross-sectoral) commitments related to its regulatory processes and structure. During the years of Russia’s WTO accession negotiations, it undertook a series of steps to improve the business environment in Russia, including streamlining the processes for company registration and reducing the number of activities subject to licensing. To address concerns of WTO Members about its activity licensing regime, Russia committed to make publicly available its measures affecting trade in services, as well as the names of the competent authorities responsible for issuing licenses. Russia undertook specific commitments to ensure transparency in the process for granting and denying licenses and to ensure that the relevant regulatory authority would not be accountable to any service supplier that it regulates in sectors where Russia had taken specific commitments. Russia further committed to instituting notice and comment requirements to ensure transparency in the development of the regulatory regime governing those same sectors. Russia’s services commitments also establish the rules for business visas for executives and professionals, and allow service companies to transfer vital employees to their operations in Russia.

A. Financial Services

Russia undertook significant market opening commitments in the financial services sector, including allowing 100 percent foreign ownership of certain non-insurance financial services firms, including banks, broker dealers, and investment companies. Russia agreed that foreign companies can own and trade the full range of securities (including state securities, bullion, and new instruments, once they are approved), lead-manage Russian securities issuance, and participate in financing the privatization of government-owned firms. Russia also agreed to allow important cross-border services such as financial leasing, financial information, and data processing, as well as credit cards and other types of payments. U.S. officials are not currently aware of any areas of concern with respect to Russia’s implementation of its WTO GATS commitments with regard to non-insurance financial services.

With regard to insurance, Russia has agreed to provide a significant level of market access and national treatment for U.S. insurance companies, including 100 percent foreign ownership of non-life insurance firms. Russia has also committed to phase out its existing restrictions on foreign insurance firms. Limits on the number of life insurance licenses granted to foreign insurance firms, as well as foreign participation in a small number of mandatory insurance lines,
were to be phased out over five years from the date of Russia’s accession. Russia committed to allow foreign insurance companies to open direct branches for life and non-life insurance, reinsurance, and services auxiliary to insurance nine years from the date of its accession.

In 2016, Russia established a state-owned re-insurance company and mandated that Russian insurance companies place ten percent of their reinsurance business with the new state-owned company. Because Russia did not take any reservations or limitations to its insurance services commitments, this mandatory placement of business with a specific company could raise questions about its WTO consistency. The United States has sought clarification from Russia regarding this reinsurance requirement, but received no response.

B. Telecommunications

Russia agreed to open its market for telecommunication services, both on a facilities and non-facilities basis, to all WTO suppliers as of the date of its accession to the WTO. Sectoral coverage is comprehensive, and Russia committed to allow telecommunications companies to operate as 100 percent foreign-owned enterprises. Importantly, Russia eliminated the requirement that a fixed satellite operator must establish a commercial presence in Russia in order to provide capacity to a Russian telecommunications company. Russia also accepted the pro-competition WTO Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper that requires the establishment of an independent regulator, the prevention of anti-competitive behavior by dominant suppliers, and the introduction of transparency obligations and interconnection requirements. U.S. officials are not currently aware of any concerns with respect to Russia’s implementation of its WTO GATS commitments in this area since it became a WTO Member, but will continue to review Russia’s implementation of these commitments.

C. Computer and Related Services

Russia committed not to limit market access and to extend national treatment to all computer and related services, including on a cross-border basis. This latter commitment is particularly important, given the growth of cloud computing, which is covered by Russia’s WTO commitments. An ongoing concern is how this commitment will be implemented in light of Russia’s 2001 Data Protection Law, which includes an “adequacy” standard to ensure privacy protection of the data, but has yet to provide alternative mechanisms to allow for the transfer of
personal information outside of Russia without the consent of the data subject. In addition, Russia’s so-called Data Localization Law has raised WTO-consistency concerns. Even though the law has been in effect for over a year, Russia still has not issued any implementing regulations, creating enormous uncertainty among both domestic and foreign companies as to the actual requirements of the law. However, the core requirement appears to be that any collection of personal data on Russian citizens must be done using servers in Russia. This requirement may violate a number of Russia’s commitments related to cross-border services.

Russia’s “16-point Plan” for the information technology sector also raises additional national treatment and import substitution concerns. USTR has reviewed the relevant laws (and the few subsidiary measures and explanatory documents available) and consulted with a wide variety of U.S. stakeholders and trading partners impacted by this law. The United States continues to consult with U.S. stakeholders and foreign interlocutors on these issues, and to scrutinize closely Russia’s information technology sector policies and the implementation of its commitments in this area to ensure that U.S. interests are not adversely impacted.

**D. Distribution Services**

Russia committed to liberalize its wholesale, retail, and franchise sectors by allowing foreign distributors to operate as 100 percent foreign-owned enterprises upon its accession to the WTO. Therefore, U.S. distributors are to be allowed to engage in the distribution of most products, including nutritional supplements, with minimal limitations and on terms comparable to those of domestic distributors. Russia’s WTO commitments for distribution services also provide for direct sales by individual commission agents.

However, U.S. stakeholders have told USTR that rules that require that sales of specialized dietary products containing biologically active substances be sold only through pharmacies and specialized stores remain in effect. These restrictions may raise questions with regard to Russia’s compliance with its commitment to allow direct sales of such products. The United States will urge Russia to revise these measures in order to clarify the legal status of such sales.
E. Audio-Visual and Media Services

Russia made strong commitments related to its dynamic film, television, and media sectors, including in motion picture distribution and projection services, the sale of programming to television and radio stations, printing and publishing, and news agency services. Russia also agreed to allow foreign audio-visual companies to operate as 100 percent foreign-owned enterprises. Since 2015, however, Russia has banned advertisements on pay cable and satellite channels. It is unclear whether the law applies to state-owned television channels, but because those channels are subsidized by the state and hence rely little, if at all, on advertising revenue, the ban is likely to have little, if any, practical impact on them. Further, in 2017, Russia adopted a law limiting foreign ownership of large online streaming companies (i.e., over 100,000 daily views Russia-wide per month) to 20 percent. Russia has not, however, issued any implementing legislation, resulting in significant uncertainty to the market. Also in 2017, Russia began enforcing a law (adopted in 2014) that limits foreign ownership of Russian media assets to 20 percent. The United States will consult with U.S. stakeholders regarding the impact of these measures on U.S. interests and will ensure Russia acts consistently with its WTO obligations.

X. Intellectual Property Rights

Upon joining the WTO, Russia assumed all the obligations of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and the additional commitments on IPR issues contained in the WPR. The TRIPS Agreement sets minimum standards for protection of copyrights and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, integrated-circuit layout designs, and undisclosed information. The TRIPS Agreement also establishes minimum standards for the enforcement of IPR in administrative and civil actions and, at least in regards to copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting, in criminal actions and actions at the border. Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement requires that, with very limited exceptions, WTO Members provide national and MFN treatment to the nationals of other WTO Members with regard to the protection and enforcement of IPR rights.

In the WPR, Russia undertook additional commitments on IPR protection and enforcement, such as clarifying how undisclosed information and test data will be protected in Russia, withdrawing
exceptions to copyright protection for works that existed prior to 1995, reviewing and improving the operation of its collecting society regime, and updating law enforcement procedures to address certain issues related to digital piracy of materials protected by copyright.

A. Legal Framework

Prior to its accession to the WTO, Russia amended its IPR laws to integrate WTO commitments into its legal regime and with the objective of implementing the 2006 United States-Russia bilateral IPR agreement. Russia improved its civil protections for IPR by amending Part IV of its Civil Code, which relates to protection of various forms of IPR, including patents, trademarks, and copyrights and related rights, updating its civil enforcement procedures and adopting the legal framework for Russia’s implementation of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, referred to collectively as the WIPO Internet Treaties. Russia has not yet fully harmonized Part IV of the Russian Civil Code (i.e., the IPR portion thereof) with the WIPO Copyright Treaty. This legislative uncertainty appears to have generated uncertainty with law enforcement agencies about the proper scope and procedures for enforcement of copyright and related rights, including those protected by the TRIPS Agreement. Russia also amended its Civil Code to clarify that an existing Internet domain name would not serve as a ground for refusal to register a third party’s trademark or service mark for that name. Russia also standardized its patent fees to apply in the same manner to Russian and non-Russian entities.

In recent years, reflecting commitments in the WPR, Russia has made progress toward implementing controls on unlawful optical media production, notably through amendment of its Law on Activity Licensing, to ensure that copyright infringers cannot renew a license to engage in optical media production. However, the extension of such controls to other forms of unlawful media production (e.g., audio disks) is still yet to be confirmed. Consistent with a commitment in the WPR, Russia revoked its reservation to Article 18 of the Berne Convention for the

42 WPR, ¶1224.
43 WPR, ¶¶1208, 1294, 1295, and 1339.
44 WPR, ¶¶1208, 1224, 1303, 1312, 1338, 1339, 1350, and 1353.
45 WPR, ¶1253.
46 WPR, ¶1226.
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 2013. As a result, Russia now provides copyright protections for works that existed prior to 1995 and originated from the United States or any other party to the Berne Convention or the WTO Agreement.

In the WPR, Russia committed to take action against websites that promote illegal distribution of content protected by copyright or related rights. In June 2013, Russia approved its first law specifically dedicated to decreasing online piracy of television and film. In November 2014, the Duma adopted amendments to extend the scope of the law to cover more categories of copyrightable material, as well as to provide additional court-ordered remedies for copyright infringement, including permanent injunctions with respect to repeated copyright infringement, which came into force as of May 1, 2015. Further amendments extended the law to cover “mirror” websites (websites with the same infringing content moved to a different URL). The United States continues to study closely Russia’s evolving laws and practices related to online piracy.

In the WPR, Russia also committed to ensure that the thresholds for the application of criminal procedures and penalties with regard to cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale would be set and applied in a manner that reflected the realities of the commercial marketplace. Accordingly, Russia amended its Criminal Code to establish fines and to reflect adjustments to the threshold for the application of criminal procedures and penalties for willful counterfeiting or commercial-scale piracy. For example, administrative fines for criminal trademark violations had been extremely low. In August 2013, Russia implemented a method of calculating such fines, replacing an arbitrarily low and fixed fine with a fine calculated based on the value of the counterfeits being produced or sold. This method should result in penalties that have a stronger deterrent effect. In addition, as called for in the WPR commitments, Russia ensured that its Civil Code does not predicate protection of a well-known trademark on its inclusion in Russia’s List of Well-Known Trademarks.

Russia’s customs law also required alteration to strengthen IPR protection. In December 2010, Russia adopted the Law “on Customs Regulation” to provide for ex officio authority for customs officials and strengthened the ex officio provisions contained in the CU Customs Code. The law

\[47\] See WPR, ¶1350.
also updated procedures for registering certain intellectual property rights with the Russian Customs IPR Register. However, Russia has yet to harmonize fully its IPR regime with the regulatory principles adopted under the EAEU. The United States will review the newly adopted EAEU Customs Code to ensure Russia is complying with its WTO commitments.

In 2010, Russia passed amendments to the Law on the Circulation of Medicines to protect undisclosed test or other undisclosed data generated to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical products, including six years of protection for such data from reliance by subsequent applicants seeking marketing approval for the same pharmaceutical product. These amendments came into force the day Russia became a WTO Member, but Russia still has not implemented final regulations necessary to ensure implementation of such protection. In 2015, Russia again amended the Law on the Circulation of Medicines, including the regulatory data protection (RDP) provision, to provide four years of data exclusivity and two years of marketing exclusivity (as it relates to generic drug registration) and three years of data exclusivity and three years of marketing exclusivity (as it relates to biosimilar drug registration). However, a recent judicial interpretation of the RDP provision raised issues with respect to unfair commercial use of pharmaceutical data and how Russia addresses its TRIPS obligations in this area. USTR continues to engage actively and often with U.S. stakeholders on Russia’s protection and enforcement of IPR, and will use the instruments of the WTO to ensure that Russia meets its WTO commitments.

Most recently, the pharmaceutical industry has expressed some concerns about Russia’s potential implementation of the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement. Article 31bis (annexed to the Protocol) allows WTO Members, under certain limited conditions, to issue compulsory licenses for the production of patented pharmaceutical products, without authorization from the patent owner, for export to “eligible” WTO Members (i.e., least-developed countries or those that demonstrate insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the product in question). The industry fears that Russia plans to implement the Protocol in such a way as to exceed the narrow circumstances under which the patented pharmaceutical products, manufactured under compulsory license, could be imported. The potential implications of this draft legislation and proposed secondary legislation, which would give the government broad discretion to issue compulsory licenses, are troubling. The pharmaceutical industry has also
expressed concern about a court decision granting a compulsory license for an innovative drug under patent protection. The United States will work with industry to monitor legislative developments in Russia and remind Russia of its TRIPS obligations.

B. Enforcement

Russia committed, upon becoming a WTO Member, to apply fully the WTO provisions for enforcement of IPR, without a transitional period. In the WPR, Russia also committed to take “expeditious action” against acts of infringement on the basis of complaints lodged by right holders and through other means with the objective of eliminating such acts in Russia. Russia made specific commitments for authorized officials to conduct unannounced inspections of plants licensed to produce optical media bearing content protected by copyright or related rights. Although Russia conducted such raids initially, piracy has largely now moved online, making optical media disk piracy a small portion of the infringing content market. Russia also established a specialized court for intellectual property disputes, which began operating in the summer of 2013.

USTR and other U.S. officials meet on a regular basis with U.S. stakeholders to discuss Russia’s IPR enforcement record. Based on those discussions, and USTR’s ongoing observations, it is evident that, as a general matter, the current IPR enforcement environment in Russia remains weak. End-user software piracy and sales of counterfeit goods are two particular concerns. Additionally, online piracy (including unlicensed streaming services, pay-per-download websites, videogame hacking sites, cyberlockers, BitTorrent sites, private servers bypassing official videogame servers, and others) has been, and remains, a significant problem in Russia. In the WPR, Russia committed to take enforcement measures against online piracy and to ensure that existing law is applied to prevent certain types of devices or services from circumventing technical protection measures protecting content, but notorious pirate websites continue to proliferate. Since its WTO accession, Russia has enacted legislation providing a framework to combat certain types of online piracy in cases where an action is initiated by right holders.

48 WPR, ¶1353.
49 WPR, ¶1313.
50 In 2018, Russia remained on USTR’s Special 301 Priority Watch List.
Starting in October 2015, in response to right holders’ complaints, courts in Russia have issued permanent injunctions against 162 pirate websites, including the high-traffic Russian torrent website RuTracker.org, which has been listed in the USTR’s *Special 301 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets (Notorious Markets List).*\(^{51}\) In 2016, the Moscow City Court issued more than 700 preliminary injunctions against various Russian infringers disseminating pirated films online. It does not appear, however, that the government of Russia has prosecuted those who operate these sites and profit from this piracy. In particular, the government of Russia has not acted against those sites that, while located in Russia, target users outside of Russia. Nor has the government of Russia taken action against websites that publish pirated books and scientific, technical, and medical journals.

Poor enforcement in Russia has also led to a sharp increase in the distribution and availability of pirated movies. Through rampant unauthorized camcording, pirates obtain illicit copies of films and then upload them onto the Internet (and sell them in hard copy). According to U.S. stakeholders, Russia is home to some of the most prolific criminal enterprises for the release of pirated movies. The United States will continue to review and analyze Russia’s enforcement of IPR, and whether those actions result in combatting the commercial scale online piracy of the type identified in the USTR’s *Notorious Markets List.*

Another area in which enforcement appears inadequate is with respect to patent enforcement. According to stakeholders, Russia does not maintain an effective mechanism for the early resolution of patent infringement disputes. For example, because Russian courts do not grant preliminary injunctions in pharmaceutical patent infringement cases, patent infringing follow-on products are allowed to enter the market prematurely.

In fact, currently available information continues to indicate that overall enforcement of IPR has decreased, rather than increased, over the past few years. Criminal enforcement, in particular,

\(^{51}\) Notwithstanding the permanent injunction against Rutracker.org imposed by the Moscow City Court, sophisticated Internet users still manage to access the website, undermining the effectiveness of the court’s decision. Moreover, the website has launched several mirror websites, including RuTracker2.org, RuTracker-pro.org, and RuTracker.net. In June 2017, Russia passed a law that permits action against mirror versions of any website that is already subject to a permanent injunction. This law came into force on October 1, 2017 and may significantly reduce response times to taking action against “mirror sites.”
has been lacking. An ongoing barrier to Russia’s adequate and effective enforcement of IPR is the lack of resources devoted to hiring and training law enforcement personnel to investigate and prosecute IPR crimes. Furthermore, U.S. stakeholders have informed us that when they attempt to enforce their IP rights through civil litigation, administrative and procedural hurdles prevent them from doing so.

Russia’s size and geographic location make enforcement of IPR at its borders an essential component of IPR protection. In the WPR, Russia committed that, from the date of its accession, it would encourage its customs officials to use their *ex officio* authority to strengthen enforcement against acts of infringement at the border, based on the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Russia needs to work with the other EAEU member states to ensure that the regulatory principles adopted in the EAEU Treaty are executed in a manner that most effectively protects IPR and are consistent with Russia’s WTO commitments. The United States will continue to scrutinize Russia’s progress in this regard.

Based on information gathered by USTR from U.S. stakeholders, it appears that Russia’s collecting society regime remains nontransparent and burdensome, making it difficult for right holders to be fairly compensated for the use of their intellectual property. Russia committed in the WPR to review its system of collective management of rights, and this review seems to have resulted in a 10-year re-appointment term of the existing collecting societies, which are unable or have failed to properly represent and compensate U.S. right holders. Russia also stated that it intended to phase out non-contractual license management within five years of Part IV of the Civil Code entering into force (which happened in 2013), but does not yet appear to have taken steps to meet that deadline. Russia’s legislature adopted a new law in 2017 (which entered into force in May 2018) to address problems of state accreditation and governance of collecting societies. However, the new law does not allow right holders to be involved in the selection and management of the organization, and fails to provide sufficient transparency to determine what royalties are being collected and to whom they are being paid. The United States will press Russia to accelerate its reform efforts to improve the transparency and effectiveness of these organizations, and, in particular, to ensure that U.S. right holders receive equal treatment with respect to domestic right holders.
The United States had been engaging on a bilateral basis on these issues through the United States-Russian Federation Intellectual Property Rights Working Group and other means. However, due to the current political situation, bilateral engagement with Russia has been put on hold since early 2014, including the bilateral IPR dialogue. Nevertheless, the United States continues to press Russia on its WTO commitments, including through the Special 301 Report. The United States will continue, in appropriate settings, to press Russia for full implementation of its WTO commitments.

XI. Investment

A. Trade-Related Investment Measures

The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS Agreement) prohibits trade-related investment measures that are inconsistent with a Member’s obligations under Article III (national treatment) and Article XI (general elimination of quantitative restrictions) of GATT 1994. The TRIMS Agreement thus requires elimination of measures such as those that require or provide benefits for the use of domestically produced goods (local content requirements), or measures that restrict a firm’s imports to an amount related to its exports or related to the amount of foreign exchange a firm earns (trade balancing requirements).

During the 18 years it was negotiating its WTO accession, Russia worked to bring its investment-incentive programs into compliance with the TRIMS disciplines. For example, prior to its WTO accession, Russia had in place a law that required production sharing agreements (PSAs) to include the obligation to purchase a certain percentage of Russian technical equipment for natural resource extraction and to employ a certain percentage of Russian citizens. In preparation for WTO membership, Russia amended its law governing PSAs to provide that, for all PSA contracts signed after Russia’s WTO accession, any WTO-inconsistent provisions in such contracts would be invalidated or brought into conformity with the WTO Agreement. In addition, Russia has stopped concluding PSA agreements. Similarly, in the aircraft sector, in August 2001, Russia eliminated the exemption from customs duties and taxes for temporary import for aircraft, aircraft parts and engines, and simulators that were imported under investment agreements.
In the WPR, Russia agreed that, except for measures subject to a specific transition period, all of its laws, regulations, or other measures concerning matters covered in the TRIMS provisions of the WPR, whether adopted by it or the competent bodies of the EAEU, would be consistent with its WTO commitments, and in particular with the TRIMS Agreement, as of the date of Russia’s membership in the WTO. WTO Members agreed to provide Russia with a transition period to bring two programs that comprise Russia’s automotive assembly investment incentive regime into WTO compliance. The first program, introduced in 2005, allows for the duty-free entry of auto parts used in the production of vehicles that contain a certain level of Russian content. In December 2010, Russia initiated a second automotive industry investment incentive program that increased the production volume significantly as well as the domestic content requirement to qualify for duty-free entry of auto parts. Russia notified the WTO that it had terminated these automotive investment incentive programs as of July 1, 2018. However, shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Industry and Trade announced that it would provide support to automotive manufacturers if they meet certain production quotas and local content requirements. The United States will seek further information about these new state support programs to ascertain their consistency with Russia’s WTO commitments. Since Russia became a WTO Member, in response to concerns raised by the United States and other Members in TRIMS Committee meetings, Russia eliminated the program under which the Ministry of Agriculture provided loans to farmers at an interest rate below the market rates for the purchase of farm machinery manufactured in Russia. The United States continues to watch for possible local content requirements in a preferential leasing program implemented by a government-owned agricultural equipment leasing company, RosAgroLeasing.

Other initiatives that USTR is reviewing for compliance with Russia’s TRIMS obligations include a program to support automotive leases of only Russian-made automobiles; efforts by the Government Import Substitution Commission to limit the goods and services that may be sourced outside of Russia by government entities and SOEs; and a proposal to establish a minimum target for procurement by SOEs of “hi-tech and innovative products,” including from small and medium businesses. To obtain information regarding these initiatives, in particular concerning their consistency with Russia’s WTO commitments, USTR has met with relevant USTR.

See WPR, ¶698.
stakeholders and consulted with foreign interlocutors. In the WTO, the United States has repeatedly posed written questions about these programs in the TRIMS Committee. Although Russia provided some initial oral responses, they were vague and did not address the issues raised. Russia has not provided written replies. The United States will continue to press Russia for complete responses.

Furthermore, in light of Russia’s focus on local content, the United States has sought, and will continue to seek, information in the TRIMS Committee and the Council on Trade in Goods on programs that support domestic production at the expense of imports to supplement information provided by U.S. stakeholders and USTR’s independent research. The goal is to ensure Russia’s compliance with its commitments under the WTO Agreement and the WPR.

**B. Special Economic Zones**

Upon accession to the WTO, Russia undertook to apply the provisions of the WTO Agreement throughout its territory, including in its special economic zones (SEZs), which were established to encourage investment through the extension of certain incentives. Russia has transition periods to implement this commitment for the Kaliningrad and Magadan SEZs. To implement that commitment, Russia adopted a new law on SEZs which did not impose any export performance or local content requirements on operations in SEZs. In addition, all customs duties, VAT, and excise taxes due on goods imported into the SEZs were to be paid when those goods were released into the chain of commerce in Russia whether or not those goods were further processed. Moreover, Russia agreed to apply all EAEU agreements governing SEZs in a manner consistent with its WTO obligations and to work with its EAEU partners to amend any EAEU measures to ensure their consistency with Russia’s WTO commitments. The United States will continue to monitor Russia’s “Titanium Valley” SEZ to ensure its consistency with Russia’s WTO commitments.

**XII. Rule of Law**

In order to address major concerns raised by WTO Members during its lengthy WTO accession negotiations, Russia committed to broad legal reforms in the areas of transparency, uniform

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53 WPR, ¶1124.
application of laws, and judicial review. Implementation of these reforms would strengthen the rule of law in Russia’s economy and help to address pre-WTO accession practices that have made it difficult for U.S. and other foreign companies to do business and invest in Russia.

A. Eurasian Economic Union

As noted above, Russia has transferred authority for many aspects of its trade regime to the EAEU. The administrative bodies of the EAEU include the EAEU Court, which has competence, inter alia, over disputes of an economic nature arising from the implementation of decisions of the EAEU bodies and treaties. The Court of the EAEU does not have jurisdiction to opine directly on the member states’ WTO obligations nor can the EAEU Court rule on a member state’s compliance with such obligations. However, after the Treaty on the Multilateral Trading System was adopted in 2011, the EAEU Court received the legal authority to provide advisory opinions on whether an EAEU measure violates WTO rules. The right to bring a case to the EAEU Court is not limited to the EAEU member states or the bodies of the EAEU; individuals with a specific interest can also challenge EAEU acts in the EAEU Court. USTR continues to study and analyze the workings of the EAEU to understand better its rules and procedures and their compliance with Russia’s WTO obligations.

B. Transparency

One of the core principles of the WTO Agreement reflected throughout Russia’s WPR is transparency. Transparency permits markets to function effectively and reduces opportunities for officials to engage in trade-distorting practices behind closed doors. Many of the WTO agreements contain initial and annual notification requirements to ensure that other WTO Members are aware of any new measures being implemented and have the opportunity to raise questions and concerns with regard to those measures.

Russia agreed in the WPR to submit all of the required initial notifications by the date of its accession, with the exception of five notifications which were to be submitted within specified deadlines following its accession.54 In addition, Russia committed to establish formal notice and

54 WPR, ¶1430.
comment procedures for proposed measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, and intellectual property;\textsuperscript{55} to provide WTO Members and interested parties with decisions in writing setting out reasons for the decision;\textsuperscript{56} and to institute new rights of appeal of decisions.\textsuperscript{57} These obligations apply to measures that the EEC adopts and that are applied in Russia and to Russia’s domestic laws, regulations, and other measures. Russia has also undertaken specific commitments regarding transparency on issues ranging from application of price controls to fees charged for engaging in importing or exporting goods.

To implement Russia’s transparency commitments at the EAEU level, the EEC established procedures for publication and public comment on proposed EAEU legal acts, including a requirement that draft decisions shall be published no fewer than 45 calendar days before the EEC meeting at which the decision will be considered. The EEC provided additional details concerning SPS quarantine and veterinary-sanitary measures, including requiring that draft decisions and recommendations be published for no fewer than 60 calendar days prior to adoption of such measures. This mechanism appears to provide that these EAEU measures will not become effective prior to their publication.

During the 18 years of its accession negotiations, Russia provided the required initial notifications as part of the WTO review of its trade regime. Russia has also provided to the WTO all the initial notifications which it committed to provide in the WPR (although, as noted above, it has failed to provide subsequent notifications). Russia has notified many modifications and updates to its trade regime (\textit{e.g.}, TBT measures, SPS measures, or trade remedy actions) as required under its transparency commitments. Russia has also implemented its commitment to provide trade data to the WTO’s Integrated Data Base.

The United States has used a variety of WTO committee meetings to identify instances in which Russia has not notified measures, as well as to seek additional information and provide comments on certain measures that have been notified. As a result, Russia notified to the WTO the six safeguards measures resulting from investigations initiated prior to Russia becoming a WTO Member, as well as legislation related to its intellectual property rights regime, import

\textsuperscript{55} WPR, ¶1427.
\textsuperscript{56} See, \textit{e.g.}, WPR, ¶1418.
\textsuperscript{57} See, \textit{e.g.}, WPR, ¶¶189-202.
licensing regime, and customs valuation regime. Russia also notified the EAEU to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements. In addition, the United States has submitted multiple rounds of questions, prompting Russia to provide further details on certain investment incentive programs, certain subsidy programs, including numerous subsidy programs identified by the United States that Russia did not notify, giving the United States a greater understanding of these measures.

As made clear throughout this report, the United States has serious concerns about the completeness of Russia’s notifications made pursuant to the WTO Agreements. Notifications are intended to provide basic factual information regarding each Member’s application or implementation of the relevant commitment. Currently, if Russia or any other Member fails to make the required notifications, there is no consequence for that failure. To encourage compliance, the United States believes that consideration should be given to tangible benefits for compliance and negative consequences for non-compliance. To that end, in October 2017, the United States circulated to WTO Members a Draft Ministerial Decision on “Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification under WTO Agreements,” which would allow for the imposition of administrative consequences where a Member does not fulfill notification commitments. The United States believes that such administrative steps will encourage compliance by Russia and other WTO Members. The United States will continue to analyze the comprehensiveness of Russia’s notifications, as well as the availability of adequate opportunities to comment on those notifications.

C. Judicial Review

The right to prompt and effective judicial review of economic matters by an independent tribunal is a fundamental component of the WTO Agreement and, in fact, is explicitly required in many of the covered agreements comprising the WTO Agreement. Russian law appears to ensure the right of appeal on customs-related matters (both actions and inactions), tax issues, and the protection of IPR and technical regulations, including SPS issues. Moreover, Russia has specifically committed that it will provide the right for independent review consistent with its WTO commitments.58

58 See WPR, ¶ 215.
Because many aspects of Russia’s trade regime have been transferred to the EAEU, Russia has worked, and continues to work, with its EAEU partners to adopt the legal acts necessary to ensure that WTO Members and their nationals have recourse to the EAEU Court that has jurisdiction over EAEU issues, including whether Russia or the other EAEU member states have effectively implemented EAEU acts related to WTO issues.

U.S. officials are not currently aware of any areas of concern with respect to Russia’s implementation of these commitments since becoming a WTO Member.

XIII. Conclusion

In 2018, notwithstanding a few actions taken to comply with its WTO commitments, Russia continued to pursue a regime of import substitution and local content requirements. It maintained arbitrary behind-the-border measures and other discriminatory practices to exclude U.S. exports. In response, the United States has used, and will continue to use, the tools of the WTO to voice concerns with these practices and to remind Russia of its WTO commitments.
Appendix 1

List of Written Comments
Submitted in Response to Request for Public Comment
on Russia’s Implementation of its WTO Commitments
by the Trade Policy Staff Committee

1. Alliance for Network Security
2. International Intellectual Property Alliance
3. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
5. U.S. Meat Export Federation
Appendix 2

List of Witnesses Testifying at the Public Hearing on Russia’s Implementation of its WTO Commitments before the Trade Policy Staff Committee
Washington, D.C.
October 4, 2108

1. Randi Levinas, Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer, US-Russia Business Council

2. Eric J. Schwartz, Counsel, International Intellectual Property Alliance