UNITED STATES – LAWS, REGULATIONS AND
METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING
DUMPING MARGINS (“ZEROING”)

RECOUSE TO ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU
BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

WT/DS294

FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

February 8, 2008
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Proceedings under Article 21.5 are meant to address disagreements “as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings [of the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”)].” A panel composed under Article 21.5, therefore, begins with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and examines measures that a Member has taken pursuant to those recommendations and rulings to determine if that Member is in compliance.

2. The European Communities (“EC”), however, attempts to expand the scope of these proceedings by incorporating claims regarding measures entirely distinct from those measures it originally challenged in its “as applied” claims and which were not measures taken to comply.

3. As demonstrated below, the United States has implemented the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and thus has complied with its obligations under the DSU. This Panel should therefore reject the EC’s claims of non-compliance and its effort to enlarge the obligations of the United States.

4. The United States has structured its First Written Submission as follows. First, the United States provides a brief overview of how its retrospective antidumping system operates. Next, the United States addresses the specific measures challenged by the EC in its original request for the establishment of a panel, the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and the actions taken by the United States in response to those recommendations and rulings. The United States then addresses the terms of reference of this Panel and requests that the Panel find that the terms of reference are limited to the measures identified in the EC’s Article 21.5 panel request – the 15 original investigations and 16 administrative reviews. The United States next explains why it has complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

5. The United States has already provided an explanation of its antidumping system in its First Written Submission in the underlying dispute. The United States will not repeat the full explanation in this submission. However, the United States highlights below those aspects of its antidumping system relevant to the issues in this Article 21.5 dispute.

A. The U.S. Antidumping System

6. The United States maintains a retrospective antidumping duty system. Pursuant to this system, importers of products subject to an antidumping duty order post a cash deposit of the
estimated amount of the antidumping duties at the time of importation. The final amount of antidumping duties will be determined through a proceeding called an administrative review.

1. The Investigation

7. In an antidumping investigation, the Department of Commerce ("Commerce") determines an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer of the subject merchandise. Commerce will also determine an “all others” rate which applies to imports from those exporters or producers who were not investigated individually. The all-others rate is usually a weighted average of the margins of dumping determined for each of the exporters or producers actually investigated, excluding those margins of dumping which are zero or de minimis, or which were determined by applying an adverse inference in determining the facts otherwise available. However, when such a calculation is not possible, Commerce may determine the all others rate by any reasonable method.

8. If the margins of dumping determined by Commerce are above de minimis, and the International Trade Commission ("ITC") determines that the domestic industry is being materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, because of the dumped imports, Commerce will publish an antidumping duty order. The order provides the United States with the authority to collect cash deposits at the time of importation and assess antidumping duties.

2. Administrative Reviews

9. Interested parties may request an administrative review of the antidumping duty order each year in the anniversary month of the publication of the order. Through these administrative reviews, for each of the exporters or producers for whom a review has been requested,

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1 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(3). (Exhibit US-1)
2 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(a). (Exhibit US-5) There are several different types of administrative reviews in the U.S. system. The U.S. antidumping statute identifies periodic reviews of the amount of duty, reviews based on changed circumstances, five-year (or sunset) reviews, and new shipper reviews. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675. In this First Written Submission, the United States uses the term “administrative review” to refer to the periodic review of the amount of duty, which may be requested every year during the anniversary month of the publication of the antidumping duty order. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1). (Exhibit US-2)
3 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(1). Where the number of known exporters or producers is so large so as to render the determination of margins of dumping for each impractical, Commerce may either limit its examination to a sample of exporters or producers, or to those exporters or producers who account for the largest volume of subject merchandise that can be reasonably examined. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2). (Exhibit US-3)
6 19 U.S.C. § 1673e. (Exhibit US-1)
7 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a). (Exhibit US-1)
8 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(b)(1). (Exhibit US-5)
Commerce reexamines whether that exporter or producer was dumping. The administrative review normally covers sales of the subject merchandise from the twelve months preceding the most recent anniversary month.

10. The results of the review serve as the basis for the calculation of the assessment rate for each importer of the subject merchandise covered by the review. The results also establish new cash deposit rates for the collection of estimated antidumping duties on imports going forward, superceding any cash deposit rate already in effect for the exporters or producers reviewed. If no review is requested, the estimated duties collected in the form of cash deposits are finally assessed. Commerce communicates the results of its determinations to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) by issuing what are referred to as “instructions.”

3. Sunset Reviews

11. Five years after the publication of the antidumping duty order, Commerce and the ITC will conduct a “sunset review” to determine whether revocation of the antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping, and the recurrence or continuation of material injury. The United States will revoke an antidumping duty order unless both Commerce and the ITC make an affirmative finding of likelihood in a sunset review.

B. The Current Dispute

12. This Article 21.5 dispute arises from a challenge made by the EC against the United States concerning the calculation of the margins of dumping in antidumping duty proceedings.

1. The EC’s Original Claims

13. The EC challenged U.S. “laws, regulations, administrative procedures, measures and methodologies for determining the dumping margin in original investigations and review investigations” as being inconsistent with the AD Agreement, the GATT 1994, and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (“Marrakesh Agreement”) “as
such." The EC also challenged “methodologies and the laws, regulations, administrative procedures and measures” “as applied” in the determinations made in fifteen specific antidumping investigations and sixteen specific administrative reviews.

2. Panel Proceedings

14. On October 31, 2005, the original panel issued its report, finding that Commerce’s methodology with respect to the calculation of margins of dumping in investigations was “as such” inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. The panel further found that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 with respect to its determinations in the fifteen antidumping investigations challenged by the EC.

15. With respect to the determinations in the sixteen administrative reviews, the panel found that the United States did not act inconsistently with Articles 1, 2.4, 2.4.2, 9.3, 11.1, 11.2 and 18.4 of the AD Agreement, Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of GATT 1994, or Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement. Similarly, the panel found that Commerce’s methodology with respect to the calculation of the margin of dumping in administrative reviews, new shipper reviews, changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews was not “as such” inconsistent with the covered agreements.

3. Appellate Body Proceedings

16. The EC appealed the panel’s “as such” and “as applied” findings with respect to administrative reviews. The United States appealed the panel’s “as such” findings with respect to antidumping investigations. The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that Commerce’s methodology for determining margins of dumping in investigations was “as such” inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement. The Appellate Body reversed the panel’s “as applied” finding concerning the determinations in the sixteen administrative reviews, finding that these determinations were inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement and Article VI:2 of GATT 1994. The Appellate Body found that it was unable to complete the analysis of whether Commerce’s methodology for calculating margins of dumping in administrative reviews was inconsistent with the AD Agreement, GATT 1994 or the Marrakesh Agreement, and declined to make an “as such” ruling concerning this methodology. The DSB adopted the panel report, as

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18 WT/DS294/7/Rev.1, p. 2.
19 WT/DS294/7/Rev.1, p. 4.
20 US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), para. 8.1(c).
22 US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), paras. 8.1 (d), (e) and (f).
23 US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), paras. 8.1 (g) and (h).
25 US – Zeroing (EC) (AB), paras. 263(c) and (g)(ii).
modified by the Appellate Body, on May 9, 2006. The EC and the United States agreed to a reasonable period of time, ending April 9, 2007, for the United States to implement the rulings and recommendation of the DSB.

4. Implementation of the DSB Recommendations and Rulings

17. On December 27, 2006, Commerce announced that it would no longer calculate the margin of dumping in antidumping investigations using comparisons of weighted average normal values and weighted average export prices without providing offsets for sales made at greater than normal value.26 This modification of Commerce’s methodology became effective for all future investigations and those pending before Commerce as of February 22, 2007.27

18. On March 1, 2007, Commerce initiated proceedings pursuant to Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act28 covering twelve of the fifteen antidumping investigation determinations found to be inconsistent with the AD Agreement.29 Commerce noted that the antidumping orders resulting from three of the investigations originally challenged by the EC had already been revoked.30 Commerce announced that in these Section 129 determinations, it intended solely to recalculate the margins of dumping by applying the modification of its calculation methodology described in the December 26, 2006 Federal Register notice.31

19. Commerce issued its determinations with respect to eleven of the Section 129 determinations on April 9, 2007.32 These eleven Section 129 determinations became effective

26 Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin During an Antidumping Investigation; Final Modification, 71 Fed. Reg. 77722 (December 27, 2006). (Exhibit EC-1)
27 Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin During an Antidumping Investigation; Change in Effective Date of Final Modification, 72 Fed. Reg. 3783 (January 26, 2007). (Exhibit EC-2)
on April 23, 2007. The Section 129 determinations resulted in the full revocation of the antidumping duty orders on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from the Netherlands and Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Sweden. In addition, the Section 129 determinations resulted in the partial revocation of the antidumping duty orders on Stainless Steel Bar from France, Stainless Steel Bar from Germany, Stainless Steel Bar from Italy, and Stainless Steel Bar from the United Kingdom with respect to certain individual companies for which Commerce had found de minimis margins in the Section 129 determinations.

20. With respect to the antidumping duty investigation of Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Italy, Commerce continued the Section 129 proceeding in order to permit the interested parties to address allegations of certain errors in the original investigation determination. Commerce issued its Section 129 determination with respect to this investigation on August 20, 2007, recalculating the margin of dumping under its modified methodology and declining to address the substance of any of the errors alleged by either the Italian respondent or the U.S. domestic industry. This Section 129 determination became effective August 31, 2007.

21. With respect to the determinations in the sixteen administrative reviews challenged by the EC, the cash deposit rates established by those reviews, with the exception of one company, were no longer in effect because they had been superceded by determinations made in later administrative reviews.

5. The EC’s Request for the Establishment of a Panel Under Article 21.5

22. On September 13, 2007, the EC submitted its request for the establishment of a panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU. In its Article 21.5 panel request, the EC contends that “there is a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.”

23. Among the issues raised in the Article 21.5 panel request, the EC contends, “With regard to the 15 original investigations and 16 administrative reviews, the US has continued zeroing in the reviews related to the measures in question. . . . Details of the reviews in question are set out

in the annex." The annex of the Article 21.5 panel request contains the same two charts that the EC attached to its original panel request. However, the EC added a column to these charts which listed distinct determinations made by Commerce.

24. First, Chart I of the annex lists the determinations made in the fifteen antidumping investigations challenged by the EC in its original panel request. However, in Chart I, the EC identifies determinations made in eleven administrative reviews and eight sunset reviews which it now seeks to challenge in this Article 21.5 proceeding. For example, case number two in this chart is the antidumping investigation of Stainless Steel Bar from France. In addition to identifying the determination made concerning the investigation, the EC now identifies the determinations made in the administrative reviews covering the periods March 1, 2003 through February 29, 2004 and March 1, 2004 through February 28, 2005, as well as the continuation of the order reflecting the determination made in the sunset review, published on June 4, 2007.

25. Similarly, Chart II lists the determinations made in the sixteen administrative reviews challenged by the EC in its original panel request, and identifies the determinations made in an additional thirty administrative reviews, eight sunset reviews and two changed circumstances reviews. Case twenty-two, for example, is the determination made in the administrative review of Stainless Steel Sheet Strip Coils covering the sales made by Acciai Speciali Terni SpA during the July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2001 period. In Chart II, the EC now identifies the Commerce determinations in the administrative reviews covering July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2002 and July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2003, and the continuation of the order reflecting the determination made in the sunset review, published on August 5, 2004.

6. Further Actions

26. In 2007, Commerce and the ITC instituted sunset reviews of the antidumping duty orders on Stainless Steel Bar from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Pursuant to these sunset reviews, the ITC determined that revocation of the antidumping duty orders “would not be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time.” Accordingly, Commerce revoked these antidumping duty orders effective March 7, 2007. All cash deposits on imports made on or

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38 Initiation of Five-Year ("Sunset") Reviews, 72 Fed. Reg. 4689 (February 1, 2007). (Exhibit US-10)
40 Stainless Steel Bar From France, Germany, Italy, Korea, and The United Kingdom, 73 Fed. Reg. 5869, 5869 (January 31, 2008). (Exhibit US-12)
41 Revocation of Antidumping Duty Orders on Stainless Steel Bar From France, Germany, Italy, South Korea, and the United Kingdom and the Countervailing Duty Order on Stainless Steel Bar From Italy, 73 Fed. Reg. 7258 (February 7, 2008). (Exhibit US-13)
after March 7, 2007 will be refunded. These importations will not be subject to a final assessment of antidumping duties in the future.\textsuperscript{42}

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

27. On May 9, 2006, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified by the Appellate Body, in this dispute. On April 24, 2007, the United States announced at a DSB meeting that it had taken all of the steps necessary to implement the DSB’s recommendations and rulings. On May 4, 2007, the United States and the EC concluded an agreement in this dispute concerning the procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU.\textsuperscript{43}

28. The EC requested consultations on July 9, 2007. Consultations in response to this request were held on July 30, 2007.

29. On September 13, 2007, the EC requested the establishment of a panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU.\textsuperscript{44} It was not possible to refer this matter to the original panel. On November 30, 2007, the Director-General composed this Panel.\textsuperscript{45}

IV. PRELIMINARY RULING REQUEST

30. Article 21.5 of the DSU applies when there is a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of a measure taken to comply with recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Thus, the scope of an Article 21.5 compliance panel proceeding is inherently limited – it may only examine a measure that is taken to comply, and then only if that measure is specified in the request for the establishment of a panel.

31. The United States requests preliminary rulings concerning the EC’s apparent effort to include certain determinations within the terms of reference of this proceeding, including certain administrative reviews and sunset reviews that are not measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the original proceeding. A number of these measures also were not identified in the EC’s Article 21.5 panel request.

\textsuperscript{42} Revocation of Antidumping Duty Orders on Stainless Steel Bar from France, Germany, Italy, South Korea, and the United Kingdom and the Countervailing Duty Order on Stainless Steel Bar from Italy, 73 Fed. Reg. 7258 (February 7, 2008). (Exhibit US-13)

\textsuperscript{43} Understanding between the United States and the European Communities Regarding Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU (WT/DS294/21, 9 May 2007).

\textsuperscript{44} WT/DS294/25.

\textsuperscript{45} WT/DS295/26.
A. Administrative Reviews

32. The only measures that were the subject of the DSB recommendations and rulings were the investigations and administrative reviews listed in the annexes to the EC’s original panel request. The EC pursued a challenge against zeroing in administrative reviews “as such” but did not prevail.\(^{46}\) Upon reviewing the EC’s first submission, it appears that the EC seeks to include within the terms of reference determinations that are not properly within the terms of reference for two reasons: first, because they were not identified in the EC’s Article 21.5 panel request, as required by Article 6.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”), and second, because those determinations were not subject to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, nor are they measures taken to comply.

1. The Reviews Are Not Identified in the Panel Request

33. Article 6.2 of the DSU provides that a panel request shall “identify the specific measures at issue.” The key passage in the EC’s Article 21.5 request is paragraph 7, which provides:

> With regard to the original 15 original investigations and 16 administrative reviews, the US has continued zeroing in the reviews related to the measures in question. The United States has not eliminated zeroing in these reviews though they determine the cash deposit rate currently applicable, and/or are relied upon to maintain the AD measure or to impose, collect or liquidate anti-dumping duties at a rate inflated by zeroing after 9 April 2007. Details of the reviews in question are set out in the annex. For the reasons set out above, this is inconsistent . . . .

34. This paragraph plainly states that the measures at issue are the investigations and administrative review determinations from the original proceeding. In its submission, however, the EC appears to take a different approach. The EC includes a section entitled “jurisdiction” and states therein that “all matters referred to in this submission fall within the scope of this proceeding.” The EC further states that “the measures listed in the Annex . . . fall within the scope of this proceeding.”\(^{47}\) The EC’s statements in that part of its submission are not consistent with the EC’s panel request. In the Article 21.5 panel request, the only reference to the annex is in paragraph 7 (“Details of the reviews in question are set out in the annex.”). That paragraph is clear that the reviews listed in the annex are not themselves “measures in question” but only “related to” the “measures in question.”\(^{48}\) The EC thus seeks to transform the “reviews” referenced in its panel request as separate and distinct from the “measures at issue” into “measures” within the terms of reference. Under Article 6.2, however, the EC was obliged, in its

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\(^{46}\) Appellate Body Report, para. 263(c)(ii).

\(^{47}\) EC First Written Submission, para. 47.

\(^{48}\) See paragraph 7 of the EC’s panel request: “the US has continued zeroing in the reviews related to the measures in question.” (Emphasis added.)
For the foregoing reasons, the United States requests that the Panel reject the EC’s attempt to use its first submission to expand the terms of reference beyond the specific measures identified in its panel request, i.e., the 16 administrative reviews in the original proceeding.

2. The Reviews Are Not Measures “Taken to Comply”

The EC’s attempt to use its submission to expand the measures within the terms of reference of this proceeding is flawed for a second reason. The scope of an Article 21.5 proceeding is limited to the issue of the existence or consistency of measures to taken to comply.

Pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, in its request for the establishment of a panel in the original proceeding, the EC was required to “identify the specific measures at issue” (emphasis added). That identification in turn informs the question of what is a “measure taken to comply.” The Appellate Body has discussed the scope of such Article 21.5 proceedings:

Proceedings under Article 21.5 do not concern just any measure of a Member of the WTO; rather, Article 21.5 proceedings are limited to those “measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings” of the DSB.

There must be an express link between the alleged measures taken to comply and the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Accordingly, in assessing whether a challenged measure is a measure taken to comply, the Panel must first look to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Nonetheless, not every measure that has some connection with, or could

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49 The EC’s submission fails to present a clear picture of precisely what “matters” and “measures” are at issue. The EC variously refers to “any determination of dumping based on zeroing made after the end of the reasonable period of time in connection with the measures challenged in the original dispute is inconsistent with the DSB’s recommendations” (para. 45). Later, the EC refers to “‘any amendments’ and ‘each of the assessment instructions issued pursuant to any of the 16 Notices of Final Results.’” (para. 53). The request for findings refers more generally to continued collection of dumping. EC First Written Submission, para. 155. While Article 6.2 requires the panel request to identify the specific measures at issue, it must be noted that even the submission fails to do so.

50 Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5) (AB), para. 36 (emphasis in original).

51 US – OCTG from Argentina (AB), para. 142; US – Softwood Lumber CVD Final (Article 21.5) (AB), para. 68.

52 US – OCTG from Argentina (AB), para. 142; US – Softwood Lumber CVD Final (Article 21.5) (AB), para. 68.
have some impact upon a measure taken to comply may be scrutinized in an Article 21.5 proceeding.\textsuperscript{53} Rather, such measures falling within the competence of an Article 21.5 panel are those “taken in the direction of, or for the purpose of achieving compliance [with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB].”\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{a. The EC Adds Reviews that Are Distinct from the Measures that Are the Subject of the DSB Recommendations and Rulings}

39. Here, however, the EC seeks to expand the terms of reference beyond the inquiry into the existence or consistency of measures taken to comply. Precisely what the EC seeks to include is something of a moving target, as noted above, but in essence, it appears that the EC is arguing that subsequent reviews and assessment instructions are measures taken to comply and thus within the scope of this proceeding.

40. The United States recalls that the EC challenged 16 administrative reviews, and the Appellate Body concluded that those reviews were inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement. Thus, those 16 reviews were the subject of the DSB recommendations and rulings. None of the other “measures” the EC seeks to include in these proceedings – such as subsequent reviews or assessment instructions – was the basis for a DSB recommendation or ruling.

\textbf{b. The EC’s Panel Request in the Original Dispute Demonstrates that Each Administrative Review Is a Distinct Measure}

41. In the EC’s original panel request, the EC identified determinations made by Commerce in sixteen administrative reviews, but specifically challenged \textit{particular margins} in those determinations. The EC also challenged \textit{multiple reviews} of the same product.\textsuperscript{55} Thus, in the original proceeding, the EC treated each review as a separate measure and in fact challenged specific margins within each such measure. Moreover, while the Appellate Body found that Commerce’s determination of margins of dumping “as applied” in the sixteen administrative reviews was inconsistent with certain WTO obligations,\textsuperscript{56} the Appellate Body denied the EC’s request that it find Commerce’s methodology for calculating margins of dumping in administrative reviews to be “as such” inconsistent with any WTO obligations.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{53} US – Softwood Lumber CVD Final (Article 21.5)(AB), para. 87.
\textsuperscript{54} US – Softwood Lumber CVD Final (Article 21.5)(AB), para. 66 (emphasis in original).
\textsuperscript{55} For example, the EC lists the 1999-2000 administrative review of Certain Pasta from Italy as case number 19, and the 2000-01 administrative review as case number 20. The EC does the same for the administrative reviews of Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Italy, Granular Polytetrafluoroethylene from Italy, Stainless Steel Sheet Strip in Coils from France, and Stainless Steel Sheet Strip in Coils from Germany.
\textsuperscript{56} US – Zeroing (EC) (AB), para. 263(a)(i).
\textsuperscript{57} US – Zeroing (EC) (AB), para. 263(c)(ii).
42. This is consistent with the fact that in each administrative review, Commerce examines different facts, a different time period, and a different set of transactions. Thus, in its initial panel request, the EC recognized that a determination from one administrative review is separate and distinct from a determination made in a subsequent administrative review.

43. The EC cannot ignore the consequences of this. Accordingly, the EC cannot bring entirely new and distinct determinations concerning different periods of time into this compliance proceeding simply because those determinations involved the same subject merchandise. Rather, the scope of the DSB’s “as applied” recommendations and rulings are limited to those specific determinations that the EC indicated that it was challenging in its original panel request. Anything else would be directly contrary to the fact that the DSB’s recommendations and rulings were limited to these 16 administrative reviews “as applied” and explicitly did not include an “as such” recommendation or ruling.

44. The EC apparently understood this, as it filed a second challenge to Commerce’s calculation methodology in an entirely separate DSB proceeding.58 In the US – Zeroing (EC) II panel request, for example, the EC identifies the determination in the administrative review of Certain Pasta from Italy covering sales made by PAM from July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2003 as an “as applied” measure.59 This very same determination is also identified by the EC as a review in the annex to its panel request that is “related to” the “measures in question.” The EC recognized that these subsequent determinations are distinct measures and not measures taken to comply with the DSB’s recommendations and rulings in this dispute.

45. Further undermining the EC’s contention that subsequent reviews are measures taken to comply is the EC’s argument that it is, in fact, challenging the “omissions” by the United States to take the necessary measures to comply.60 The EC cannot have it both ways: if the United States failed to comply by “omission,” then any corresponding finding against the United States should be that a measure was not taken to comply, not that subsequent determinations are not consistent with U.S. obligations.

46. Many of the distinct administrative review determinations identified by the EC in its 21.5 panel request cannot be considered measures taken to comply because they pre-date the adoption of the DSB’s recommendations and rulings. “As a whole, Article 21 deals with events

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59 WT/DS350/6, p. 13.
60 EC First Written Submission, para. 60.
subsequent to the DSB’s adoption of recommendations and rulings in a particular dispute. 61
Thus, determinations made by a Member prior to the adoption of a dispute settlement report are
not taken for the purpose of achieving compliance and cannot be within the scope of an Article
21.5 proceeding.

47. For example, in its Article 21.5 panel request, the EC identifies the Commerce
determination in the administrative review of Certain Pasta from Italy covering the period of July
1, 2000 through June 30, 2002. This determination was not identified by the EC in its original
panel request. The DSB adopted the Appellate Body’s report in this dispute on May 6, 2006.
Commerce, however, made and published the final results of the 2001-02 administrative review
of Certain Pasta from Italy in February 2004, more than two years before the adoption of the
Appellate Body’s report. This measure, therefore, cannot possibly have any connection with the
DSB’s recommendations and rulings, and cannot be a measure taken to comply. The same is true
for all of the additional measures identified by the EC in its Article 21.5 panel request where the

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determinations were made prior to the DSB’s recommendations and rulings. Accordingly, these measures are beyond the terms of reference of this Panel.

3. The EC Attempts to Treat an “As Applied” Finding As An “As Such” Finding

48. According to the EC, the United States’ implementation obligations with respect to the “as applied” claims extend to distinct determinations which supercede the measures described in its original panel request. To this end, the EC is attempting to use these Article 21.5 proceedings to obtain the effect of an “as such” finding that the Appellate Body expressly declined to make.

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62 The Commerce determinations which were made prior to the adoption of the Appellate Body’s report are: (1) the determinations in the 2001-02 and 2002-03 administrative reviews of Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel from the Netherlands, which were made on July 22, 2004 and April 11, 2005 respectively; (2) the determination in the 2003-04 administrative review of Stainless Steel Bar from France, which was made on August 10, 2005; (3) the determination in the 2001-03 administrative review of Stainless Steel Bar from Germany, which was made on June 14, 2004; (4) the determination in the 2001-03 administrative review of Stainless Steel Bar from Italy, which was made on June 14, 2004; (5) the determination in the sunset review of Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Sweden, which was made on August 13, 2004; (6) the determination in the 1998-99 administrative review of Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Spain, which was made on February 21, 2001; (7) the determination in the sunset review of Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Spain, which was made on August 13, 2004; (8) the determination in the sunset review of Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Italy, which was made on August 13, 2004; (9) the determination in the sunset review of Certain Cut-to-length Carbon-quality Steel Plate from Italy, which was made on December 6, 2005; (10) the determinations in the 2002-03 and 2003-04 administrative reviews of Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium, which were made on January 19, 2005 and December 7, 2005 respectively; (11) the determination in the sunset review of Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium, which was made on July 18, 2005; (12) the determinations in the 2001-02 and 2002-03 administrative reviews of Certain Pasta from Italy as it relates to PAM, which were made on February 10, 2004 and February 9, 2005 respectively; (13) the determination in the 2001-02 administrative review of Certain Pasta from Italy as it relates to Pastifi Garofalo, which was made on April 27, 2004; (14) the determinations in the 2001-02 and 2002-03 administrative reviews of Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Italy, which were made on December 12, 2003 and March 17, 2005 respectively; (15) the determination in the sunset review of Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Italy, which was made on August 4, 2005; (16) the determination in the sunset review of Granular Polytetrafluoroethylene from Italy, which was made on December 22, 2005; (17) the determinations in the 2001-02, 2002-03, and 2003-04 administrative reviews of Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from France, which were made on December 12, 2003, February 11, 2005 and February 7, 2006 respectively; (18) the determinations in the 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04 administrative reviews of Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany, which were made on February 10, 2004, December 20, 2004 and December 13, 2005 respectively; (19) the determination in the sunset review of Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany, which was made on August 4, 2005; (20) the determinations in the 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04 administrative reviews of Ball Bearings from France, which were made on July 24, 2003, September 15, 2004 and September 16, 1005 respectively; (21) the determinations in the 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04 administrative reviews of Ball Bearings from Italy as they relate to both FAG Italia SpA and SKF Industrie SpA, which were made on June 16, 2003, September 15, 2004 and September 16, 2005 respectively; and (22) the determinations in the 2002-03 and 2003-04 administrative reviews of Ball Bearings from the United Kingdom, which were made on September 15, 2004 and September 16, 2005 respectively.

63 EC, First Written Submission, paras. 59-60.
49. The panel will recall that the EC made an “as such” claim against Commerce’s methodology for calculating margins of dumping in administrative reviews in its initial panel request. The original panel rejected this claim. The Appellate Body also declined to find that Commerce’s calculation methodology in administrative reviews was inconsistent with U.S. WTO obligations “as such.”

50. The EC, however, would have the United States recalculate the margins of dumping in any subsequent determination which happened to involve the same products that were the subject of the measures challenged in the initial panel request. For example, the EC originally challenged Commerce’s determination in the administrative review of PAM’s sales of Certain Pasta from Italy between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2000. The EC would now have this Panel presume that Commerce’s calculation of the margin of dumping for PAM in its determinations regarding the 2001-02 and 2002-03 administrative reviews are also inconsistent with the covered agreements, without the EC having brought a challenge to either determination. That is, the EC seeks the benefit of an “as such” finding, when neither the original panel nor the Appellate Body made one in this dispute. The panel should reject the EC’s efforts.

B. Sunset Reviews

51. The EC also attempts to challenge certain sunset reviews. The United States recalls that the EC did not challenge any sunset reviews in the original proceeding and, thus, there are no DSB recommendations or rulings relating to sunset reviews. Consequently, the sunset reviews identified in the EC’s 21.5 panel request cannot be within the terms of reference of this panel.

52. The EC relies on US – Zeroing (Japan) for support. However, that dispute only confirms the fundamental flaw in the EC’s posture. In US – Zeroing (Japan), Japan in its panel request in the original proceeding expressly challenged sunset reviews and included a claim that the United States had acted inconsistently with Article 11.3. By contrast, in its panel request in the original proceeding, the EC did not challenge sunset reviews nor set out a claim concerning Article 11.3. (Indeed, the EC appears to have recognized that claims against sunset reviews must be made in the original panel request, because it has expressly done so in its other zeroing dispute against the United States.) The EC cannot cure its failure to pursue a claim in the original proceeding by seeking to include it in a compliance proceeding.

64 US – Zeroing (EC) (Panel), para. 8.1(g).
65 US – Zeroing (EC) (AB), para. 263(c)(ii).
67 WT/DS322/8.
68 WT/DS350/6.
53. In addition, the EC’s Article 21.5 panel request did not identify the sunset reviews as measures within the terms of reference of this proceeding. Rather, the sunset reviews are simply identified as “reviews” related to the measures in question. Therefore, with respect to those reviews, the EC did not “specify the measures at issue” as required by Article 6.2.  

C. Conclusion

54. For the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests the Panel to find that the only measures within the terms of reference of this proceeding are the 15 original investigations and 16 administrative reviews referenced in paragraph 7 of the EC’s Article 21.5 panel request.

V. ARGUMENT

A. Investigations

1. Stainless Steel Bar from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom

55. The EC’s claims regarding the Section 129 determinations on Stainless Steel Bar from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom should be rejected because these claims concern measures that are no longer in effect. Specifically, Commerce revoked the antidumping duty orders covering Stainless Steel Bar from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom and that revocation is effective as of March 7, 2007.

a. The All Others Rate

56. With respect to Stainless Steel Bar from France, Italy and the United Kingdom, the EC contends that the Section 129 determinations resulted in an unjustifiable increase in the all others rates. With the revocation of these antidumping duty orders, the all others rates resulting from the Section 129 determinations have been removed and will have no effect on trade. Moreover, the EC has failed to point to any obligation under the AD Agreement with which the United States has acted inconsistently.

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70 Moreover, four of the Commerce determinations in sunset reviews cited by the EC have been terminated because Commerce has revoked the antidumping duty orders. Specifically, as discussed in Section above, Commerce revoked the antidumping duty orders on Stainless Steel Bar from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, effective March 7, 2007. (Exhibit US-13).

71 EC, First Written Submission, para. 124.
i. The Cash Deposit Requirements Based on the New All Others Rates Have Been Removed

57. The Section 129 determinations, which resulted in a change to the all others rates, became effective on April 23, 2007. Thus, imports made on or after April 23, 2007, from exporters or producers who did not have their own cash deposit rate were subject to the posting of a cash deposit at the new all others rate. However, the revocation of the antidumping duty orders on Stainless Steel Bar from France, Italy and the United Kingdom became effective as of March 7, 2007. Pursuant to this revocation, the United States will refund any cash deposits posted on imports of stainless steel bar from these countries made on or after March 7, 2007 and those imports will not be subject to any final assessment of antidumping duties.

58. Accordingly, the United States requests that this Panel reject the EC’s claims because the measure has been removed.

ii. The EC Has Failed to Show that the United States Acted Inconsistently with the AD Agreement

59. Alternatively, the EC also has failed to demonstrate that the calculation of the all others rates from the Section 129 determinations was inconsistent with the AD Agreement.

60. Consistent with Article 6.10, in the original investigations, Commerce limited its examination to the largest percentage of the volume of the exports from the country in question which could reasonably be investigated. Commerce then calculated an all others rate to apply to imports from those exporters or producers who did not have their own margin of dumping, consistent with Article 9.4. In the Section 129 Determinations, Commerce recalculated the rates for the selected respondents as well as the all others rate. For the three stainless steel bar determinations challenged by the EC, each of the margins of dumping Commerce calculated, however, were either zero or de minimis, or based on facts otherwise available. Article 9.4 does not address this situation. Accordingly, Commerce determined the simple average of the margins of dumping calculated in each of the Section 129 Determinations to establish the all others rate for that determination.

61. The EC’s contention here is not with the reasonableness of the methodology Commerce employed. Rather, the EC’s arguments are merely results-oriented, pointing to the fact that the resulting all others rates were higher than those calculated in the original investigations. Thus, if the panel reached this claim, which it need not, the EC has failed to demonstrate that Commerce acted inconsistently with Articles 6.8, 6.10 or 9.4 of the AD Agreement, and the Panel should find accordingly.
b. Injury

62. The EC contends that the United States acted inconsistently with the AD Agreement and GATT 1994 by maintaining the antidumping duty orders with respect to Stainless Steel Bar from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom without reconsidering the issue of injury after the Section 129 Determinations found that some of the exporters originally investigated were not dumping. The Panel should reject this contention because it concerns measures that are no longer in effect.

63. Pursuant to the sunset reviews discussed above, the United States revoked the antidumping duty orders on Stainless Steel Bar from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom effective March 7, 2007. Thus, contrary to the EC’s contention, the United States no longer maintains antidumping duties on products subject to these orders. Indeed, the revocation is effective more than one month prior to the end of the reasonable period of time. The United States will refund the cash deposits on any imports occurring on or after March 7, 2007. Additionally, these imports will not be subject to any final assessment of antidumping duties in the future.

64. Accordingly, the United States requests that this Panel reject the EC’s claims.

65. As a procedural matter, the United States notes that the EC asserted these claims in the original proceeding, and the original Panel declined to consider them. Should the EC pursue these claims even though the order has been revoked, the United States reserves its right to request a ruling from the Panel that such claims are not within the terms of reference of this proceeding.

2. Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from the Netherlands

66. Turning to the EC’s claims regarding the determination in the investigation of Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from the Netherlands, the United States has complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB by providing offsets for non-dumped sales when it recalculated the margin of dumping in the Section 129 determination. As a result of the Section 129 determination, the antidumping duty order was revoked effective April 23, 2007. Moreover, as a result of a subsequent Commerce determination in a sunset review, the revocation of the antidumping duty order became effective as of November 29, 2006. All cash deposits made on imports occurring on or after November 29, 2006 have been or will be refunded. Additionally,

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72 EC, First Written Submission, para. 144.
73 EC, First Written Submission, para. 144.
74 Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Netherlands; Final Results of the Sunset Review of Antidumping Duty Order and Revocation of the Order, 72 Fed. Reg. 35220, 35221-22 (June 27, 2007). (Exhibit US-14)
imports made on or after November 29, 2006 are not subject to any final assessment of antidumping duties. Thus, the EC’s claims concern a measure that is no longer in effect.

67. In its First Written Submission, the EC raised two arguments concerning the determination in the investigation of Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from the Netherlands. First, the EC argued that the United States has assessed antidumping duties pursuant to determinations made in subsequent administrative reviews, where Commerce continued to deny offsets for non-dumped sales. Second, the EC contends that as a result of a rescission of an administrative review, the United States assessed antidumping duties at the cash deposit rate established in the original investigation.

68. These final assessments, however, are the result of determinations distinct from the determination made in the investigation. With respect to the EC’s first argument, those assessment instructions were issued pursuant to the determination made in the 2004-05 administrative review. With respect to the EC’s second argument, those assessment instructions were issued pursuant to the determination (in that case to terminate) the 2005-06 administrative review.

69. Neither of these two subsequent determinations are within the scope of this Article 21.5 proceeding. The EC’s original panel request identified only Commerce’s determination in the investigation of Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from the Netherlands. Similarly, the original panel’s “as applied” findings only covered Commerce’s determination from the investigation. Thus, the Panel should reject the EC’s claims as beyond the scope of this Article 21.5 dispute.

3. Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Sweden

70. Turning to Commerce’s Section 129 determination concerning the investigation of Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Sweden, Commerce complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB by providing offsets for non-dumped sales in the recalculation of the margin of dumping. As a result of the Section 129 determination, Commerce revoked the antidumping duty order on Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Sweden effective April 23, 2007.

71. The EC contends that the United States has established new cash deposit rates in Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Sweden based on an administrative review that Commerce published after concluding the Section 129 determination. The EC’s statement of facts, however, is in error.

75 EC, First Written Submission, para. 78.
76 EC, First Written Submission, para. 79.
78 EC, First Written Submission, para. 80.
72. Commerce did publish the amended final results of the 2004-05 administrative review of Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Sweden on May 9, 2007.\textsuperscript{79} In those amended final results, Commerce did state that it would notify CBP of the revised cash deposit resulting from the review, that the cash deposit rate would be effective as of the date of publication, and that “the cash deposit requirement shall remain in effect until further notice.”\textsuperscript{80} However, on May 10, 2007, Commerce provided “further notice” by issuing instructions to CBP informing it of the revocation resulting from the Section 129 determination.\textsuperscript{81} These instructions informed CBP that any cash deposits paid on imports of wire rod from Sweden made on or after April 23, 2007, were to be refunded. All imports made on or after April 23, 2007, would not be subject to the final assessment of antidumping duties.

73. As a result of the revocation of the antidumping duty order on stainless steel wire rod from Sweden, Commerce did not issue new cash deposit instructions to CBP based on the determination made in the 2004-05 administrative review. Accordingly, the United States requests that this Panel reject the EC’s claim regarding the Section 129 determination in Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Sweden because Commerce provided offsets for non-dumped sales in the recalculation of the margin of dumping and that measure is no longer in effect.

4. **Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Italy**

74. In this proceeding – a compliance proceeding – the EC argues for the first time that in the original investigation of stainless steel sheet and strip in coils (“SSSS”) from Italy, Commerce made a calculation error. Although the EC could have made these claims in the original dispute, it did not. Therefore, as discussed below, the EC’s claims are beyond the terms of reference of this proceeding.

75. Second, the EC has failed to make a prima facie case with respect to the claims asserted.

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\textsuperscript{79} Amended Final Results of the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Sweden, 72 Fed. Reg. 26337 (May 9, 2007). Commerce determinations are published in the Federal Register sometime after they are issued. The Section 129 determinations, for example, were issued on April 9, 2007, but not published until May 4, 2007. Commerce issued its amended final results in the 2004-05 administrative review of Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Sweden on May 2, 2007, two days before the Section 129 determination was published. The amended final results were not published in the Federal Register, however, until May 9, 2007. (Exhibit EC-16)

\textsuperscript{80} Amended Final Results of the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Stainless Steel Wire Rod from Sweden, 72 Fed. Reg. 26337, 26337 (May 9, 2007). (Exhibit EC-16)

\textsuperscript{81} Instructions to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Revocation of Antidumping Duty Order on Stainless Steel, Wire Rod from Sweden (A-401-806) Pursuant to Final, Results in Section 129 Determination (May 10, 2007) (Exhibit US-15).
76. Finally, Commerce’s decision not to consider the respondent’s argument, when raised for the first time in the section 129 proceeding, is fully consistent with an investigating authority’s right to the orderly conduct of its proceedings.

a. EC’s Claim Is Not Part of the Terms of Reference

77. In the original proceeding, the United States was found to have breached its obligations in respect of, inter alia, the Italy SSSS investigation because of the failure to provide offsets. To comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings, Commerce conducted a section 129 proceeding to recalculate the margin without zeroing. The EC does not dispute that Commerce did, in fact, recalculate the margins without zeroing.\(^{82}\)

78. During the section 129 proceeding, the respondent argued that Commerce had made a clerical error in the original investigation and that Commerce should correct that error as part of the Section 129 proceeding. Thereafter, petitioners also argued that Commerce should correct other alleged errors.\(^{83}\)

79. Commerce considered the arguments from the interested parties. Commerce ultimately concluded that the various claims were not related to the purpose of the section 129 proceeding – to comply with the recommendations and rulings in the underlying WTO dispute, which was limited to zeroing. Commerce therefore rejected the parties’ requests. (To accommodate the parties’ requests, Commerce would have had to reopen the entire original investigation record.)

80. Although the EC could have at least attempted to make a claim concerning the alleged clerical error in the original proceeding (the United States finds no textual basis for such a claim), the EC did not. Therefore, the DSB made no findings with respect to the alleged clerical error. The DSB made findings with respect to Commerce’s use of zeroing only. The United States then took its measure to comply: the recalculation of the margin without zeroing. That measure addressed the DSB’s findings on zeroing. The fact that the United States did not address the alleged clerical error during the Section 129 proceeding does not, however, make the alleged clerical error part of the measure taken to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings. To the contrary, that calculation issue is entirely separate from the zeroing issue that the United States did address in the Section 129 proceeding. Because the alleged clerical error is not part of the measure taken to comply, it is outside the permissible scope of an Article 21.5 proceeding in this dispute; and it is therefore outside the terms of reference of this Article 21.5 panel. See, e.g., EC – Bed Linen (21.5) (AB), para. 86 (no basis to assume that part of a redetermination that merely incorporates elements of the original determination constitutes an inseparable element of a measure taken to comply with the DSB rulings in the original dispute).

\(^{82}\) EC First Written Submission, para. 115.

\(^{83}\) Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the Section 129 Determinations: Certain Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Italy (Italy SSSS), 20 August 2007, pp. 4-5 (Exhibit EC-8)
81. The United States notes that the EC itself recognizes the limitations of a compliance proceeding. The EC states that “it is not arguing that all allegations of errors from the original LTFV determination need to be revisited in a Section 129 proceeding.”\(^{84}\) The EC suggests that there is a separate rule for “blatant, simple arithmetical mistakes.” The EC fails to explain on what basis certain errors should be taken into account, while others should not – and particularly fails to explain where in the Antidumping Agreement, or the DSU, support for such a position can be found.

**b. The EC Failed to Present a Prima Facie Case**

82. The EC makes a series of conclusory assertions that the U.S. failure to address the alleged pre-existing errors is inconsistent with Articles 2, 6.8, 5.8, 11.1, 11.2, 9.3, and Annex II of the AD Agreement.

83. With respect to all these claims, the EC makes unsupported assertions. The EC identifies the provision in question, repeats language from the provision, and states that the error breaches that provision.\(^{85}\) That is not enough to constitute a *prima facie* case. As the Appellate Body has noted, “a *prima facie* case must be based on ‘evidence and legal argument’ put forward by the complaining party in relation to each of the elements of the claim.”\(^{86}\) The EC has presented unsupported assertions rather than argument and thus has failed to make a *prima facie* case with respect to any of these claims.

84. In addition, the EC’s claims in connection with Articles 5.8, 11.1, and 11.2 are premised on the same flawed assumption. According to the EC, had Commerce reopened the record and taken into account the error alleged, the dumping margin would have been negative and the order would have been revoked.\(^{87}\) However, the EC ignores that petitioners too asserted errors. The United States does not understand the EC to suggest that one interested party’s claims of error be heard but that another’s be disregarded. The EC has not demonstrated that if *all* claims of error were taken into account, the margin would have been negative or less than *de minimis*. Indeed, depending upon which alleged errors were confirmed as erroneous, not only might the margin not have been *de minimis*, it is even possible that the margin might have been higher than the 2.11% margin that resulted from the section 129 determination.

85. The EC also relies on the *US – German Steel (Panel)* report for the proposition that an investigating authority may not remain “passive.” The relevance of the EC’s discussion of that dispute is unclear. The question here is not, as in that dispute, whether an investigating authority

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\(^{84}\) EC First Written Submission, para. 116.

\(^{85}\) EC First Written Submission, paras. 117-122.

\(^{86}\) *US – Gambling (AB)*, para. 140, quoting *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses (AB)*, at 335.

\(^{87}\) EC First Written Submission, paras. 115, 120, and 121.
is required to consider relevant factual evidence already on the record, but whether a compliance proceeding is the appropriate venue to advance a claim that could have been brought in connection with the original proceeding. The Appellate Body has made clear that it is not.

86. For these reasons, the United States respectfully requests that this Panel reject the EC’s claims.

c. Proceedings Must Have Finality

87. As Commerce explained in its determination, it rejected all claims – by all interested parties – of errors arising in connection with the original investigation. “The Department determines that considering any alleged clerical or computational errors is outside the scope of this 129 proceeding.”

Commerce went on to state that all aspects other than those involving offsets “became final and conclusive and have not been revised or reopened pursuant to domestic litigation or WTO dispute settlement proceedings.” Commerce explained still further that to allow correction of errors two years after the final determination in this case “would effectively be allowing time for such allegations far exceeding the time granted to other parties in these and other proceedings.” Commerce also noted that all of the alleged errors, by all interested parties, “did not relate to the revision of the margin calculation program to implement the panel’s findings.”

88. The need for finality of proceedings and for equitable treatment of all parties thus formed the basis for Commerce’s decision not to correct any of the alleged errors in this case. The Appellate Body has recognized the need for investigating authorities to establish procedures “in the interest of orderly administration” of the proceedings, including setting and enforcing deadlines. As the Appellate Body noted in *US – Hot Rolled Steel (AB)*:

> investigating authorities must be able to control the conduct of their investigation and to carry out the multiple steps in an investigation required to reach a final determination. Indeed, in the absence of time-limits, authorities would effectively cede control of investigations to the interested parties, and could find themselves unable to complete their investigations within the time-limits mandated under the *Anti-dumping Agreement*. We therefore agree with the Panel that “in the

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88 [I&D, p. 8]
89 [I&D, p. 8]
90 [I&D, p. 9], quoting Korea Stainless Steel, 66 FR 45279, 45282.
91 [I&D, p. 9]
interest of orderly administration investigating authorities do, and indeed must establish such deadlines.”

In US – OCTG Sunset Reviews (AB), the Appellate Body reiterated the need for authorities to establish deadlines and “control[] the conduct of their investigations.” The Appellate Body also noted that allowing some parties to disregard deadlines would “affect the rights of other interested parties.”

89. In this regard, the United States notes that Commerce applied this same approach in rejecting other of petitioners’ requests in the other section 129 proceedings related to this dispute. Petitioners requested that Commerce use the targeted dumping methodology for purposes of recalculating the margins. One petitioner noted that “the European Union has employed a targeted dumping analysis without offsetting dumped sales with non-dumped sales.” In declining to use the targeted dumping methodology, Commerce noted that “there was ample time during the original investigations . . . to make targeted dumping allegations.” Yet Commerce rejected petitioners’ request to use targeted dumping on the grounds that such a request had not been made in the original investigation and was not otherwise related to the implementation of the DSB recommendations and rulings.

90. Therefore, Commerce has consistently, and even-handedly, confined its section 129 proceedings to complying with the DSB recommendations and rulings. The EC has failed to prove that Commerce breached its WTO obligations in so doing.

B. Administrative Reviews

91. In the underlying dispute, the EC obtained DSB recommendations and rulings with respect to Commerce determinations in sixteen administrative reviews. For the reasons set forth in this section, the United States has taken measures to comply with respect to each of those determinations, and as a result of those measures, the United States has complied with those recommendations and rulings.

92. In some instances, the United States has revoked the antidumping duty order giving rise to the determinations challenged by the EC. Under U.S. law, the United States no longer has the authority to collect cash deposits, or assess antidumping duties, on products subject to a revoked antidumping order which are imported on or after the date of revocation. This is the situation

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92 US – Hot-Rolled Steel (AB), para. 73.
93 US – OCTG from Argentina (AB), para. 241.
94 US – OCTG from Argentina (AB), para. 241.
95 Final Results for the Section 129 Determinations, April 9, 2007, at 11 (Exhibit EC-7).
96 Final Results for the Section 129 Determinations, April 9, 2007, at 14 (Exhibit EC-7).
97 Final Results for the Section 129 Determinations, April 9, 2007, at 14 (Exhibit EC-7).
with respect to the four of the sixteen determinations challenged by the EC. With respect to the remaining reviews that the EC challenged, the cash deposit rate established in the challenged determination (the only aspect of the administrative review that could – absent the U.S. compliance – have continued beyond the expiration of the RPT), is no longer in effect. To the extent that a cash deposit rate is currently in effect with respect to these same products from the same Member States of the EC, that is the result of a separate determination of dumping made in a separate administrative review examining distinct facts during a subsequent period of time.

93. Turning first to the antidumping duty orders revoked by the United States, these orders form the basis under U.S. law for the authority to impose antidumping duties. That is, without an antidumping duty order in place, the United States cannot collect cash deposits and assess antidumping duties on imports made on or after the date of revocation.

94. In its annex to its panel request, the EC acknowledges that the following antidumping orders have been revoked in whole or with respect to certain companies identified in the EC’s original panel request:

(1) Industrial Nitrocellulose from France (revocation effective August 1, 2003)
(2) Industrial Nitrocellulose from the United Kingdom (revocation effective July 1, 2003)
(3) Certain Pasta from Italy (revoked for Ferrara effective February 9, 2005, and for Pallante on November 29, 2005); and
(4) Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from France (revocation effective July 27, 2004).

95. By way of example, with regard to Industrial Nitrocellulose from France, the United States revoked the antidumping duty order effective August 1, 2003. This means that the United States ceased collecting cash deposits on imports occurring on or after that date, and such imports incur no antidumping duty liability. Therefore, as of the date of the EC’s panel request in this Article 21.5 proceeding (and, in fact, as of the expiry of the reasonable period of time established in this dispute), no imports are affected by that antidumping duty order, and the measure challenged by the EC in the underlying proceeding has been terminated. The same is

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true with respect to the other antidumping duty orders that the United States has revoked. The elimination of these orders has thus brought the United States into compliance with the recommendations and rulings related to those orders.

96. Turning to Commerce’s determinations in the remaining administrative reviews challenged by the EC in its initial panel request, the United States has implemented the recommendations and rulings because each of those reviews has been superceded by Commerce determinations in subsequent administrative reviews. The chart attached as Exhibit US-17 specifies the subsequent Commerce determinations that have superceded each of the administrative reviews subject to the DSB’s recommendations and rulings. The determinations in these subsequent reviews cover the same merchandise and the same exporters or producers identified by the EC.\footnote{The cash deposit rate established by the administrative review of ball bearings from the United Kingdom covering sales from May 1, 2000 through April 30, 2001, as it applies to NSK Bearings Europe, however, still remains in place.} As noted above, however, the subsequent reviews examined a wholly different set of sales transactions occurring during a different period of time. In these subsequent determinations, Commerce calculated new margins of dumping, and put in place new cash deposits for the companies examined. As a result, the cash deposit rates that had been established in the determinations that the EC originally challenged have been superceded, because cash deposit rates from a determination in one administrative remain in effect only until a determination in a subsequent administrative review establishes a new cash deposit rate – once Commerce issues a determination in a subsequent administrative review involving the same merchandise and the same exporter or producer, the former cash deposit rate is terminated.

97. Consequently, as of the date of the EC’s panel request in this Article 21.5 proceeding (and in fact, as of the expiry of the reasonable period of time established in this dispute), no further entries are subject to antidumping rates established in the administrative reviews that the EC challenged in the underlying proceeding. Accordingly, because the challenged determinations, and in particular their cash deposit rates, have been superceded, the United States has brought the challenged measures into compliance with the DSB’s recommendations and rulings.

98. In this connection, the United States notes that it is puzzled by the occasional references in the EC’s first submission to “definitive assessment of duties” and “collect[ion] of duties pursuant to liquidation instructions” after April 9, 2007 (the end of the reasonable period of time established in this dispute).\footnote{E.g., EC First Written Submission, paras. 6, 45, 66, 91, 107(ii) and 158.} While the point of these references is not at all clear, the United States assumes that the EC remains faithful to its long-held and oft-repeated position that, for purposes of assessing compliance with the rulings and recommendations of the DSB relating to duties, one examines the treatment accorded to goods entered on or after the expiration of the
reasonable period of time. As the EC explained to the panel that considered the Section 129 dispute:

The EC is concerned that Canada’s claim implies a legal obligation of WTO Members not to act inconsistently with the DSB ruling with respect to all decisions taken after the expiry of the reasonable period of time even if these concern goods that entered before the expiry of the reasonable period of time or even before the adoption of the DSB ruling. Yet, for all the reasons set out earlier in its Oral Statement, the EC considers that no such obligation has been incurred by WTO Members under the DSU. Such broad reasoning could not be limited to administrative decisions, but would also entail judgements of courts.  

The EC has taken the same position elsewhere. For example, in the preamble to its regulation entitled On the Measures that May be Taken by the Community Following a Report Adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Concerning Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Matters, the EC said:

Recourse to the DSU is not subject to time limits. The recommendations in the reports adopted by the DSB only have prospective effect. Consequently, it is appropriate to specify that any measures taken under this Regulation will take effect from the date of their entry into force, unless otherwise specified, and, therefore, do not provide any basis for the reimbursement of the duties collected prior to that date . . . .

The EC took a similar view when it implemented the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the dispute EC – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts.  

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102 United States – Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (DS221), Replies to Questions by the Panel from the European Communities (March 4, 2002).

103 Council Regulation (EC) 1515/2001 of 23 July 2001, On the Measures that May be Taken by the Community Following a Report Adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Concerning Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 201) 10 (emphasis added). Article 3 of Regulation 1515/2001 provides that “[a]ny measure adopted pursuant to this Regulation shall take effect from the date of their [sic] entry into force and shall not serve as basis for the reimbursement of the duties collected prior to that date, unless otherwise provided for.” (Exhibit US-19).

104 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 949/2006 (to which the EC referred in a status report announcing compliance in that dispute, WT/DS269/15/Add.1) provides, in paragraph (9) of the preamble, that “this regulation should enter into force ... at the end of the reasonable period of granted by the WTO... Recourse to the DSU is not subject to time limits. The recommendations in reports adopted by the DSB only have prospective effect. Consequently, this regulation cannot have retroactive effects nor provide interpretative guidance on a retroactive basis. Since it cannot operate to provide interpretative guidance for classification of goods which have been released for free circulation prior to [the end of the RPT] it cannot serve as a basis for the reimbursement of any duties paid prior to that date. (Exhibit US-20)
101. Indeed, this EC position follows logically from the fact that the WTO dispute settlement provides prospective relief, not retrospective relief. As the United States has noted on other occasions, the language of the DSU demonstrates that when a Member’s measure has been found to be inconsistent with a WTO Agreement, the Member’s obligation extends only to providing prospective relief. For example, Article 19.1 of the DSU provides, “Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement” (footnotes omitted). The ordinary meaning of the term “bring” is to “[p]roduce as a consequence,” or “cause to become.” These definitions give an indication of future action. Furthermore, under DSU Article 3.7, “the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.” The withdrawal of the inconsistent measure is meant to provide a prospective solution to the nullification or impairment of the benefits accruing under the covered agreements, and not to provide compensation for any past harm.

102. Furthermore, in a WTO dispute challenging an antidumping or countervailing duty measure, the measure in question is a border measure. Accordingly, eliminating a WTO-inconsistent antidumping or countervailing duty measure prospectively at the border will constitute “withdrawal” of the measure within the meaning of DSU Article 3.7. And in this case, by superseding the administrative reviews at issue in the underlying proceeding, the United States has withdrawn the challenged measures.

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106 Other provisions of the DSU further support this analysis. For instance, nothing in Article 21.3 suggests that Members are obliged during the course of the reasonable period of time to suspend application of the offending measure, much less to provide relief for past effects; rather, in the case of antidumping and countervailing duty measures, entries that take place during the reasonable period of time will continue to be liable for the payment of duties. Moreover, Articles 22.1 and 22.2 of the DSU confirm not only that a Member may maintain the WTO-inconsistent measure until the end of the reasonable period of time for implementation, but also that neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations are available to the complaining Member until the conclusion of that reasonable period of time.

107 Antidumping and countervailing measures are border measures. That is, they are applied to counteract the dumping or subsidization of the goods at the national border. See GATT 1994, Arts. VI:2 and VI:3; SCM Agreement, Art. 10, note 36. Thus, when a good is being sold at less than normal value and causes injury to domestic producers, the importing country may apply an antidumping duty at the time and place of entry. Similarly, when an exporting country grants a countervailable subsidy that causes injury to domestic producers, the importing country may apply a countervailing duty at the time and place of entry. Thus, liability for antidumping and countervailing duties attaches at the time of entry.
C. Alleged Breach of Article 21.3

103. The EC claims that the United States breached Article 21.3 and Article 21.3(a) by implementing its measures taken to comply on April 23, 2007, two weeks after the conclusion of the reasonable period of time.108

104. The EC fails to explain how U.S. implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB constituted a breach of Article 21.3 or Article 21.3(a). Article 21.3 does not impose an obligation on the Member concerned, but rather provides that Member with the right to a reasonable period of time should immediate compliance be impracticable. Article 21.3(b) simply identifies the reasonable period of time.

105. Contrary to the EC’s assertion, the report in Australia – Salmon does not support the EC’s position. That panel simply concluded that the measures taken to comply did not exist at the end of the reasonable period of time.109 The panel made no finding that Australia had breached Article 21.3, or any of its subparagraphs, as a result.

106. By contrast, the United States does find support for the futility of such a finding in the report in US – Upland Cotton (21.5). There, the panel explained that a finding of a breach of Article 21.3 would “be of little relevance to the effective resolution of disputes.”110 The panel went on to explain that

Where a panel makes a finding under Article 21.5 of the DSU that a Member has not complied with the DSB recommendations and rulings in the original dispute, the consequence of that finding is that the Member remains subject to obligations that flow from the recommendation issued in the original proceeding and is thus required to take steps to bring itself into compliance with that recommendation. A finding by the panel that the Member also failed to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings in the original proceeding at an earlier point in time would have no additional operative value in terms of the nature of the obligations of the Member in question. On the other hand, if a panel under Article 21.5 finds that the Member has brought itself into compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings as of the time of the establishment of the panel, such a finding logically would supersede and render irrelevant any finding that the Member was not in compliance with those recommendations and rulings at an earlier point in time. Thus, in both cases a finding of a violation at the end of the reasonable period of time would be of a declaratory nature and without practical implications as to the obligations of the Member in question, unless one interprets...
the DSU to mean that a proceeding under Article 21.5 can create obligations for a Member to take steps that must be effective as of the end of the reasonable period of time. We see no textual support for such a retroactive interpretation of the DSU.\textsuperscript{111}

107. The EC states that having the Panel make a finding regarding the effective date of U.S. implementation “could have implications for interested parties in the US municipal law jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{112} The EC goes on to state that “since there are entries which have not yet been liquidated by the United States, such a finding may lead the relevant authorities to stop proceedings for collection of duties.”\textsuperscript{113} The EC has made assertions about the operation of U.S. municipal law. As such, the EC would be obligated to substantiate its assertions with evidence in support thereof. The EC has failed to do so; further, the EC itself appears to realize that it would be inappropriate to engage in such an inquiry in this context.\textsuperscript{114} The United States agrees.

D. The EC’s Request for a Suggestion

108. This Panel should decline to make the suggestion requested by the EC.\textsuperscript{115} A Member retains the right to determine the manner of implementing DSB recommendations and rulings. The question in this proceeding is the existence or consistency of the measure taken to comply,\textsuperscript{116} not what future actions the United States should take to ensure compliance.

VI. CONCLUSION

109. For the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that this Panel find that the United States has met its obligations to bring the measures found to be inconsistent with the AD Agreement and GATT 1994 into conformity. The United States has therefore complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.

\textsuperscript{111} US – Cotton Subsidies (Article 21.5), para. 9.67 (citation omitted).
\textsuperscript{112} EC First Written Submission, para. 105.
\textsuperscript{113} EC First Written Submission, para. 105.
\textsuperscript{114} EC First Written Submission, para. 106.
\textsuperscript{115} See EC, First Written Submission, para. 157.
\textsuperscript{116} DSU, Article 21.5.
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US-17 Chart of Commerce Determinations

US-18 United States – Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (DS221), Replies to Questions by the Panel from the European Communities (March 4, 2002)

